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Thesis Summary
This thesis investigates whether children’s understanding of both mental and 
non-mental representations can be accounted for by the same underlying competence 
in representational understanding. This research question stems from a long-standing 
dispute between domain-specificity and domain-generality in understanding mental 
representations. In Chapter 1 ,1 highlight the importance of using false representations 
to assess representational understanding, and discuss a fundamental problem inherent 
in previously devised false non-mental representation tasks in comparison to false 
mental representation tasks. I also outline the confounding of other cognitive skills 
such as language and executive function during the assessment of representational 
understanding. This motivates the subsequent empirical work for this thesis which 
includes (1) the development of novel measures for assessing children’s 
understanding of non-mental representations; and (2) the investigation of the 
equivalence between children’s understanding of mental and non-mental 
representations. Evidence for this equivalence was shown by a transfer of training 
between a new false non-mental representation task and an existing false mental 
representation task presented in Chapter 2. With the use of another novel false non­
mental representation task which minimises and eliminates the confounding factors of 
language and cognitive inhibition, the two experiments in Chapter 3 further indicated 
that the equivalence between false non-mental and false mental representation tasks 
could not be explained by these confounding factors. Chapter 4 extended the research 
from typical to atypical development, namely Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) as 
individuals with ASD are known to be specifically impaired in processing social and 
mental information. Intriguingly, the findings in Chapter 3 were shown to be 
generalised to children with ASD. Finally, the consistent findings of the five 
experiments reported in this thesis are discussed in relation to the theoretical accounts 
and neurological basis of typical and atypical cognitive development.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
“ ‘Hallo!’ said Piglet, ‘what are you doing?
‘Trackingsomething, ’said Winnie-the-Pooh mysteriously. ... ‘Now, look there. ’He 
pointed to the ground in front o f him. ‘What do you see there? ’
‘Tracks, ’ said Piglet. ‘Paw-marks. ’ He gave a little squeak o f excitement. ‘Oh, Pooh!
Do you think it’s a - a - a  Woozle? ’
‘It may be, ’ said Pooh. ‘Sometimes it is, and sometimes it isn ’t. You never can tell
with paw-marks. ’
With these few  words he went on tracking, and Piglet, after watching him for a minute 
or two, ran after him. Winnie-the-Pooh had come to a sudden stop, and was bending 
over the tracks in a puzzled sort o f way. ... ‘but there seem to be two animals now. 
This -  whatever-it-is -  has been joined by another- whatever-it-is -  and the two o f  
them are now proceeding in company 
... Christopher Robin came slowly down his tree. ‘Silly old Bear, ’ he said, ‘what were 
you doing? First you went round the spinney twice by yourself, and then Piglet ran 
after you and you went round again, together, and then you were just going round a
fourth time - ’”
— Milne (1926) 
“Winnie-the-Pooh”
Winnie-the-Pooh, who was also known as the Bear of Very Little Brain, made a 
silly mistake of tracking his own paw-marks. But why did he do that? It was because 
he thought his own paw-marks were someone else’s. In other words, he had a false 
belief about the paw-marks on the ground. Not only the Bear of Very Little Brain, 
also human beings, who are supposed to be the most intelligent creatures in the world, 
tend to make similar mistakes due to false beliefs.
Belief, whether true or false, is a type of mental representation that represents 
and sustains information. However, paw-marks also form a representation, which is 
non-mental. They are a sign or indicator of an animal and the direction in which it is 
travelling. Both mental and non-mental representations present themselves 
extensively in everyday life and understanding them has a vital importance. For 
example, paw-marks represent a track of some kind of animal, but they can also be a 
sign representing that danger is around if they are created by a fierce beast. What you
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believe the paw-marks to represent determines your reaction of tracking or running 
away. Based on how you react, I can understand what you think the paw-marks 
represent. It is also critical to realise that representation has a crucial characteristic in 
that it can be false. For example, Winnie-the-Pooh falsely believed his own paw- 
marks as someone else’s; paw-marks might also falsely represent a track of someone 
who wears a giant animal feet costume as the track of a fierce beast. Misleading 
beliefs, appearances, and signs may lead to inefficient, redundant, or even hazardous 
behaviours. However, weakness can be turned into strength. By understanding false 
representations and being aware of them, negative behaviours can be avoided. 
Therefore, both interpreting what a representation represents (e.g., Winnie-the-Pooh’s 
belief represented an animal which created the paw-marks) and understanding that it 
may not be what it is represented as (e.g., that animal was falsely represented as 
Whatever-it-is) can have adaptive significance and is essential to children’s cognitive 
and social development.
However, whether children’s understanding of mental representations can 
possibly be explained by their understanding of representation in general has 
continuously been debated. Using non-mental representations, such as pictures or 
photographs, questions have been raised about whether mental representations such as 
false beliefs are understood in the same way as non-mental representations (Zaitchik, 
1990), and whether training on either type of representation will enhance 
understanding of the other type of representation (Slaughter, 1998). Inconsistent 
findings and controversial comments about the non-mental representation tasks used 
in the studies have led the dispute to remain unsolved. To make the dispute even more 
complicated, research shows that understanding false representations often requires 
other cognitive skills such as language and executive function.
This thesis attempts to address this dispute of whether mental and non-mental 
representations are understood on the basis of a single concept of representation. In 
this review chapter, I first define what “representation” is and the essential elements it 
constitutes. I then describe some research on the prerequisites for understanding 
representations, attempting to make clear what researchers mean by representational 
understanding. Then, I review traditional and recent research on representational 
understanding and clarify the distinction between true and false representations. I 
highlight the importance of using false representations to assess representational 
understanding and discuss the significance of addressing whether mental and non­
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mental representations are underpinned by the same competence of representational 
understanding. Following this discussion, an overview is given of subsequent 
empirical chapters, describing the work for these empirical chapters, including the 
development of new tasks for assessing children’s understanding of non-mental 
representations and investigation of the equivalence between children’s understanding 
of mental and non-mental representations in various aspects. The aim of Chapter 2 is 
to investigate the question of whether training on understanding non-mental 
representations will improve children’s understanding of mental representations and 
vice versa. Chapter 3 examines whether other cognitive processes such as language 
and executive function can explain the equivalence between the understanding of 
mental and non-mental representations. Chapter 4 extends the research from typical 
development to atypical development. Results of the empirical work presented in 
Chapter 2 and 3 jointly suggest that both mental and non-mental representations are 
underpinned by the same competence o f representational understanding and that this 
competence is independent of language and an aspect o f executive function. 
Importantly, this finding can be generalised to a group o f atypically developing 
children who have always been known to be specifically impaired in processing social 
and mental information. This result can be found in Chapter 4.
What is “Representation”?
Reviewing the literature in psychology, the term “representation” has been given 
different meanings. Piaget (1951) used “representation” to mean (1) something that 
stands for something else; and (2) general intelligence. More recently, Pemer (1991) 
defined “representation” in more specific terms: representational medium which is an 
entity that represents (e.g., Winnie-the-Pooh’s belief), or representational process 
which is an activity of representing (e.g., Winnie-the-Pooh was entertaining a 
representation of an animal which created the paw-marks). Another researcher, Denis 
(1994), also proposed a distinction between representation as product and 
representation as process. To avoid confusion, in this thesis the term “representation” 
is specified to refer to representational medium in Pemer’s sense.
A representational medium can be a mental entity (e.g., belief), but it can also be 
a physical object (e.g., paw-marks). It stands for, or represents, something else (e.g., 
Winnie-the-Pooh’s belief represented an animal which created the paw-marks; paw- 
marks represent a track of an animal). Hence, representations could be considered
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according to two types: mental or non-mental. Some obvious examples of non-mental 
representations are pictures, signs, symbols, numerals, words, and sentences. Mental 
representations can be conceptualised as structures in the mind that represent and 
sustain information. Examples of mental representations include memory, knowledge, 
thoughts, and beliefs. As there are many kinds of things that can be representations, 
pictures, signs, and beliefs are the main focus o f this thesis due to a heated debate 
about humans’ understanding of these representations in the current literature (e.g., 
Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004; Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino, 
Bickerton, & Humphreys, 2007; Cohen & German, 2010; Leekam, Pemer, Healey, & 
Sewell, 2008).
Having specified “representation” as a representational medium (mental or non­
mental) which represents something else, it is also important to clarify the nature of 
this “something else”. Goodman (1976) termed this “something else” as “referent”. 
The referent of a representation can be almost anything, which varies from physical 
objects to non-exsisting entities. A picture or a thought can represent physical objects 
(e.g., sunflowers), non-physical objects (e.g., anxiety), and non-existing entities (e.g., 
dragons). However, Goodman furthered that a representation does not only represent 
a referent but also represents it as being a certain way (sense). For example, Winnie- 
the-Pooh’s belief represented the animal that created the paw-marks (referent) as a 
Whatever-it-is (sense), whereas Piglet’s belief represented it as a Woozle. Both 
Winnie-the-Pooh and Piglet’s beliefs refer to the same animal (referent) but they 
differ in their senses.
Therefore, representations are entities which represent something (referent) as 
being a particular way (sense). The ability to understand or mentally represent that a 
representation is representing its referent as being a certain way is termed as 
metarepresentation (Pylyshyn, 1978). Without this ability, a representation is not 
understood as an entity which has a referent as well as a sense; rather, it is confused 
with its referent and its referent is not differentiated from its sense. Throughout this 
thesis, the terms “metarepresentation”, “representational understanding” and 
“understanding of representations” are used synonymously.
Prerequisites for Metarepresentation
As early as 3 months of age, infants are able to perceive the similarity between a 
representation and its referent. For example, 3-month-olds recognised their mother’s
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face in photographs (Barrera & Maurer, 1981) and 5-month-olds, after being 
habituated to a person’s real face, showed dishabituation to a photograph of a novel 
face rather than a photograph of the familiar face (Dirks & Gibson, 1977). Later 
research further demonstrated that older infants do not only recognise the similarity 
between a representation and its referent, but also confuse the two. When presented 
with photographs of objects, 9-month-olds manually explore (e.g., feel, rub) the 
photographs and grasp at them as if attempting to pick up the depicted objects 
(DeLoache, Pierroutsakos, Uttal, Rosengren, & Gottlieb, 1998; Pierroutsakos & 
DeLoache, 2003). Infants act on photographs of objects as if the depicted objects were 
real, but this is not because they cannot discriminate between depicted and real 
objects. If they are presented with real objects and photographs of the objects, they 
prefer the former over the latter. However, their manual exploration of photographs 
greatly decreases from 9 to 15 months of age. By 18 months of age, manual 
exploration is replaced by pointing and talking (DeLoache et al., 1998; Pierroutsakos 
& Troseth, 2003), suggesting that infants gradually appreciate how representation 
differs from its referent with age and through experience.
It is also around the same age period that infants have been shown to be able to 
interpret representations. Evidence comes from studies which observed the reactions 
of infants, aged 9 to 24 months, with a red spot painted on their noses when they were 
in front of a mirror. If infants recognise their mirror images as themselves, they will 
show more self-directed behaviours, e.g., touch their noses. This nose-directed 
behaviour is first seen at 15 to 18 months of age and has been found to gradually 
increase with age; whereas sociable “playmate” or mirror-directed behaviours, e.g., 
smiling at and touching the “playmate” in the mirror, dominate in younger ages 
(Amsterdam, 1972; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). Infants younger than 15 months 
act as if their mirror images were real persons. The finding of 18 months as the mean 
age of emergence for mirror self-recognition was replicated in a more recent study 
(Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2004).
More recent studies also indicate that 15- to 18-month-old infants are able to 
interpret words and pictures (Ganea, Bloom-Pickard, & DeLoache, 2008; Ganea, 
Preissler, Butler, Carey, & DeLoache, 2009; Preissler & Carey, 2004). The general 
methodology of these studies is to teach children a novel word (e.g., ‘whisk’) for a 
picture of a novel object (e.g., a whisk) and test whether they transfer the word from 
the picture to the object depicted (e.g., identifying the real whisk out of two real
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objects; indicating the real whisk, either alone or together with its picture, when being 
asked for a whisk). Results suggest that even 15-month-olds interpreted the word as 
corresponding to a certain object, not just to the picture which has been paired with 
the word. However, when being shown a real whisk that differed in colour from the 
one depicted in the picture, children as old as 24 months failed to extend the word 
“whisk” from the depicted whisk to the real whisk of a different colour (Ganea et al., 
2009). This finding suggests that 24-month-olds interpreted the word and the picture 
as corresponding to a real whisk of the same colour, but not to a real whisk of a 
different colour because it did not correspond to the one depicted in the picture. Thus, 
the word and the picture were not yet understood as representations which represent a 
real whisk of any kind.
The ability to interpret representations as corresponding to something also 
allows children above 25 months old to match an outcome of a real or even pretend 
action to the correct picture that depicts this outcome (Harris, Kavanaugh & Dowson, 
1997). Given that in this task the outcome of a pretend action was not visible when 
children made their choice of pictures, perceptual similarity between the outcome and 
the picture is not a necessary element for determining the correspondence between 
them This explains why 24-month-olds were able to transfer the word “whisk” from a 
line drawing of a whisk to a real whisk in Preissler and Carey (2004) although the 
perceptual similarity between the line drawing and the real whisk was less than that 
between the highly realistic picture of a whisk and the real whisk o f a different colour 
in Ganea et al. (2009). Thus, the lack of word transference from the picture of a whisk 
to the real whisk of a different colour in Ganea et al. (2009) is not simply due to the 
perceptual dissimilarity between them Rather, it is children’s interpretation of the 
picture/drawing determines the correspondence between the picture/drawing and the 
real whisk.
DeLoache and Bums (1994, Experiment 1 & 6) also reported that 24-month- 
olds could use a picture or a line drawing of a room to guide their placement of an 
object in the room, illustrating their ability of corresponding the picture/drawing and 
the room However, they were not able to use the picture/drawing to guide their 
search of the object in the room (Experiment 1 - 5). These findings suggest that 24- 
month-olds can understand the correspondence between the picture/drawing and the 
room, but they may not be able to take advantage of this correspondence to infer the 
real location of the object so they failed the searching task. However, when they come
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to the age of 30 months, they can correctly infer the real location of the object from 
the picture/drawing. Salsa and de Mendoza (2007) further demonstrated that children 
aged 30 months succeeded in the searching task only when they were first asked to 
place the object in the corresponding real location as the depicted location the 
experimenter has pointed to. In other words, they were asked to use the picture to 
guide their mission towards the room. In a follow up experiment, the authors showed 
that children aged 36 months succeeded without any instructions about 
correspondence and functionality.
With the understanding of correspondence and the spontaneous ability of 
inference, children aged 36 months also understand what other people can and cannot 
see (i.e., level 1 visual perspective-taking). For example, Flavell, Everett, Croft, and 
Flavell (1981) showed children a drawing of a turtle which was bisected vertically by 
a piece of cardboard so that the turtle’s back, but not its feet, was visible from one 
side, and its feet, but not its back, from the other side. Children were asked whether 
the experimenter, who sat opposite to them, saw the turtle’s back or feet. Perfect 
performance was shown by children aged 3 years, suggesting that they understood the 
correspondence between other people’s visual perceptions and the situation in front of 
their eyes, and correctly inferred what they saw. Research also shows that 3-year-olds 
consider mental representations, such as perceptions and beliefs, transparent in that 
they reflect or correspond to reality (e.g., Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983).
So far, none of the above studies showed a full understanding of representations 
in children aged 36 months and below because these children were not shown to 
understand a representation as an entity which (1) requires interpretation; (2) 
represents something (referent) as being a certain way (sense); and (3) may become 
false when its referent is distinct from its sense. Children by the age of 36 months 
interpret representations spontaneously but they do not realise that a representation is 
an object in itself and needs to be interpreted (e.g., the word “whisk” and the picture 
of a whisk need to be interpreted as representing a real whisk). They only 
spontaneously interpret representations as corresponding to something (e.g., the 
picture of a red whisk corresponds to a real red whisk). This understanding of 
correspondence does not differentiate what the representation is representing 
(referent) from how this referent is represented as being (sense). That is, the picture of 
a red whisk is interpreted as corresponding to a real red whisk, but is not treated as a 
representation which represents a real whisk (referent) as being red (sense). Hence,
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understanding correspondence does not require an understanding of representations. 
Further, an understanding of correspondence and an ability for inference allows 
children to use representations to solve a problem (e.g. taking advantage of the 
correspondence between a picture and a room to infer an object’s location in the 
room), but not understand representations (e.g., the picture) as representing something 
(e.g., the room).
Metarepresentation I: Understanding of Representations
The understanding of representations develops after the age of 3 years. Children 
become aware that representations need to be interpreted and can be given different 
interpretations (e.g., paw-marks can be interpreted as the track of a Woozle or a 
Whatever-it-is). Masangkay et al. (1974), for example, investigated “level 2” visual 
perspective-taking and found that children understand that another person who views 
a picture from a different viewpoint will give the picture a different interpretation by 
the age of 4 years. In this study, children were shown a picture of a turtle and were 
required to distinguish whether the turtle was standing upright or lying on its back 
from their viewpoint or another person’s viewpoint. A few 3-years-olds but many 4- 
year-olds understood that the other person who sat opposite to them would see the 
turtle as it was lying on its back when they themselves saw it as it was standing 
upright. In other words, they understood that the picture represented a turtle and it 
could be interpreted as the turtle standing or lying, depending on which viewpoint it 
was being viewed from.
Children from the age of 4 years also come to understand that an ambiguous 
figure has two different interpretations, e.g., can be interpreted as both a duck
and a rabbit (Doherty & Wimmer, 2005; Gopnik & Rosati, 2001; Rock, Gopnik, & 
Hall, 1994). Even though switching from one interpretation to the other, an ability 
termed as reversal, was found to be difficult until the age of 5 years, some 4-year-olds 
did report reversal and most 4-year-olds acknowledged both interpretations after 
being informed about the ambiguity of the figures. On the contrary, most informed 3- 
year-olds could neither reverse nor acknowledge the two different interpretations of 
each ambiguous figure.
In addition to the awareness of different possible interpretations of a single 
representation, metarepresentation involves the understanding that a representation is 
an entity which represents something (referent) as being a certain way (sense). If there
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is a reliable mechanism that ensures the correspondence between a representation and 
its referent, this representation is a true representation which faithfully represents its 
referent as the way the referent really is (sense). For example, photography, under 
normal circumstances, is a kind of reliable mechanism which produces a photograph 
that truly represents a scene at the time the photograph was taken. If Bert takes a 
photograph of Duckie while it is on a bed using a Polaroid camera, the scene of 
Duckie on the bed (referent) will be represented by the photograph as the way that 
scene exactly is (sense). Thus, a photograph is usually a true representation which has 
a sense and a referent that correspond with each other. If Duckie is then removed from 
the bed to a bathtub, the photograph will still truly represent the scene of Duckie on 
the bed as the way it was. This understanding of photograph was tested on children 
aged 3 to 5 years in Zaitchik (1990). Without being shown the photograph of Duckie, 
children were asked, “In the picture, where is Duckie?” Most 3-year-olds answered 
“bathtub” (incorrect answer) whereas 4- to 5-year-olds replied “bed” (correct answer). 
Zaitchik pointed out that this finding was not due to children’s lack of knowledge of 
photography, and could neither be explained by their failure to infer the content of the 
photograph nor memory o f Duckie’s location at the time when the photograph was 
taken. However, whether the correct responses given by the 4- to 5-year-olds implied 
an understanding that a representation has a referent and a sense cannot yet be 
concluded for the following reason. As the photograph of Duckie was a true 
representation which corresponded to its referent and sense, children could possibly 
pass this photograph task using their understanding of correspondence rather than 
representation. Although 3-year-olds also understood correspondence, as mentioned 
in the previous section, they failed the task probably because their understanding of 
correspondence tended to be bound by reality. More evidence regarding this 
possibility is outlined and discussed below.
Another example of true representation is knowledge. It is a true mental 
representation which reflects information faithfully when one has had perceptual 
access to that information. In this case, perception is the reliable mechanism that 
ensures the truthfulness of the representation -  knowledge. For example, if someone 
has looked inside a box and seen a red ball, he or she knows what is in the box. That 
is, he or she holds knowledge that represents the content of the box (referent) as what 
it really is (sense; i.e., as a red ball). Understanding the relationship between 
perception and knowledge is shown by children aged 3 to 4 years who attribute
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knowledge of the contents of an opaque box to people who have looked inside the box 
rather than to those who have not (e.g., Pratt & Bryant, 1990). However, whether 
knowledge was understood as a representation which has a referent and a sense was 
not demonstrated in this “see-know” task.
It is important to note that perception does not always reliably reflect reality and 
lead to knowledge. Perception itself is also a mental representation which differs from 
knowledge in that it may not be true. Children’s ability to understand not only the 
distinction between perception and knowledge but importantly “seeing as” has been 
investigated by Flavell et al. (1983). In the study, children were shown a sponge 
which looked like a rock so they saw the sponge as a rock. In other words, their visual 
perception falsely represented the object in front of them (referent; i.e., the sponge) as 
a rock (sense) and hence they did not have the knowledge about the real identity of 
the object. After tactile exploration, their tactile perception led to knowledge, both of 
which truly represented the object as a sponge. Flavell et al. then asked children who 
aged 3 to 4 years two questions: (1) “What is this really, really? Is it really, really a 
rock or really, really a piece of sponge?” (2) “When you look at this with your eyes 
right now, does it look like a rock or does it look like a piece of sponge?” Results 
showed that most 4-year-olds could differentiate the real identity of the sponge from 
its appearance (i.e., answered both of the test questions correctly), whereas most 3- 
year-olds could not. Children aged 3 years tend to answer “sponge” to both questions. 
This finding implies that 3-year-olds, as mentioned earlier, tend to regard perception, 
whether it is visual or tactile, as corresponding to reality or knowledge. Some 
researchers termed this phenomenon as reality bias (e.g., Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991) 
whereas others called it the curse o f knowledge (e.g., Birch & Bloom, 2004). As 
perception is not yet understood as a representation, 3-year-olds cannot appreciate the 
distinction between appearance (sense) and reality (referent).
In sum, a true representation confounds its referent with its sense that any 
success in tasks concerning true representations could be alternatively explained by 
children’s understanding of correspondence. Only by evoking a striking difference 
between a representation’s referent and its sense, can children’s understanding of 
representation as having a referent and a sense be examined more unambiguously.
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Metarepresentation II: Understanding of False Representations
When a representation’s sense is distinct from its referent, this representation 
becomes a false representation. In the story of Winnie-the-Pooh, the animal that 
created the paw-marks was actually Winnie-the-Pooh himself. If Winnie-the-Pooh or 
Piglet’s belief had represented that animal (referent) as Winnie-the-Pooh (sense), his 
belief would have been a true representation because its referent corresponded with its 
sense. However, that animal (referent) was either represented as a Whatever-it-is or a 
Woozle (sense). The sense was at odds with the referent so Winnie-the-Pooh and 
Piglet each had a false representation in mind.
Understanding of false representations requires a clear distinction between sense 
and reference. To determine whether children understand false representations, there 
is a well-established task in which a protagonist’s belief becomes false when its 
referent no longer matches with its sense. This is the false belief (FB) task (e.g., 
Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). It shows a protagonist who observes an object being placed 
in location A but is then absent when the object is moved to location B. Children are 
then asked where the protagonist thinks the object is or where he will go for the object 
when he returns. Both of these test questions ask about the protagonist’s belief of the 
object’s location. Before the move of the object, the protagonist held a belief which 
truly represented the object’s location (referent) as location A (sense) because the 
object’s location was really location A at that time. Then, the protagonist has not 
witnessed the change of the object’s location so his belief still represents the object’s 
location as location A. However, the object’s location is now location B, causing a 
mismatch between the referent and the sense of the protagonist’s belief. Thus, his 
belief is now false. In order to answer the test questions correctly, children have to 
understand belief as representation which has a referent and a sense, and be able to 
distinguish between reference and sense. Children aged 3 years usually fail the task by 
replying that the protagonist will search in location B for the object, providing 
evidence that they take belief as corresponding to reality; whereas children aged 4 
years and above pass the task by replying location A.
Since the 1983 study, different versions of the FB task have been introduced in 
the literature. For example, there is a FB task which involves a change of contents 
rather than locations. In this contents change FB task (e.g., Hogrefe, Wimmer, & 
Pemer, 1986; Pemer, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987), children are presented with a 
familiar box (e.g., a “Smarties” box) and asked what they think is inside. Having
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responded “Smarties”, children are shown that the box contains, not Smarties, but a 
pencil. The box is then closed with the pencil inside and children are asked what 
another person, who has never seen the real contents of the box, will think is in it.
This test question, like the one in the previous location change FB task, assesses 
children’s comprehension of another person’s false belief so it is usually named as the 
‘other’ question. Children are also asked what they thought was inside the box before 
they were shown its real contents. This is the ‘self question which tests children’s 
comprehension of their own prior false belief. Although there are a variety of FB 
tasks, which vary in materials and procedures, children across countries demonstrated 
a consistent developmental pattern on these tasks: they improved their performance 
from below-chance to above-chance levels between the ages of 2.5 and 5 years (for a 
meta-analysis, see Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).
Belief, however, is not the only type of representation that can be used to 
investigate children’s understanding of false representation. Another type of 
representation that has been used is photographic or pictorial representation. 
Nevertheless, this research using “false” photographs and “false” drawings has been 
shown to have problems associated with it. In the following, I briefly outline this 
research and its findings. Its problems are subsequently discussed with conceptual 
analysis and empirical evidence.
Zaitchik (1990) was the first who attempted to make a photograph become 
“false” by changing the location of Duckie after photographing it, as described in the 
previous section. Without seeing the front of the photograph (Duckie on bed) which 
was in conflict with the current reality (Duckie in bathtub), children were asked where 
Duckie was in the photograph. This “false” photograph (FP) task was claimed to be a 
structurally similar comparison task to the FB task but tested children’s understanding 
of a non-mental representation. A similar developmental pattern to that found on the 
FB task was shown on this FP task: 3-year-olds failed but 4- to 5-year-olds passed. 
Other studies using similar photograph tasks (e.g., Leekam & Pemer, 1991; Leslie & 
Thaiss, 1992) or drawing task (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992) also found 
comparable performance between these photograph/drawing tasks and the FB task in 
different samples of typically developing children. These findings were interpreted as 
demonstrating that typically developing children at the age period of 4 to 5 years are 
capable of understanding representations, regardless of whether these representations 
are mental or not.
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However, it is important to note that the photographs and drawings used in these 
tasks represented the scenes at the time the photographs/drawings were taken/drawn. 
Moreover, these scenes were represented as the way they really were at the time the 
photographs/drawings were created. Therefore, these photographs and drawings were 
not false and no distinction between reference and sense was required. According to 
this conceptual analysis, Leekam and Pemer (1991) argued that the difference 
between these photographs/drawings and false beliefs is not purely a difference in 
mental versus non-mental state. They are also different in the sense that these 
photographs/drawings are true representations of the situations at the time the 
photographs/drawings were created; in contrast, false beliefs are false representations 
of whatever they are supposed to represent. Hence, these photographs and drawings 
should not be considered as comparable to false beliefs.
Tasks using these photographs and drawings, collectively known as the FP task, 
can possibly be passed by employing an understanding of correspondence, as 
discussed in earlier sections; whereas the FB task requires an understanding of 
representation which clearly distinguishes reference from sense. Furthermore, if the 
FP and FB tasks were equivalent and reflected a common underlying ability of 
representational understanding, a positive correlation, in addition to similar 
performance, would have been illustrated between the two tasks. Five studies have 
been carried out and none of them found a correlation between the FP and FB tasks 
(Davis & Pratt, 1995; Lewis, Freeman, & Smith, 1992; Pemer, Leekam, Myers,
Davis, & Odgers, 1993; Peterson & Siegal, 1998; Slaughter, 1998). Although Leekam 
and Pemer (1991) demonstrated a correlation, it was not reported whether this 
correlation remained when children’s age or intellectual level were controlled. Two 
more recent studies found weak correlations but these correlations did not persist after 
age was controlled for (Leekam et al., 2008; Sabbagh, Moses, & Shiverick, 2006).
In addition to correlation, researchers have employed other experimental 
methodologies to test the equivalence between the FP and FB tasks. The general logic 
behind these methodologies is that any manipulation that enhances performance on 
one task should also improve performance on the other task if the two tasks are 
equivalent. However, Pemer et al (1993) demonstrated that drawing children’s 
attention to the back of the photograph improved their performance on the FP task, 
but drawing their attention to the person holding a false belief did not improve their 
performance on the FB task. More specifically, training on one task should improve
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performance on that task as well as the other untrained task if the two tasks tap the 
same underlying concept. Nevertheless, training on the FP task has not been found to 
enhance children’s performance on the FB task and vice versa (Slaughter, 1998, Study 
2), indicating that the FP and FB tasks are not only conceptually distinctive but also 
empirically non-equivalent by being non-transferable. Hence, the FP task is not 
appropriate as a control for singling out the mental aspect of the FB task because the 
comparison confounds the mental nature of the tasks with their “falseness”.
To adequately realise Zaitchik’s (1990) original research goal of measuring 
children’s understanding offalse non-mental representation, a false sign (FS; Parkin, 
1994) task was subsequently devised to replace the FP task. In this FS task, a signpost 
initially shows an object in location A but then the object is moved to location B 
without changing the signpost which thus becomes a false sign. Participants are asked 
where the signpost shows the object is. A sign, like a belief represents whatever it is 
supposed to, which is usually up-to-date with respect to reality. For example, a sign 
indicates the way to an ice-cream van by pointing along a road that goes behind a 
house. Participants can thus use this sign to find the van behind the house. But then 
the van drives over to a church which is situated on a different road. The driver 
forgets to change the sign, which keeps pointing along the road that goes behind the 
house. When the van is stationed behind the church, participants are asked, “Where 
does the sign show the ice-cream van is?” In this case, the referent of the sign was the 
location of the ice-cream van (i.e., behind the church) which does not match with its 
sense of showing the ice-cream van behind the house. In sum, the FS task is non­
mental, in the same way as the FP task; but it genuinely misrepresents a current state 
and requires a distinction between reference and sense, in the same way as the FB 
task. Consistent with this conceptual equivalence, Parkin obtained robust correlations 
between children’s performance on the FS and FB tasks.
Sabbagh, Moses, et al. (2006, Experiment 2) adopted the FS task and found a 
marginally significant correlation between the FB and FS tasks but non-significant 
correlation between the FB and FP tasks when age was partialled out. Leekam et al. 
(2008) also observed no significant difference between the FB and FS tasks; 
moreover, the correlation between the two tasks was significantly greater than the 
correlation between the FB and FP tasks when controlling for the third task and age. 
Both studies also showed no significant difference between two different versions of 
the tasks: one in which the location changed and one in which the contents changed.
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Furthermore, there is a study (Bowler, Briskman, Gurvidi, & Fomells-Ambrojo,
2005) which developed a false signal (non-mental, mechanical) task, in which 
participants had to predict the destination of an automatic train, to correspond with the 
FB task. The train in this false signal task had no driver. It automatically picked up 
cargo from planes based on a signal which either accurately or falsely indicated the 
planes’ location. This false signal task was found to be highly correlated with the FB 
task in children with typical development, intellectual disabilities, and autism. These 
findings suggest that the FB and FS/false signal tasks are related, sharing a 
developmental factor which is not shared by the FP task.
This shared developmental factor which underlies both FB and FS tasks could 
be a general understanding of representations which clearly differentiate reference 
from sense. If so, false beliefs are difficult for young children not because they are 
mental but because they are representational and require distinctions between 
references and senses (Pemer, 1991). Similar claims have been proposed by others in 
various forms (Astington, 1993; Fodor, 1992). However, this shared developmental 
factor could also be argued to be a developmental coincidence between two distinct 
concepts, one for understanding mental representations and the other for 
understanding non-mental representations. Or one might further argue that it could be 
a range of other general cognitive skills, e.g., executive function, which underlies both 
FB and FS tasks but not the FP task. The main aim of this thesis is therefore to 
critically investigate whether false mental and false non-mental representations are 
equivalently understood on the basis of a unitary concept of representations which 
enables the discrimination between reference and sense.
Main question: Can False Mental and False Non-Mental Representations be 
Understood Using the Same Underlying Concept of Representations?
Although there is evidence showing that children’s understanding of false signs 
is equivalent to their understanding of false beliefs, the question of whether 
understanding beliefs should be treated as a capacity for representational 
understanding which covers both mental and non-mental representations is still under 
debate. This stems from the traditional view that the ability to understand beliefs is 
central to a mentalistic understanding of self and others which focuses on the mental 
rather than the representational aspect of beliefs. Performance on the FB task has long 
been used as the index of “theory of mind” which refers to the ability to read a broad
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range o f inner, mental and emotional states (e.g., desire) that may not necessarily be 
treated as representations (Wellman et al., 2001). In particular, “theory of mind” has 
been regarded as a domain-specific mechanism which is limited to mental-related 
information processing since the 1980s (Leslie, 1987, 1994; Leslie, Friedman, & 
German, 2004; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992).
Recently, Cohen and German (2010) showed that adults’ reaction times to false- 
belief situations were faster than to false-map and false-sign situations, claiming that a 
domain-specific “theory of mind” exists in human cognition. In the study, participants 
were instructed to watch some videos and track an object’s location in the videos.
Each video showed the object being put in a drawer by an actress who then sat by a 
table with her back facing participants. At this point, participants knew that the actress 
was drawing a map/arrow to indicate the object’s location because this had been 
communicated to them at the outset in a number of practice trials, so that they could 
make sense of the videos even when the maps/arrows were not shown in the main task 
(T. C. German, personal communication, August 11, 2010). Participants then saw the 
actress leave and a man coming in to either move the object or leave it in place. 
Subsequently, the video was interrupted with an unpredictable test probe, either 
saying “She thinks that the purse is in the right drawer” for the false-belief condition 
or “The map/arrow shows that the purse is in the right drawer” for the false- 
map/false-sign condition. Participants had to make a “yes/no” response to the probe 
and their reaction times were measured. Although Cohen and German claimed that 
false maps/signs were processed slower than false beliefs, I would like to propose a 
criticism of their claim If the map/arrow was drawn by the actress and was not shown 
to participants, participants might have to first process what the actress believed in 
order to work out what she has drawn when they had to response to the latter probe, 
resulting in longer reaction times for the false-map and false-sign conditions relative 
to the false-belief condition. If that was the case, then their results did not necessarily 
support the domain-specific claim of “theory of mind”.
As a result, even very recent experimental evidence has not provided a clear 
conclusion for the question of whether mental representations are understood with a 
general representational understanding system or a domain-specific mechanism which 
dedicates to mental-related processing only. For more than two decades, this question 
has been highly debated and it is still important because (1) it affects the explanation 
of what changes with typical development and how the change takes place, and (2) it
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relates to our understanding of the human brain. Each of these two issues is discussed 
next.
Developmental change: Competing theories of understanding mental
representations.
There have been competing developmental theories of understanding mental 
representations. Theorists, taking the general system approach, emphasise that 
children’s understanding of mental representations depends on a general theory of 
representation which develops with age (e.g., Pemer, 1991; Wellman, 1990). Young 
children initially understand the world with a simplistic, intuitive theory of common 
sense and rules. For example, they understand “seeing” and “knowing” as 
synonymous with each other, without a representational understanding of “seeing” 
and “knowing”. As children grow older, they are confronted with an accumulating 
amount of counterevidence (e.g., visual perception can be misrepresented by 
deceptive appearance) which then triggers a transition of “theory change”. Hence, this 
conceptual change of theory, shifting from the theory of common sense to the theory 
of representation, is mainly determined by experience. Although this change of theory 
occurs around the age of 4 years, the theory of common sense remains as the default 
theory unless an understanding of representations is necessary in dealing with a 
certain situation.
On the other side of the debate, theorists supporting the domain-specific claim 
propose that the mechanism for understanding mental representations is inborn and 
takes the form of a specific module in the brain (e.g., Leslie, 1987, 1994). It is 
suggested to be separate and dissociable from mechanisms which are responsible for 
the understanding of non-mental representations. As a result, there are at least two 
types of mechanisms for the two different types of representations (mental and non­
mental). The mechanism for understanding mental representations is assumed to 
emerge on its own maturational timetable which leads to an early conception of 
mental representations. In that sense, children’s failure on the FB task is not due to 
their incompetence of understanding mental representations but because of a lack of 
sophisticated general cognitive skills required for successful performance of the task, 
such as language and executive function. Thus, the neurological maturation of the 
domain-specific module and general cognitive skills provide the mechanism for
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change occur through development. During this changing process, experience does 
not play a necessary role.
Role o f other general cognitive skills: Language and executive function.
One of the problems of previous research on children’s understanding of false 
belief is that the results might be due to other cognitive skills such as language 
processing ability. The FB task does not only require children to comprehend the 
story about a protagonist and an object’s location, but also involves a linguistically 
complex structure such as a proposition embedded in another (e.g., Where does she 
think that X is?). Many studies have demonstrated a relationship between language 
and false-belief understanding (e.g., Astington & Jenkins, 1999; de Villiers & Pyers, 
2002; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003; for a meta-analysis, see Milligan, Astington, & 
Dack, 2007). Other confounding cognitive factors include: (1) the need to disengage 
from participants’ own knowledge about the salient reality and attending to the 
protagonist’s abstract representation (cognitive inhibition), (2) the need to inhibit a 
prepotent response of pointing to the true location of the object (response inhibition), 
and (3) the need to hold and process information in mind simultaneously (working 
memory). These three cognitive factors together with the others, such as planning and 
cognitive flexibility, are collectively referred to as executive function. Evidence has 
been provided for the relationship between false-belief understanding and executive 
function, such as inhibitory control (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Pemer, Lang, & 
Kloo, 2002) and working memory (e.g., Davis & Pratt, 1995; Gordon & Olson, 1998).
Much research has focused on which specific aspects of language (e.g., 
grammar or pragmatics) and executive function (e.g., inhibitory control or working 
memory) are most strongly associated with false-belief understanding. The question 
of the extent to which language and executive function is involved in false-belief 
understanding is less investigated. There was a study by Call and Tomasello (1999) 
who first attempted to disentangle language and executive function from false-belief 
understanding by devising a non-verbal FB task which did not require cognitive 
inhibition. This study did not receive much attention although researchers have 
developed an interest in isolating other cognitive factors from false-belief 
understanding as a result of a greater interest in populations other than typically 
developing 3- to 5-year-olds over the last decade. In the following, I first outline Call 
and Tomasello’s study and their non-verbal FB task. Then I move on to discuss the
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research on false-belief understanding in young children and infants, followed by 
other growing false-belief research developments in adults and brain-damaged 
patients.
Call and Tomasello (1999) tested children aged 4 to 5 years with a non-verbal 
version of the location change FB task which was embedded in a hiding-finding game 
context. In this context, children were asked to find an object, which was hidden by an 
experimenter, with the help of a communicator who knew the object’s location. The 
experimenter hid the object in one of two identical containers without showing this 
hiding process to the children. However, the communicator saw the hiding process so 
she knew the object’s location and helped the children to find it by placing a marker 
on the correct container. Having understood the game, children were then screened on 
their ability in mastering general task requirements: (1) to track the object being 
moved to a new location; (2) to track the container marked as containing the object 
being moved to a new location (Le., swapping containers around); and (3) to ignore 
the communicator’s marker when it was known to be incorrect (i.e., children had seen 
the object being moved while the communicator was away). After successful 
completion of the screening phase, children were given the testing phase. During the 
testing phase, the communicator watched the hiding process and left while the 
experimenter swapped the containers around. It is important to note that children until 
this point did not know where the object was, so no cognitive inhibition of knowledge 
about reality was required. The communicator returned and placed the marker on the 
container at the location where she saw the object being hidden. As the containers had 
been swapped while the communicator was away, she had a false belief about the 
object’s location and hence placed the marker on the wrong container. Children had to 
reason about the communicator’s false belief in order to correctly find the object. In 
addition to this non-verbal FB task, a verbal FB task which corresponded to the 
standard FB task was incorporated into the game context. It was found that children’s 
performance on both non-verbal and verbal versions of the FB task were highly 
correlated. This result was consistent with the typical developmental change found 
with the standard FB task in previous studies. This finding suggests that language and 
cognitive inhibition did not have a critical effect on false-belief understanding 
otherwise children should have performed better on Call and Tomasello’s non-verbal 
FB task.
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Although Call and Tomasello’s (1999) non-verbal FB task was later adapted to 
be used with deaf children who are raised by hearing parents (i.e., late exposure to 
sign language; Figueras-Costa & Harris, 2001), brain-damaged adult patients 
(Apperly et al., 2004), and low-functioning children with autism and children with 
specific language impairment (Colle, Baron-Cohen, & Hill, 2007), it has still not 
gained as much attention as the non-verbal paradigms designed for testing false-belief 
understanding in young children and infants (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; 
Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). All these infant 
studies used the violation-of-expectation and anticipatory-looking paradigms which 
measure spontaneous looking behaviours while infants are observing false-belief 
situations to infer their attribution of false beliefs. These studies have all concluded 
that young children are capable of attributing false beliefs to other people, further 
suggesting that false-belief understanding exists independently of the development of 
language and executive function in ages earlier than 3 years.
In the violation-of-expectation paradigm, young children are tested as to 
whether they look significantly longer when a protagonist’s behaviour is incongruent, 
as opposed to congruent, with his/her false belief. The logic behind this is that infants 
show their expectation of people behaving according to what they believe by looking 
longer at behaviours that are incongruent with the actors’ beliefs. For example, the 
well-known study of Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) first familiarised 15-months-olds 
to a protagonist hiding an object in one of two boxes (e.g., box A) and reaching inside 
box A. Then, in a false-belief condition, the object moved to another box (e.g., box B) 
in the protagonist’s absence. When the protagonist reappeared, infants looked reliably 
longer if she reached box B (incongruent with her false belief) instead of box A 
(congruent with her false belief). Scott and Baillargeon (2009) extended this finding 
from false belief about location to false belief about identity. Together with other 
violation-of-expectation studies (e.g., Surian et al., 2007), it was concluded that 
infants as young as 13 months expected a protagonist to act on the basis of his/her 
false belief.
However, alternative explanations are available. For example, Pemer and 
Ruffman (2005) suggested that infants may create associations between different 
elements (e.g., protagonist-object-box A); and that a similar combination of elements 
will need less processing and thus a shorter looking time than a different combination 
of elements (e.g., protagonist-object-box B). In other words, it is possible that infants
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look longer at behaviours or situations based on their novelty-familiarity rather than 
unpredictability-predictability. Similar criticisms towards this violation-of-expectation 
paradigm have been proposed by other researchers (e.g., Cohen, 2004; Haith, 1998). 
Wellman (2010) also questioned the assumption that a longer looking time at 
behaviour A reflects infants’ expectations of behaviour B. Although a longer looking 
time at behaviour A could be interpreted as suggesting that infants do not expect 
behaviour A, it does not imply that infants expect behaviour B. Hence, the violation- 
of-expectation paradigm may not be good enough to provide clear evidence for 
infants’ attribution of false beliefs.
To have more confidence about infants’ expectation of someone behaving in a 
particular way, the anticipatory-looking paradigm measures whether infants visually 
anticipate where a protagonist with a false belief about an object’s location will search 
for the object. Southgate et aL (2007) familiarised 25-month-olds with a bear hiding a 
ball in one of two boxes while a protagonist was watching; then the protagonist 
reached towards the box which contained the ball In the test trial, the protagonist saw 
the bear hide the ball in one box and then looked away. Meanwhile, the bear moved 
the ball from its location and took it away. Thus, the ball was no longer in either one 
of the boxes and infants’ looking at either one of the boxes was not due to the ball’s 
location but their expectation of the protagonist’s searching location. Results showed 
that 25-month-olds correctly anticipated the protagonist’s searching location. 
However, this finding could be explained by behaviour rules such as people look for 
objects where they last saw them (Pemer & Ruffinan, 2005; Ruffinan & Pemer,
2005). If this was the case, 25-month-olds did not necessarily attribute to the 
protagonist a false belief about the ball’s location in order to correctly anticipate her 
searching location.
To conclude, all these infant studies appeared to support the domain-specific 
account that the concept of mental representations exists early in infancy and may 
even be innate. However, looking behaviours are so ambiguous that explanations 
other than an attribution of false belief are possible. Moreover, there is no evidence 
that young children understand belief as representation and are able to distinguish 
between reference and sense. As a result, none of the above non-verbal FB tasks 
which involve least cognitive demands provided compelling evidence for an 
understanding of false belief in children below age 3.
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Given the difficulty in demonstrating a real understanding of false beliefs at the 
younger end of the developmental span, other researchers have sought to extend the 
testing population from children to adults. Interestingly, adults who are more skilful in 
language, executive function and any other cognitive processing than children are not 
necessarily performing at ceiling on different versions of the FB task, when 
parametric measures such as probability estimates and error rates are used to assess 
performance (e.g., Birch & Bloom, 2007; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). It was found 
that the need to resist interference from one’s knowledge about reality (termed as 
cognitive inhibition hereafter) in the FB tasks is a problem for adults, just as it is for 
young children.
Other research with brain-damaged adults indicated that an impairment in 
cognitive inhibition hindered the expression of false-belief understanding (Samson, 
Apperly, & Humphreys, 2007; Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys, 
2005). Samson et al. (2005) used a non-verbal FB task which followed closely to the 
traditional location change FB task for 3- to 5-year-olds and showed that a particular 
patient (known as WB A) who had a brain lesion to the right frontal lobe performed 
below chance with a strong tendency of committing reality bias, but performed well 
on memory control trials. WB A was also tested with another non-verbal FB task 
(Apperly et al., 2004) which was adapted from the one originally devised by Call and 
Tomasello (1999). In Apperly et al.’s (2004) non-verbal FB task, following Call and 
Tomasello’s, participants are not shown the location of the object. Instead, they are 
asked to find the object with the help of a clue given by a protagonist who has a false 
belief about the object’s location in the test trials. The protagonist puts a marker on 
the box where she thinks the object is. Participants thus need to understand that the 
protagonist’s false belief represents the object’s location (referent) as the box she puts 
the marker on (sense) and reason the object’s location to be the alterative box as they 
have witnessed the switch of boxes. As participants do not know where the object 
really is, they will not be biased. Therefore, no cognitive inhibition is required while 
they are inferring the protagonist’s false belief. The task also involves control trials, 
similar to those in the screening phase of Call and Tomasello’s task, in which 
participants are tested on incidental executive demands of the task (i.e., response 
inhibition and working memory). Results showed that the patient, WBA, referred to 
above, performed above chance on this non-verbal reality-unknown FB task. Taken 
together, these findings show that WBA was able to understand false beliefs but may
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not have been able to express this ability due to his impairment in cognitive 
inhibition.
Another brain-damaged patient, PH, who has severe grammatical impairment 
after a left hemisphere lesion, performed almost perfectly on the same non-verbal FB 
tasks used in Apperly et al. (2004) and Samson et al. (2005) and a more complex non­
verbal FB task. This finding suggested that general language and grammatical 
impairments did not diminish performance on false-belief understanding (Apperly, 
Samson, Carroll, Hussain, & Humphreys, 2006). Having reviewed these studies and 
other related research on children and adults, Apperly, Samson, and Humphreys 
(2009) proposed that executive function plays essential roles in the competence and 
expression of false-belief understanding, lasting along the developmental span; 
whereas language, especially grammar, may only be necessary for the development of 
false-belief understanding, showing its effect on children but not adults.
Returning to the competing accounts of mental-representation understanding, 
would Apperly et aL’s (2009) suggestion speak to either the domain-specific account 
or the general system account? As the domain-specific account suggests that 
children's failure on the standard FB task is due to their lack of language and 
executive skills, it appears that their suggestion supports this account. However, they 
also suggest that the development of false-belief understanding requires the 
contribution o f language. In other words, a delay in language development may hinder 
the acquisition of false-belief understanding. For example, Figueras-Costa and Harris 
(2001) found that deaf children who are bom of hearing parents demonstrated a 
developmental delay in passing a non-verbal FB task which was adapted from Call 
and Tomasello (1999). As a result, false-belief understanding may not be innate and 
mature on its own timetable. Despite that, this suggestion does not exclusively support 
the general system account of mental-representation understanding either. To provide 
evidence for the general system account, it is essential to illustrate that false-belief 
understanding relies on a general understanding of representations which develops 
through experience. This illustration is attempted in the following chapters of this 
thesis which report and discuss a series of behavioural experiments with typically and 
atypically developing children.
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The human brain: A general-purpose device or a set of specialised
components?
In addition to the competing theoretical explanations for the development of 
mental-representation understanding, the importance of the debate in question also 
reflects in the long-standing investigation of brain function. For almost two centuries, 
researchers have been arguing whether the human brain functions as a general- 
purpose device, in which each region engages in a broad range of cognitive processes, 
or as a set of specialised components, each of which has a specific mission. One of the 
first to propose ideas about localisation of brain function is Franz Joseph Gall (1758- 
1828). Pierre Flourens (1794-1867) and others, on the other hand, argued for 
distributed cognitive processing throughout the brain. An empirical example for the 
argument about brain function is the posterior part of the left inferior frontal gyrus 
described by Broca in 1861 and many later studies as a specialised region for 
language (e.g., Dronkers, 1996; Penfield & Roberts, 1959; Schaffler, Lueders, &
Beck, 1996). However, this region has been recently found to be also recruited in non- 
linguistic processing, e.g., human action (e.g., Baumgaertner, Buccino, Lange, 
McNamara, & Binkofski, 2007; Fazio et al., 2009; for a review, see Fadiga,
Craighero, & Roy, 2006).
Is there a specific neural mechanism which selectively responds to mental rather 
than non-mental representations and is independent of language and executive 
demands? It has been suggested that the medial prefrontal cortex is specifically 
responsible for distinguishing mental representations from physical representations 
(for a review, see Frith & Frith, 2003). However, more recently, the importance of the 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) in understanding both mental and non-mental 
representations has been increasingly stressed (Aichhom et al., 2009; Pemer, 
Aichhom, Kronbichler, Staffen, & Ladumer, 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & 
Powell, 2006; Saxe & Wexler, 2005). Evidence from brain-damage patients further 
suggests that the TPJ is more essential for processing mental representations than the 
medial frontal areas. For example, patients with damage to the medial frontal regions 
demonstrated impairments in both false-belief reasoning and executive functioning 
whereas patients with damage to the left TPJ showed deficit in false-belief reasoning 
only when all of them were tested with non-verbal FB tasks (Apperly et al., 2004; 
Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004). Sommer et al. (2007) also 
suggested that the activity in the medial prefrontal cortex might reflect the executive
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demands inherent in the FB task, rather than the representation of mental 
representation.
A brain imaging study, which tested children aged 8 years and above with both 
verbal and non-verbal FB tasks, also found more robust brain activity in the TPJ 
during false-belief reasoning than physical causal reasoning, whereas the medial 
prefrontal cortex activated more during a baseline condition which did not require 
reasoning (Kobayashi, Glover, & Temple, 2007). Although the TPJ has consistently 
been demonstrated to be actively involved in mental-representation processing in both 
children and adults, it is suggested that the right TPJ is more important for the 
understanding of false beliefs whereas the left TPJ is associated with both false beliefs 
and false signs in adults (Aichhom et al, 2009; Pemer et al, 2006). Saxe, Whitfield- 
Gabrieli, Scholz, and Pelphrey (2009) who examined children aged 6 to 11 years also 
found a change in response selectivity for mental-related information with age in the 
right TPJ. Intriguingly, while the right TPJ is proposed to be a specific brain region 
for adults’ mental-representation understanding, other studies have repeatedly shown 
that the right TPJ is also engaged in a general process o f attentional reorientation 
(e.g., Mitchell, 2008; Serences et al, 2005). As a result, whether there is a specific 
neural mechanism which is responsible for mental-representation understanding in the 
brain is still controversial. Although this thesis does not include any brain imaging or 
neurological studies with brain-injury patients, I further discuss these issues of neural 
specificity and development in the last chapter of this thesis in relation to the 
behavioural findings from children with typical and atypical development.
Overview of This Thesis
This thesis aims to address the debate of the domain-specific versus general 
system account of understanding mental representations because this debate has 
crucial implications to the theoretical and neurological bases of cognitive 
development. Reviewing related literature, the understanding of mental 
representations appears to be a complex cognitive process which involves 
representational understanding, mentalising, language and executive function. These 
four factors often confound with each other, making the interpretation of results in 
this area of research difficult and leaving the debate in question unresolved.
The empirical work for this thesis involved the design and execution of a series 
of experiments which attempted to disentangle the above four factors in order to
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investigate whether representational understanding can exclusively explain children’s 
understanding of both mental and non-mental representations. This was achieved by 
(1) introducing new false non-mental representation tasks, one of which was non­
verbal and to which the usual demands o f executive function were eliminated or 
controlled for, and (2) exploring the equivalence between these new false non-mental 
representation tasks and previously devised false mental representation tasks. The 
following sections briefly describe the series o f experiments that are reported in the 
following empirical chapters.
In order to determine whether the understanding of mental representations is 
domain-specific or relies on a general concept of representations, it is not sufficient to 
find an association between tasks that assess understanding o f mental versus non­
mental representation. As previously mentioned, this association could be explained 
by a developmental coincidence between two independent concepts (mental versus 
non-mental representations) or other shared cognitive skills of language and executive 
function. Given that correlational studies leave open different interpretations, 
experimental studies which (1) manipulate children’s understanding of mental versus 
non-mental representations, (2) control the confounding factors of language and 
executive function, or (3) compare typical with atypical development in 
understanding the two types of representations may provide a clearer picture.
Training and transferability: Manipulating children's understanding of
mental versus non-mental representations.
The first step taken in the empirical work of this thesis is the development and 
administration of a training study to investigate transfer of understanding based on the 
following logic. If tasks that assess understanding of mental versus non-mental 
representations are underpinned by the same concept of representation, it is expected 
that the tasks are correlated and the effects of training on either one of the tasks are 
transferable to the other (Slaughter, 1998). If the tasks are supported by two 
independent concepts which happen to follow a similar developmental time course, an 
association but no transferability between the tasks are expected. There are several 
studies that have shown transfer effects between tasks that tested the same concept 
such as “theory of mind” (Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996), symbolic representation 
(DeLoache, 1991; DeLoache, Simcock, & Marzolf, 2004; Marzolf & DeLoache,
1994) and inductive reasoning (Klauer, Willmes, & Phye, 2002; see also Klauer &
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Phye, 2008, for a meta-analysis). All of these studies involve either training or initial 
experience on one task and then better performance shown on an untrained but related 
task or more difficult tasks with similar (near transfer) and different (far transfer) 
contexts. In this way, training studies have an advantage for examining whether two 
tasks tap a single concept because they demonstrate a causal relation between training 
and later measures.
Chapter 2 deals with the equivalence between the FB and FS task by critically 
examining the transfer of training across tasks. In that chapter, I briefly review several 
successful training studies on false-belief understanding, and outline a design used by 
Slaughter (1998) which trained children on the FB or FP task and examined the 
transferability between the two tasks. I then introduce a new FS task that is matched 
closely with Slaughter’s FB task. By substituting the FP task used in Slaughter’s 
study with the new FS task, a training study is carried out to determine the 
transferability between the FB and FS tasks. If the FB and FS tasks are transferable, it 
would suggest that they are supported by the same underlying concept of 
understanding representations which develops through experience gained from 
training. On the contrary, it would imply that the FB and FS tasks are not equivalent 
and support the domain-specific account if the two tasks are not transferable.
Controlling for language and executive function using non-verbal reality-
unknown false representation tasks.
The second step is to exclude the possibility that the equivalence between 
mental and non-mental representation tasks might be explained by other cognitive 
processes of language and executive function. As mentioned earlier, the FB task 
confounds the requirement of processing the content of a mental representation with 
the cognitive demands on language and executive function. The same problem also 
exists in the FS task as it involves the same language and executive demands as the 
FB task while tapping the understanding of a non-mental representation. It is thus 
possible that the association found between the two tasks was due to language and 
executive function rather than representational understanding. If the FB and FS tasks 
are shown to be transferable in Chapter 2, it might also be attributed to an increased 
ability o f language and executive function rather than representational understanding 
after training.
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There is only one study that has suggested that language and executive function 
may contribute to the association between the FB and FS tasks. That is Experiment 2 
of Sabbagh, Moses, et al. (2006). They found a marginally significant correlation 
between the FB and FS tasks when age was partialled out but no significant relations 
between the two tasks when both age and verbal ability were controlled for, 
suggesting that language ability might play a role in the relation between the tasks. 
They also demonstrated that performance on an executive function task, the 
bear/dragon task (Reed, Pien, & Rothbart, 1984; Kochanska, Murray, Jacques,
Koenig, & Vandegeest, 1996) which imposes both working memory (remembering a 
rule) and inhibitory (suppressing an action) demands, predicted performance on the 
FB and FS tasks. However, the language ability test (i.e., the Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary Test; Dunn & Dunn, 1981) and the executive function task (i.e., the 
bear/dragon task) used in this experiment were independent from the FB and FS tasks. 
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test measures receptive vocabulary and the 
bear/dragon task tests certain aspects of executive function but they do not assess the 
exact incidental cognitive demands of the FB and FS tasks (e.g., narrative 
comprehension which involved in both FB and FS tasks is not adequately tested by 
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test). Thus, whether the incidental cognitive 
demands required in both FB and FS tasks can explain the association between the 
two tasks is still unclear.
Chapter 3 investigates this issue by employing tasks that disentangle language 
and executive function from representational understanding. Based on the above 
review of studies that attempted to disentangle language and executive function from 
false-belief understanding, Apperly et al.’s (2004) non-verbal reality-unknown FB 
task appears to be the best task to employ for the following reasons. First, whether the 
non-verbal FB tasks measuring infants’ looking behaviours are tapping a conceptual 
understanding of false belief which differentiates reference from sense is still 
controversial. Second, Apperly et al.’s FB task exceeded its ancestor, the original FB 
task devised by Call and Tomasello (1999), in its standardised and carefully 
controlled procedure. This involved presenting the task in videos rather than personal 
manipulation, and having test, control as well as filler trials intervene each other 
rather than screening with control trials before testing. Recall that from previous 
descriptions of Call and Tomasello’s and Apperly et al.’s tasks, only the test trials tap 
false-belief understanding whereas the control trials were either for screening or
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controlling participants’ ability in meeting incidental demands of the tasks. The 
intervening filler trials in Apperly et al.’s task provided additional controls on 
undesirable factors, such as inattention and adoption of incorrect strategies (more 
details can be found in Chapter 3). Moreover, Call and Tomasello’s procedure of 
having the control trials in the screening phase followed by the test trials in the test 
phases had a disadvantage: increasing the likelihood of participants learning how to 
succeed in the test trials through successive exposure in the test phase. The third 
reason for employing Apperly et al.’s task is that it has been successfully used with 
older children with fragile X syndrome and intellectual disability (mean age =13 
years 3 months; Grant, Apperly, & Oliver, 2007) although it has not been used with 
typically developing children in any published study yet. Therefore, Apperly et al.’s 
FB task appears to be the only task that taps a conceptual understanding of false belief 
while minimising, eliminating and controlling the language and executive demands of 
the task.
However, to clearly determine whether children’s performance on the FB task is 
mainly due to their understanding of representations rather than their language and 
executive skills, a comparable non-mental representation task is needed. Based on 
Apperly et a l’s (2004) non-verbal reality-unknown FB task, Apperly et al. (2007) 
devised a non-mental comparison task: the non-verbal reality-unknown FP task. As 
mentioned earlier, false photograph is not a good enough comparison to false belief 
and that false sign might be a better option. Hence, Chapter 3 introduces a novel non­
verbal reality-unknown FS task which was designed based on Apperly et a l ’s FB and 
FP tasks. Then, an experiment testing whether this new FS task, relative to Apperly et 
a l ’s FP task, was closely matched to their FB task is reported. A second experiment 
follows to compare the non-verbal reality-unknown FS and FB tasks with a verbal 
reality-known version, which is essentially the standard version, of the two tasks. This 
comparison has two goals: (1) replicating the associations found between the FB and 
FS tasks in both standard and non-verbal reality-unknown versions within a single 
experiment, and (2) validating the novel non-verbal reality-unknown FS task with the 
standard version of the task. As the non-verbal reality-unknown version of the FB and 
FS tasks minimised and eliminated the demands of language and cognitive inhibition, 
if the results of these two experiments show that the association between the FB and 
FS tasks remains in both versions of the tasks, it would suggest that language and 
cognitive inhibition cannot explain the equivalence between the tasks. On the
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contrary, if the association only holds in the standard version of the tasks, it would 
imply that language and cognitive inhibition play a significant role in the association 
between the tasks.
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD): A special case?
The final part of the empirical work for this thesis is to extend the research from 
typical development to atypical development. So far, the empirical work described 
has been focused on typical development. It is however insufficient to tell whether 
understanding mental representations is underlined by a general concept of 
representational understanding or a domain-specific mechanism which specialises in 
mental-related processes by looking at typical development only. For example, both 
mental and non-mental representations may be understood with the same unitary 
general concept in typical cases but the development of understanding the two types 
of representations may take two independent pathways in atypical cases. Moreover, 
cognitive components which are difficult to be factored apart in typical cases may be 
dissociated in atypical cases. An example of such ‘factoring out’ in atypical 
populations was the dissociation of tasks testing the understanding of false beliefs and 
“false” photographs/drawings shown in individuals with a neurodevelopmental 
disorder namely Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD; Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992; 
Leekam & Pemer, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). As discussed earlier, typically 
developing children demonstrated similar performance on the FB and “false” 
photograph/drawing (FP) tasks, but whether they passed the FP task by recruiting an 
understanding of representation, just as they did on the FB task, or an understanding 
of correspondence is unclear. By investigating individuals with ASD, the 
understanding of representation and the understanding of correspondence were found 
to be dissociated based on the evidence that individuals with ASD failed the FB task 
but passed the FP task.
Autism was first introduced by Kanner (1943) in his term “early infantile 
autism” to describe eleven children who were impaired in emotional relationships 
with others. In 1944, Asperger also reported four children with what he termed 
“autistic psychopathy” (Frith, 1991). These children had similar behavioural 
symptoms to those described by Kanner, but with higher functioning (e.g., better 
language and intellectual abilities). Later, Wing and Gould (1979) suggested that 
autism could be classified by a triad of impairments in behaviours within three
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domains: reciprocal social interaction, communication, and restricted, repetitive 
interests and behaviours. To this day, these behavioural domains are still in use for 
diagnosis (American Psychiatric Association, 1994; World Health Organisation,
1993). The primary difference between a diagnosis of autism and a diagnosis of 
Asperger syndrome is that individuals with Asperger syndrome have no history of 
language and cognitive delay (ie., general intelligence within the normal range; 
Bennett et al., 2008; Eisenmajer et al., 1996). Therefore, autism and Asperger 
syndrome are viewed as situated on a continuum (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Wing, 
1981, 1988), usually known as the autism spectrum which ranges from normal to 
severely autistic behaviours (Wing, 1996). More recently, it has also been suggested 
that the distinction between autism and Asperger syndrome should be abandoned 
(e.g., Leekam, Libby, Wing, Gould, & Gillberg, 2000; Mayes & Calhoun, 2003). In 
this thesis, I thus refer to individuals with diagnoses of autism and Asperger syndrome 
collectively as ASD.
There have been different theoretical explanations for the behavioural 
characteristics demonstrated in ASD. The most common one was proposed by Baron- 
Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) who assessed individuals with ASD with the FB task, 
suggesting that individuals with ASD have a “theory of mind” deficit which 
contributes to their difficulties in social functioning. Since then, it has been proposed 
that individuals with ASD have a specific deficit in their capacity to process mental- 
related information. In particular, research has indicated that children with ASD 
performed poorly on tasks that assess false-belief understanding (e.g., Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1985; Leslie & Frith, 1988; for meta-analyses, see Happe, 1995; Yirimiya, Erel, 
Shaked, & Solomonica-Levi, 1998) but were at or near ceiling on the “false” 
photograph/drawing task (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992; Leekam & Pemer, 1991; 
Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). However, in a more recent study, children with ASD showed 
similar and associated performance on the FB task and the false signal task devised by 
Bowler et al. (2005). Hence, Bowler et al.’s findings place a doubt on the suggestion 
that children with ASD are specifically impaired in mental-related processing.
In addition, individuals with ASD also show abnormalities in language (e.g., 
Charman, Drew, Baird, & Baird, 2003; Lord & Paul, 1997; Wilkinson, 1998) and 
executive function (e.g., Luna, Doll, Hegedus, Minshew, & Sweeney, 2007;
Robinson, Goddard, & Dritschel, 2009; for earlier reviews, see Baron-Cohen, Tager- 
Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000; Hill, 2004). As language and executive function play a role
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in the FB task, it is possible that the poor performance of children with ASD on the 
FB task reflects their impairments in language and executive function. Although 
children with ASD’s problem in understanding false beliefs was usually concluded 
from a comparison with a control group which matched the ASD group on verbal 
mental age and/or general intellectual ability, these verbal mental age and general 
intellectual ability were measured by independent tests which did not measure the 
exact incidental cognitive demands of the FB task as mentioned in earlier section. 
Given that the false signal task involves the same language and executive demands 
that matched with the FB task, children with ASD’s performance on the false signal 
task may also be affected by their impairments in language and executive function. As 
in the case of typically developing children, the association found between the FB 
task and the false signal task in children with ASD may also be due to language and 
executive function rather than representational understanding.
Chapter 4 investigates whether ASD is a special case in which individuals are 
specifically impaired in understanding mental representations but are intact in 
understanding non-mental representations, independent of their deficits in language 
and executive function. This is done by testing a sample of children with ASD with 
the non-verbal reality-unknown FB, FP and FS tasks used in Chapter 3. If children 
with ASD perform worse in the non-verbal reality-unknown FB task than the non­
verbal reality-unknown FP and FS tasks, it would support claims for a specific 
module for mental-representation understanding in the human brain (e.g., Leslie,
1987, 1994). If children with ASD do not show a specific difficulty on the non-verbal 
reality-unknown FB task, it would suggest that mental and non-mental representations 
are understood in a unitary system of representational understanding even in 
atypically developing children.
In sum, this thesis aims to address the debate of the domain-specific versus 
general system account of understanding mental representations. Chapters 2 and 3 
explore the equivalence between the FB and FS tasks in typically developing children. 
In chapter 2 ,1 investigate whether training on understanding false beliefs will 
improve children’s understanding of false signs and vice versa. If the understanding 
of false beliefs and false signs are both supported by a general concept of 
representation, then training effect on the FB and FS tasks would be expected to 
transfer back and forth based on other successful training studies. If the understanding 
of false beliefs and false signs only coincidentally develop in a similar time course,
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then training effect would not be expected to transfer from one task to the other. In 
Chapter 3 ,1 examine whether other cognitive processes, such as language and 
executive function, can explain the equivalence found between the FB and FS tasks. 
To do this, I design and test a novel non-verbal reality-unknown FS task. If the FB 
and FS tasks are based on the same underlying understanding of representation, it 
would be expected that the association between the two tasks cannot be explained by 
other shared cognitive functions. In Chapter 4 ,1 continue the theme of exploring the 
equivalence between the FB and FS tasks and test whether the findings with typically 
developing children in previous chapters can be generalised to children with ASD. If 
mental and non-mental representations are understood by the same concept of 
representation, it would be expected to be universal across typical and atypical 
development. Based on the findings of the series of experiments reported in Chapter 2 
to 4, implications to the debate of the domain-specific versus general system account 
in terms o f typical versus atypical development and brain function are further 
discussed in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2 Training and Transferability in Children’s Understanding of False 
Mental and False Non-Mental Representations
In Chapter 1 ,1 argued that finding an association between a mental 
representation task and a non-mental representation task is not sufficient to determine 
that mental and non-mental representations are underpinned by a general concept of 
representation. The association found between the two types of tasks may be 
accounted for by a developmental coincidence between two independent concepts, 
each of which supports one of the tasks. This alternative explanation may be excluded 
if transferability is found between the two types of tasks in an experimental study 
which manipulates children’s understanding of mental versus non-mental 
representations through training. As Slaughter (1998) has pointed out, equivalence 
between two tasks may only be properly inferred if the effect o f training on one task 
transfers to the other. The central goal o f Chapter 2 is thus to address the generality 
claim of mental-representation understanding by critically evaluating the equivalence 
between the FB and FS tasks using a different approach -  that of a training study.
There are a number of training studies which successfully improved children’s 
performance on the FB task with relevant training and controlled procedures (e.g., 
Appleton & Reddy, 1996; Clements, Rustin, & McCallum, 2000; Lohmann & 
Tomasello, 2003; Melot & Angeard, 2003; Slaughter, 1998, Study 2; Slaughter & 
Gopnik, 1996). Children in these studies were first pre-tested and were then randomly 
assigned to experimental and control training groups. They were thus trained one-to- 
one on different tasks according to their group assignment, e.g., Slaughter and Gopnik 
(1996) trained their experimental training groups on tasks testing concepts o f belief, 
desire and perception, whereas their control training group was trained on number 
conservation tasks. Training usually took place over a certain period of time with at 
least two sessions. Moreover, appropriate feedback or explanations about the 
correctness of children’s responses to the training tasks were provided in each session. 
Finally, training effects were indicated by children in the experimental training group 
who improved their performance on a FB post-test task compared to the control 
training group. However, enhanced performance on post-test tasks that are identical in 
structure to training tasks might just be due to task-specific acquired strategies, not an 
increased understanding of the relevant conceptual skill in question (Knoll & 
Charman, 2000). Hence, it is important for a training study to demonstrate concept
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generalisation, meaning that concepts trained with training tasks are generalised to 
structurally different post-test tasks, e.g., Appleton and Reddy (1996) found that 
training on location change FB tasks generalised to contents change FB post-test 
tasks.
Not only can children’s performance on the FB task be improved by training, 
but also this training effect can be transferred to other untrained “theory of mind” 
tasks (Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996, Study 2). Transfer effects on tasks tapping the same 
concept, other than “theory of mind”, have also been successfully demonstrated in 
several different studies (e.g., Marzolf & DeLoache, 1994; Klauer et al., 2002). 
Therefore, Slaughter (1998) suggested that if the FB and FP tasks were supported by a 
general concept of representation, then a transfer effect should have resulted between 
the two tasks after training. In feet, her results showed that training on either task did 
not enhance performance on the other task. This finding supports the argument 
presented in Chapter 1 that the FB and FP tasks are not conceptually equivalent.
If the FS task rather than the FP task is a better non-mental comparison to the 
FB task because both FS and FB tasks rely on the same representational capacity of 
distinguishing between reference and sense, then the FS and FB tasks should be 
equivalent by being transferable after training. That is, training on the FS task would 
be expected to enhance performance on the FB task and vice versa. In order to 
critically test whether the FS and FB tasks are tapping the same underlying concept of 
representation, I adapted Slaughter’s (1998, Study 2) design and replaced her FP task 
with the FS task. In the following, I briefly describe the design of Slaughter’s Study 2 
and then use this design as a basis from which to propose a new training study for the 
investigation of the equivalence between the FB and FS tasks (see Figure 2.1). The 
main differences between the designs of Slaughter’s Study 2 and my new training 
study are indicated in italics, where the FP task in Slaughter’s study is replaced by the 
FS task, in the figure.
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Figure 2.1. Design of a new training study for the false belief and false sign tasks. FB 
= false belief; FS = false sign; VPT = visual perspective-taking; AR = appearance- 
reality; Control = number conservation. Italics indicate where new FS task replaces 
Slaughter’s (1998) original FP task.
Slaughter (1998, Study 2) first pre-tested children on a language control task, 
which was used to control for both children’s memory ability and linguistic 
competence in answering test questions. Then she pre-tested them with a contents 
change FB task (e.g., a Band-aid box would lead someone to believe that there were 
plasters inside but it was then shown to contain a book, so the original belief became a 
false belief). Children who passed the language control task but failed the FB task 
were included in training. Slaughter had originally intended to pre-test children on the 
FP task as well and to include those who failed both FB and FP tasks in training, but 
then abandoned this design because her Study 1 found insufficient children who failed 
both tasks. Thus, children included in training were not pre-tested on the FP task.
They were randomly assigned to three training groups: FB (trained on FB tasks), FP 
(trained on false photo and false drawing tasks), or Control (trained on number 
conservation tasks). During training, tasks were presented and simple feedback was 
given based on children’s performance. After two training sessions, one per week, 
children were post-tested on theory of mind (false belief appearance-reality, and 
visual perspective-taking) tasks, FP (false photo and false drawing) tasks, and a 
number conservation task. Results showed that training on the FB tasks did not lead to 
an enhancement of performance on the FP tasks and vice versa in comparison to the 
Control training group, indicating that there was no transfer between the two tasks.
Using a design identical to Slaughter’s (1998) Study 2, and replacing her FP set 
of training and post-test with a FS set of training and post-test (see the italics in Figure
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2.1), the new training study reported here investigated the equivalence between the 
FB and FS tasks. Exactly the same design as Slaughter’s was used. This included a 
pre-test of the language control and FB tasks, a training scheme of two training 
sessions with explicit corrective feedback, and a post-test of a set of tasks (false 
beliefj visual perspective-taking, appearance-reality and number conservation). There 
were two reasons for replicating Slaughter’s design exactly. First, any difference in 
results between Slaughter’s Study 2 and the new training study would not be 
attributed to the difference in design, pre-test, training scheme and post-test. If a 
transfer effect was found in the new training study but not in Slaughter’s, this would 
be because the FS task shared the same underlying skills of representational 
understanding with the FB task whereas the FP task which Slaughter used did not. 
Second, another study which used the same design and training scheme also 
demonstrated a successful training effect in children’s false-belief understanding 
(Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996). With the same design and training scheme, a higher 
possibility of getting a training effect would be likely in the new training study.
However, before carrying out the new training study, a suitable FS task which 
matches with Slaughter’s (1998) FB task was needed. It was essential for the two 
tasks to be of the same difficulty and capture the same representational and cognitive 
demands, with the only exception that the FB task is mental whereas the FS task is 
non-mental As any difference in difficulty between the two tasks would confound 
with the mental nature of the tasks, it would then be impossible to make a clear 
conclusion regarding the understanding of mental versus non-mental representations 
if no transfer was found between the tasks. Given that Slaughter used a contents 
change FB task, a contents change FS task was required.
Previous studies have devised different versions of the contents change FS task 
including different materials. Sabbagh, Moses, et al.’s (2006) contents change FS task 
involved two objects and one container (i.e., a cat jumped out of a box with a sign 
showing a picture of a cat, and then a frog jumped into that box) whilst Leekam et 
al.’s (2008) task contained two objects and two containers (e.g., a tin with a label of 
‘cakes’ contained cakes and another tin with a label o f ‘biscuits’ contained biscuits, 
then the cakes and biscuits were switched over). However, Slaughter’s (1998) 
contents change FB task involved only one object and one container (e.g., a book 
contained in a Band-aid box). Although this difference in numbers of component 
materials should not make much difference to the cognitive demands of the tasks, it
37
was reasoned that a FS task which is equivalent in every structural aspect to 
Slaughter’s FB task would be more appropriate. Experiment 1 therefore aimed to 
prepare optimal materials for a new contents change FS task which would match 
Slaughter’s contents change FB task closely. If  the two tasks matched well, the newly 
developed FS task would then be employed in Experiment 2 -  the new training study, 
which investigated whether training on the FB task would improve performance on 
the FS task and vice versa.
To summarise, this chapter tests the proposal that the developmental difficulty 
overcome by false-belief passers lies in the ability to represent false representations. 
Experiment 1 first aimed at establishing a newly developed contents change FS task 
to match with Slaughter’s (1998, Study 2) contents change FB task. Then the newly 
developed FS task was employed in Experiment 2 to address the critical question of 
whether the FB and FS tasks are transferable. If the two tasks are transferable, it 
would suggest that they are supported by the same underlying concept of 
understanding representations. On the contrary, if they are not transferable, it would 
imply that they are not equivalent and further support the domain-specific account. 
Ethics approval which applied to both Experiment 1 and 2 was obtained from the 
Ethics Advisory Sub-Committee in the Department of Psychology in Durham 
University.
Experiment 1
A newly developed contents change FS task with different sets of materials was 
compared with Slaughter’s contents change FB task to test whether the two tasks were 
matched and to find out the best sets of materials for the new FS task to match closely 
to those used in Slaughter’s FB task. Following Slaughter’s study, children had to 
pass a language control task in order to be included in the analyses. Given that the FB 
and FS tasks are the same in every aspect, except the test questions, and previous 
studies (Bowler et al., 2005; Leekam et al., 2008; Sabbagh, Moses, et al., 2006, 
Experiment 2) had found no significant difference but instead significant correlations 
between the two types (FB and FS/false signal) of tasks, it was expected that children 
would perform similarly and their performance would be correlated between the FB 
and FS tasks. Children aged 3 to 5 years were recruited due to the universal 
developmental pattern found between this period of age on the FB task (e.g., Wellman 
et al., 2001) and a similar pattern demonstrated on the FS task (e.g., Leekam et al.,
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2008). Based on these previous studies, older children were expected to perform 
better than younger children on both FB and FS tasks.
Method.
Participants.
Twenty-eight typically developing children (aged 3;4 -  5;2; M=  52.25 months; 
SD = 7.43) were recruited from a school in North East England. Fourteen were aged 
3;4 -  4;5 (M = 45.79 months; SD = 4.34) and another 14 were aged 4;6 -  5;2 (M= 
58.71 months; SD = 2.43). Three additional children, aged 3;3, 3;4, and 3;7, were 
tested but they failed the language control task so they were excluded from the 
analyses. All children were White British (representative o f the geographical area) 
and the population of the school was of low socio-economic status. Parental informed 
consent was obtained before testing.
Design.
This was a mixed design, testing younger versus older children with both FB 
and FS tasks. Each child was firstly presented with the language control task used by 
Slaughter (1998); then he/she was tested with three trials of the FB task and three 
trials of the FS task. The purpose of giving three trials was to gain more reliable data 
for each child as each trial involves a single pass/fail response. The presentation 
orders of the tasks and the trials within each task were counterbalanced.
Materials and procedure.
Children were individually tested in a session which lasted approximately 10 
minutes by an experimenter. Slaughter’s (1998, Study 2) contents change FB task 
which used two sets of materials (a “Band-aid” box with a book inside and a “crayon” 
box with candles inside) were employed in this experiment. In order to have three 
trials for each of the FB and FS tasks, one more set of materials (a “Smarties” box 
with a pencil inside) was added to the FB task and three other sets of materials (a 
“Coca-Cola” bottle with a toothbrush inside, a “Fruit Shoot” bottle with a paintbrush 
inside and a “Lego” box with a bag of crisps inside) were used for the new FS task. A 
summary of materials employed from Slaughter’s Study 2 and new materials added 
for the current experiment is listed in Table 2.1. Two out of the three sets of materials
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of the FS task that were the most comparable to Slaughter’s “Band-aid” and “Crayon” 
contents change FB task would then be employed in Experiment 2. All of the 
materials used were familiar to the preschool children in England.
Table 2.1
Materials Employed From Slaughter’s (1998) Study 2 and new Materials (in Italics) 
Added for Experiment 1
Slaughter’s (1998) Study 2 Experiment 1
Language control task
Dolls house, orange and toy car
Contents change FB task
Set 1: “Band-aid” box and book 
Set 2: “Crayon” box and candles
Set 3: “Smarties ” box and pencil
Contents change FS task
Set 1: “Coca-Cola ” bottle and toothbrush 
Set 2: “Fruit Shoot ” bottle and paintbrush 
Set 3: “Lego ” box and a bag o f crisps
Following Slaughter (1998), the experiment started with an introduction of a 
doll called Charlie who was described as a friend who liked to help but was sleepy so 
was put to sleep under the table and would be woken up for help later. The language 
control task was the same as that in Slaughter’s study. It contained a dolls house with 
an orange, which was then replaced by a toy car. Children were asked, “What was 
inside this house when you first saw it?” The criterion for passing was replying 
“Orange” to the question. Then the FB task and the FS task were presented. The 
presentation order of the tasks was counterbalanced. The procedure for the FB task 
was also the same as Slaughter’s but with two exceptions: (1) Before asking the test 
question, the experimenter tried and failed to wake up Charlie so he stayed asleep 
under the table; and (2) One test question, instead of two (‘self and ‘other’ question), 
was asked, “What will Charlie think is inside this box when he first sees it?” (i.e., the 
‘other’ question). The purpose of the first exception was to ensure that children did 
not think that Charlie overheard their conversation with the experimenter, whereas the 
second exception was made to match the FB task with the FS task which could only 
have one test question. The reason for choosing the ‘other’ question, asking about 
Charlie’s belief, over the ‘self question is that the initial contents change FB task
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(Hogrefe et al., 1986) described in Chapter 1 only asked a question about another 
person’s belief and the procedure of introducing a doll at the beginning could be kept 
the same as that in Slaughter’s for a rational purpose. The FS task was made similar to 
the FB task except that the test question was “What does the label on the bottle show 
that is inside?” Verbatim instructions used for the language control, FB and FS tasks 
are listed in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2
Verbatim Instructions Used for the Language Control, False Belief and False Sign 
Tasks
Language control task
Participants were shown a dolls house with an orange inside.
“What is inside this house?”
The orange was removed and a toy car was put in the dolls house.
“Now what is inside this house?”
“What was inside this house when you first saw it?”
False sign False belief
Participant was shown a container. Participant was shown a container.
“What do you think is inside this box?” “What do you think is inside this box?”
The box was opened to reveal an The box was opened to reveal an
unexpected content. unexpected content.
“Look there i s .......” “Look there i s .......”
Requested that the participant say what’s Requested that the participant say what’s
inside. I f  s/he didn’t, told him/her and inside. I f  s/he didn’t, told him/her and
asked him/her to repeat. asked him/her to repeat.
The box was returned to its original state. The box was returned to its original state.
“Now what do you think is inside this “Now what do you think is inside this
box?” box?”
Test Question: Test Question:
“What does the label on the box show that Charlie was not able to be awakened.
is inside?” “What will Charlie think is inside this box
when he first sees it?”
Results.
Children received a score of 1 for each of the trials if they correctly reported 
Charlie’s false belief for the FB task and the container’s false label for the FS task. As
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the scores were either Os or Is, non-parametric tests were used to examine whether 
there were differences between the sets o f materials used within each task. There was 
no significant difference in children’s performance across the three themes within 
both FB and FS tasks, Friedman test: ^(2, N=  28) = 3.43, p  = .23 and ^(2 , N — 28) = 
1.20,/? = .85 respectively.
Children’s scores were thus collapsed across the three themes for each of the FB 
and FS tasks (range of scores for each task: 0 — 3). The means and standard deviations 
for the two tasks are presented in Table 2.3. The data were not normally distributed 
(the values of skewness were positive whereas the values of kurtosis were negative). 
Data transformations, including square root, log and inverse transformations, did not 
improve normality. However, the outcomes of the following parametric analyses were 
corroborated by running non-parametric analyses. First, children’s performance across 
tasks was examined with a between-participants factor of age. It was expected that 
performance on the two tasks would not differ but that older children’s performance 
would be better than younger children’s. It was also expected that the two tasks would 
be correlated so correlation tests were then performed to test this prediction. Finally, 
which sets of materials o f the FS task that matched best with the “Band-aid” and 
“Crayon” sets of materials of the FB task used in Slaughter (1998) were determined 
by Pearson’s chi-square tests as the range of scores children got for each set of 
materials of each task was 0 -  1.
Table 2.3
Means and Standard Deviations for the False Belief and False Sign Tasks (Range of 
Each: 0 - 2 )
False belief False sign
Age group n M  SD M SD
Younger 14 0.57 1.09 0.64 1.08
Older 14 2.21 1.05 2.36 1.15
Older children performed above chance, ts( 14) > 2.54, ps < .05 with effect sizes 
of rs > .58, whereas younger children performed below chance, ts( 14) < -2.96, ps < 
.05, rs > .40, on both of the FB and FS tasks. A 2 (age) x 2 (task) mixed-design 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with task as a within-participants factor revealed a 
significant main effect of age, F(l, 26) = 22.85,/? < .001 with an effect size of r -  .68, 
but no effect of task and no interaction, Fs(l, 26) < .24, ps > .63.
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Equivalent non-parametric analyses showed identical results. Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks tests showed that older children performed above chance, Wilcoxon Zs < -2.18, 
ps < .05 with effect sizes of rs < -.41, whereas younger children performed below 
chance, Wilcoxon Zs < -2.30, ps < .05, rs < -.43. Mann-Whitney U tests indicated 
similar age difference on the FB and FS tasks, U= 30,/? < .001 with an effect size of r 
= -.63 and U — 34.50, p < .01, r = -.60 respectively. No difference between the FB and 
FS tasks was also found by Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, Wilcoxon Z = -.58,/? = .58. 
Both Pearson and Spearman’s correlations showed that performance on the FB task 
was correlated with performance on the FS task, r(28) = .66,/? < .001 and ^(28) = .63, 
p  < .001 respectively.
Pearson’s chi-square tests were used to determine which sets of materials o f the 
FS task matched better with the “Band-aid” and “Crayon” sets of materials of the FB 
task. The “Band-aid” set of materials of the FB task was associated with both “Coca- 
Cola” and “Fruit Shoot” sets of materials o f the FS task, j^(l, N=  28) = 5.07,/? = .06 
with a phi-coefficient of .43 and ^ ( l ,  N=  28) = 5.32, p  < .05 with a phi-coefficient o f 
.44 respectively, but not with the “Lego” set of materials of the FS task, y£{\ , N — 28) 
= 1.29,/? = .45 with a phi-coefficient of .22. The “Crayon” set of materials of the FB 
task was associated with the “Coca-Cola”, “Fruit Shoot” and “Lego” sets of materials 
of the FS task, ^ s ( l , N =  28) > 7.04, ps < .05 with phi-coefficients > .50. As the 
“Lego” set of materials of the FS task was not associated with the “Band-aid” set of 
materials of the FB task, it was not employed in Experiment 2.
Discussion.
Experiment 1 aimed at establishing a newly developed contents change FS task 
to match with Slaughter’s (1998, Study 2) contents change FB task so that the new FS 
task could be employed in Experiment 2. Results showed that the new FS task 
matched well with Slaughter’s FB task, rs = .63 — .66. These correlation coefficients 
matched with those in previous studies (rs = .50 -  .88; see Pemer & Leekam, 2008, 
for a review). Moreover, both of the tasks were sensitive enough to capture the 
developmental change of understanding false belief and false sign demonstrated in 
previous studies. Older children were found to perform above chance whilst younger 
children performed below chance on both of the tasks.
This experiment also found out the best sets of materials for the new FS task to 
match closely to those used in Slaughter’s FB task. As the “Lego” set of materials of
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the FS task was associated with the “Crayon” but not the “Band-aid” set of materials 
of the FB task, the “Coca-Cola” and “Fruit Shoot” sets of materials of the FS task 
were the best matches to the “Band-aid” and “Crayon” sets of materials of the FB task 
and were thus employed in Experiment 2. Previous studies which have successfully 
demonstrated the correlation between the FB and FS or false signal tasks (Bowler et 
al., 2005; Sabbagh, Moses, et al., 2006, Experiment 2) also used completely different 
sets of materials for the FB versus FS or false signal tasks. Thus, no critical influence 
to the results was expected even though the FS task used “Coca-Cola” and “Fruit 
Shoot” whereas the FB task used “Band-aid” and “Crayon” in Experiment 2.
Experiment 21
The main aim of Experiment 2 was to critically address the issue of equivalence 
between the FB and FS tasks by investigating whether the two tasks were transferable 
after training. Children, who were different from those in Experiment 1 but o f the 
same age range of 3 to 5 years, were screened for inclusion in training, following 
Slaughter’s (1998, Study 2) procedure. This involved giving children pre-tests, 
including the language control task (see Table 2.2) and the contents change FB task 
(see Table 2.4), as described in Slaughter’s study. The FB pre-test task involved two 
test questions: the ‘self and ‘other’ questions. Employing the same inclusion criterion 
as that used in Slaughter’s study, the current experiment included only children who 
passed the language control task but failed both of the test questions of the FB pre-test 
task into the training phase.
For the training part of the experiment, children who met the inclusion criterion 
were randomly assigned to three training groups: False belief, False sign and Control. 
The FB training group received training on a FB task, the FS training group received 
training on a FS task, and the Control training group received the same training as that 
used in Slaughter (1998, Study 2), namely a number conservation task. With the 
Control training group, baseline performance could be obtained for comparing the 
training effect against development across time on understanding representations. 
During the training session, children were presented with one of the relevant tasks and 
given positive or negative feedback based on their performance. Finally, children 
were tested on the four post-test tasks used in Slaughter’s study (false belief visual
1 Experiment 2 has been accepted to be published in the Journal o f  Cognition and Development.
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perspective-taking, appearance-reality and number conservation) plus the new FS task 
developed in Experiment 1. As the FB task involved two test questions whereas the 
FS task involved only one test question, performance on the ‘self and ‘other’ 
questions of the FB task were examined separately in order to match with the FS task. 
If transferability was found, this experimental design would also enable the 
investigation of the potential mechanism underlying the training effect of 
representational understanding in children.
Table 2.4
Verbatim Instructions Used for the False Belief Pre-Test Task
False belief pre-test task
Participant was shown a container.
“What do you think is inside this box?”
The box was opened to reveal an unexpected content.
“Look there i s  ”
Requested that the participant say what’s inside. I f  s/he didn’t, told him/her and asked 
him/her to repeat.
The box was then returned to its original state.
“Now what do you think is inside this box?”
Test questions:
Self: “What did you think was inside this box when you first saw it?”
Charlie was not able to be awakened.
Other: “What will Charlie think is inside this box when he first sees it?”
In addition to the main aim, there was a subsidiary goal which was to 
demonstrate that concept generalization was another outcome of training. This issue 
was addressed using different tasks in the training phase from those used in 
Slaughter’s (1998) Study 2. Location change tasks were used in training whereas 
contents change tasks were used in the pre- and post-tests. A previous study 
(Appleton & Reddy, 1996) found an improved performance on the contents change 
FB post-test tasks after training children on the location change FB tasks, hence 
similar concept generalisation was expected in the current experiment. However, 
whether concept generalisation would also be found for the FS training group was not 
known. Children in this training group were trained on a location change FS task
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which used an arrow as the representational medium (e.g., an arrow pointing to a box 
which contained sweets; see also Table 2.5), whereas the contents change FS post-test 
task used a label as the representational medium (e.g., the “Coca-Cola” label on a 
“Coca-Cola” bottle; see also Table 2.6). Whether training on arrows would be 
generalised to labels was not yet established in literature. According to Leekam et al. 
(2008) and Sabbagh, Moses, et al. (2006, Experiment 2), no significant differences 
were found between their location change and content change versions for both FB 
and FS tasks; thus it was predicted that concept generalisation would also occur for 
the FS training group in the current experiment. Finally, it was also important to 
examine whether age would have an effect on training and subsequent post-test 
performance based on the findings in previous studies and Experiment 1 that older 
children performed better on both FB and FS tasks than younger children. The 
assumption is that older children perform better on false representation tasks because 
they possess a conceptual understanding of representation whereas younger children 
do not. However, there are also individual differences in performance across age and 
one would expect experience through training to have a similar effect on children 
without a concept of false representation regardless of age. In the case of the current 
experiment, children were screened for false-belief understanding. Therefore, none of 
them would have possessed the conceptual understanding of representation before 
training and age was unlikely to have an effect on the training and post-test 
performance.
To conclude, the current experiment intended to examine the proposal that 
understanding of false beliefs and false signs depend on a general underlying ability 
of representing false representations. Under this proposal the following predictions 
could be made: (1) No significant difference but an association would be found 
between performance on the FB and FS post-test tasks across training groups, 
replicating the results of Experiment 1; and (2) A transfer effect would be found after 
training. That is, when compared to the Control training group, the FB training group 
would show better performance on the FS post-test task and the FS training group 
would show better performance on the FB post-test task. In addition, the experiment 
also tested for concept generalisation between training and post-test by using different 
versions of the FB and FS tasks involving location and contents change at each phase. 
If the trained concept could be generalised, training on the location change task 
should enhance performance on the contents change post-test task for the FB and FS
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training group in comparison to the Control training group. Finally, the age effect on 
training and post-test performance was also investigated with the expectation that age 
would not be associated with how well children responded to the training and 
performed in the post-test.
Method.
Screening phase,
166 typically developing children (aged 3;3 -  5;11) were recruited from three 
schools in the northeast of England. None of them had participated in Experiment 1. 
The current experiment followed directly Slaughter’s (1998) design and procedure, by 
first screening children on two tasks to assess inclusion in training. Inclusion 
depended on passing the language control task and foiling the contents change FB 
pre-test task. The language control task, which was exactly the same as that in 
Experiment 1, was always administered first and then followed by the FB pre-test 
task. The FB pre-test task involved two deceptive boxes (a Band-aid box and a crayon 
box) with unexpected contents (a book and some candles respectively) inside. Half of 
the children received the “Band-aid” set of materials whereas the other half received 
the “Crayon” set of materials. There were two test questions. For the ‘self question, 
children were asked, “What did you think was inside this box when you first saw it?” 
For the ‘other’ question, the experimenter asked, “What will Charlie think is inside 
this box when he first sees it?” Charlie, same as in Experiment 1, was earlier 
identified as a doll asleep under the table. The experimenter tried but failed to wake 
Charlie up before she asked the ‘other’ question. The presentation order of the two 
test questions was counterbalanced. Verbatim instructions for the FB pre-test task are 
listed in Table 2.4. If children passed the language control task but failed both of the 
FB pre-test questions (i.e., both ‘self and ‘other’ questions were incorrect), they were 
included in training.
Although the ideal design would be to include children who failed both FB and 
FS tasks in training, it was reasoned that this goal would be difficult to achieve as 
Slaughter’s (1998) herself found insufficient children who failed both mental (FB) 
and non-mental (FP) tasks. As a result, the design of Slaughter’s study was followed 
exactly by pre-testing children on the language control and FB tasks only, and 
including those who passed the language control task but foiled both questions o f the
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FB task. One hundred and three (62%) of the children recruited did not qualify for 
inclusion in training . As a result, 63 children were included. The percentage of 
children that were included in training (38%) was similar to that of Slaughter’s Study 
2 which was 35%. However, there were 6 children who were absent from school 
either on the day of one of the training sessions or post-test so they were not included 
in the following analysis, resulting in 19 children in each training group (which was 
almost twice the number of the children in Slaughter’s Study 2).
Main experiment: Training and post-test
Participants. Fifty-seven children were randomly assigned to one of the three 
training groups: FB, FS or Control. The age range of the 19 children in the FS training 
group was 3;3 -  5;3 (M = 52.89 months; SD = 7.61), the FB training group’s age 
range was 3;7 -  5;3 (M= 52.58 months; SD = 6.41), and the Control training group’s 
age range was 3;11 -  5;4 (M = 55.58 months; SD = 5.80). A one-way ANOVA 
showed no significant difference in terms of age, F(2, 54) = 1.22, p  = .31, between the 
three training groups. The sample was White British and the populations of the three 
schools were generally of low socio-economic status. Parental informed consent was 
obtained before the pre-test.
Design. This was a mixed-design with training group as a between-participants 
factor and post-test task as a within-participants factor. Following Slaughter’s (1998) 
Study 2, the training phase consisted of two sessions, one session per week. During 
training, children were given the relevant tasks and positive or negative feedback 
according to their responses. A post-test of five tasks was then administered a week 
after the last training session. The design of the experiment is shown in Figure 2.1.
Materials and procedure. Children were trained and tested individually in a 
room in their own school by the same experimenter who also administered the pre­
test. However, the experimenter was unaware of the child’s training condition when 
the post-test session was conducted. She did not have any information in front of her
2 Thirty-two children foiled the language control task; 22 children passed one of the two questions in 
the FB task, 8 of them passed the ‘self question whereas 14 passed the ‘other’ question; 28 children 
passed both questions in the FB task; and 21 children foiled to answer the prompt question “Now what 
do you think is inside this box?” correctly but passed one or both questions in the FB task Although 
there were another 9 children who also answered the prompt question incorrectly and should normally 
be excluded, they foiled both questions in the FB task as well so they were considered as not possessing 
the understanding of false belief yet, which was in feet the most important criterion for inclusion, and 
were therefore included in the training phase.
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at time of post-test that would identify the child’s training condition. Moreover, she 
was not able to recall this information due to the complexity of the design and number 
of children participated. An assistant was present to help and record children’s 
responses.
There were two training sessions: one was scheduled within 1 month after 
children’s completion of the pre-test and the other was 6 - 9  days after the first 
training session. During each training session, children were presented with one of the 
relevant tasks according to their group assignments (FB, FS or Control) and positive 
or negative feedback was given based on their answers to test questions (verbatim in 
Table 2.5). The FB and FS training group was trained on the location change tasks 
and the Control training group was trained on the number conservation task. The 
experimenter’s feedback usually marked the end of each training session. However, 
there were a few exceptions when children disagreed with the feedback by opening 
the box to show the experimenter that the objects were actually there. The 
experimenter responded with a smile and said, e.g., ‘The arrow shows us that the 
sweets are in this box (initial location)”. Each training group of children was shown 
two sets of materials (i.e., ‘shop with sweets in one of two boxes’ and ‘kitchen with 
bananas in one of two boxes’ for the FS and FB training group; and ‘blocks’ and 
‘candles’ for the Control training group); one set of materials in each training session, 
and the order of presentation was counterbalanced across children. Only the FB 
training group involved a protagonist (doll) called Maxi. After two sessions of 
training, children were post-tested.
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Table 2.5
Verbatim Instructions Used in one of the two Sessions for Each of the Three Training 
Groups: False Sign, False Belief and Control
False sign False belief Control
This is a shop. The shop sells This is a shop. This is Maxi. Participant was
sweets. The sweets are in this The shop sells sweets. Maxi presented with two
box {point). And, look, there is shows you that the sweets are rows o f 10 small
an arrow showing us where the in this box {point). blocks (row A and
sweets are. B). They were 
manipulated so that
Prompt: Prompt: the rows were first
Where are the sweets? Where are the sweets? equal lengths.
Now, we put the sweets in the Maxi goes home. While Maxi One row was made
other box. is at home, we put the sweets longer (half o f the
in the other box. participants had 
row A longer,
Prompt: Prompt: whereas the other
Where are the sweets now? Where are the sweets now? half o f  the 
participants had
Now, Maxi wants some row B longer), then
sweets. He returns to the shop the rows were re­
in order to buy some sweets. equalized, and then 
the other row was 
made longer.
Test question: Test question: Test question:
Where does the arrow show us Where does Maxi think the Does one of these
that the sweets are? sweets are? rows have more or 
are they the same?
Positive feedback: Positive feedback: Positive feedback:
“Yes, that’s right. The arrow “Yes, that’s right. Maxi “Yes, that’s right.
shows us that the sweets are in thinks the sweets are in this They are the same.”
this box {initial location)” box {initial location).”
Negative feedback: Negative feedback: Negative feedback:
“No, the arrow shows us that “No, Maxi thinks the sweets “No, they are the
the sweets are in this box are in this box {initial same.”
{initial location)” location).”
The post-test was presented 5 - 8  days after the second training session. The 
doll, Charlie, was introduced and put to sleep under the table again. Children were 
then given five tasks: false sign, false belief appearance-reality, visual perspective- 
taking and number conservation (verbatim in Table 2.6; both FS and FB tasks were of 
the contents change version, same as those in Experiment 1). The presentation order
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of the tasks was counterbalanced, with the FB and appearance-reality (AR) tasks 
paired because they employed the same materials (i.e., the “Band-aid” and “Crayon” 
sets of materials used in Experiment 1 and the pre-test of the current experiment; see 
Table 2.6). Half of the children had the FB test questions asked first whilst the other 
half o f the children had the AR test questions asked first after the real contents of the 
deceptive boxes were revealed. Both FB and AR tasks had two test questions: the 
‘self and ‘other’ questions in the FB task (possible range of scores was 0 -  2); the 
‘appearance’ (What does it look like is inside this box?) and ‘reality’ (What is really 
and truly inside this box?) questions in the AR task. Children had to answer both 
‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ questions correctly in order to be scored as 1 (range: 0 - 1 )  
for the AR task. The presentation order of the two test questions in each of the tasks 
was also counterbalanced. The FB task was exactly the same as the FB pre-test task 
except that the set of materials used was different. Children who received the “Band- 
aid” set o f materials in pre-test would receive the “Crayon” set o f materials in post­
test, whereas the other children received the reverse ordering. Although the FB and 
AR tasks were administrated in pairs, children’s performance on the two tasks was 
analysed separately.
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Table 2.6
Verbatim Instructions Used in Each o f the Post-Test Tasks: False Sign, False Belief 
Appearance-Reality, Visual Perspective-Taking and Number Conservation
False sign
False belief & 
appearance- 
reality
Visual
perspective-
taking
Control
Participant was shown Participant was Participant was Participant
a bottle o f Fruit Shoot / shown a Bandaid / shown a straight was presented
Coca-Cola. Crayon box. stick. with two rows
“What do you think is “What do you think is o f 5 pennies in
inside this bottle?” inside this box?” equal lengths.
The bottle was opened The box was opened Then the stick One row was
to reveal a paintbrush / to reveal a book/ was put into a made longer,
toothbrush. some candles. glass o f water, then the rows
“Look there i s ...... ” “Look there is .” making it were re­
Requested that the Requested that the appear to be equalized, and
participant say what’s participant say what’s bent. then the other
inside. I f  s/he didn % inside. I f  s/he didn’t, row was made
told him/her and asked told him/her and longer.
him/her to repeat. asked him/her to
repeat.
The bottle was then The box was then
returned to its original returned to its
state. original state.
“Now what do you “Now what do you
think is inside this think is inside this
bottle?” box?”
Test question: Test questions: Test questions: Test question:
“What does the label “What did you think “What kind of “Does one of
on the bottle show that was inside this box stick did you see these rows
is inside?” when you first saw before we put it have more or
it?” in water, a bent are they the
Charlie was not able stick or a same?”
to be awakened. straight stick?”
“What will Charlie Charlie was not
think is inside this able to be
box when he first sees awakened.
it?” “What kind of
stick will
“What does it look Charlie see if we
like is inside this take it out of the
box?” water, a bent
“What is really and stick or a
truly inside this box?” straight stick?”
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The FS post-test task was the same as that in Experiment 1 but it involved only 
two sets of materials: a bottle of Coca-Cola with a toothbrush inside and a bottle of 
Fruit Shoot with a paintbrush inside. These two sets of materials for the FS task have 
been demonstrated to work appropriately compared to the “Band-aid” and “Crayon” 
sets of materials of the FB task in Experiment 1 (phi-co efficients > .43). Half o f the 
children received “Coca-Cola” and the other half received “Fruit Shoot”. The test 
question was “What does the label on the bottle show that is inside?” so the possible 
range of scores for this task was 0 -1 .
For the visual perspective-taking (VPT) post-test task, children were presented 
with a straight stick and a glass of water. Two test questions (‘self and ‘other’ 
questions) were asked after the stick was put into the glass of water (range of scores: 0 
-  2). The presentation order of the two test questions was again counterbalanced. For 
the number conservation (NC) post-test task, two rows of five pennies were presented 
in front of the children and the transformation of the two rows was performed in the 
same way as in training (range of scores: 0 -1 ) .
Results.
As most of the variables were nominal, analyses were restricted to non- 
parametric tests. Children’s performance on the FS and FB post-test tasks across 
training groups was first examined with within-participants analyses to check for any 
difference and association between the tasks. To examine whether the tasks are 
transferable, the post-test performance of the three training groups was compared with 
between-participants analyses to test whether the FB training group would show 
better performance on the FS post-test task and vice versa when comparing with the 
Control training group; and performance change through training to post-test was also 
investigated. Finally, age was subjected to correlation tests to examine whether it 
affected children’s receptiveness of training and post-test performance.
Relation between the performance o f the FS and FB post-test tasks.
Performance on each of the post-test tasks is shown in Table 2.7. If the FS and 
FB tasks were equivalent, children should perform similarly on both of the tasks. Two 
related-samples tests indicated that children’s performance on the FS task did not 
significantly differ from their performance on both ‘self and ‘other’ questions o f the
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FB task, Wilcoxon Z = -1.61,/? = .17 and Wilcoxon Z = -1.34, p  = .26 respectively. 
Moreover, Chi-Square tests showed that performance on the FS task was related to the 
performance on the ‘self and ‘other’ questions o f the FB task, j^O) = 5.56, p  < .05 
with a phi-coefficient of .31 and ^(1) = 4.31 *P< .05 with a phi-coefficient of .28 
respectively. Hence, the first prediction that no difference but an association would be 
found between performance on the FS and FB post-test tasks was supported. 
Furthermore, this finding replicated those in Experiment 1.
Table 2.7
Number and Percentage of Children With Correct Scores on Each of the Post-Test 
Tasks
Training
group
n
Post-test task
FS FB-
self
FB-
other
VPT - 
self
VPT - 
other
AR NC
FS 19 10 9 5 17 12 4 11
(53%) (47%) (26%) (89%) (63%) (21%) (58%)
FB 19 12 5 11 17 11 7 12
(63%) (26%) (58%) (89%) (58%) (37%) (63%)
Control 19 3 4 3 17 13 5 14
(16%) (21%) (16%) (89%) (68%) (26%) (74%)
Note. FS = False Sign; FB - self = the ‘self question of the False Belief task; FB - 
other = the ‘other’ question of the False Belief task; VPT - self = the ‘self question of 
the Visual Perspective-Taking task; VPT - other = the ‘other’ question of the Visual 
Perspective-Taking task; AR = Appearance-Reality; and NC = Number Conservation.
Post-test performance on all tasks.
Scores of the FS and FB post-test tasks and performance o f the FS and FB 
training groups were collapsed to create a single false representation measure (range: 
0 - 3 )  and a single False Representation training group respectively because 
children’s performance on the two tasks were not significantly different and were 
related. A Mann-Whitney U test revealed a significant difference between the False 
Representation training group and the Control training group on the false 
representation measure (U = 192.5,/? < .01 with an effect size o f Cohen’s d  = .91), 
suggesting that children’s understanding of false representations was enhanced when 
they were trained on false representation tasks in comparison to the NC task.
However, no significant difference was found between the False Representation 
training group and the Control training group on the NC post-test task (U= 313.5, p  =
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.39). Training of the NC task did not enhance children’s performance on the NC post­
test task relative to those who had not been trained on it.
To further examine the effects of different training groups on relevant post-test 
tasks and whether the FS and FB tasks are transferable, the post-test performance of 
the three training groups was compared using a series of Chi-Square tests. First, there 
was a significant difference between the performance of the training groups on the FS 
post-test task, %2(2) = 9.55, p  < .01. The performance of both FS and FB training 
groups was significantly better than the Control training group on the FS post-test 
task, 5^(1) = 5.73,/? < .05 with an effect size of phi (</>) = -.39 and ^ ( l)  = 8.92,/? <
.01,0 = -.49 respectively, whereas the performance of the FS and FB training groups 
on the FS post-test task did not differ, x?(l) = -43,/? = .74. Second, there was no 
significant difference between the performance of the training groups on the ‘self 
question of the FB post-test task, x2(2) = 3.41, p  = .28. However, a significant 
difference was found between the performance of the training groups on the ‘other’ 
question o f the FB post-test task, J?(2) = 8.21, p  < .05. The performance of the FB 
training group was significantly better than the Control training group on the ‘other’ 
question of the FB post-test task, ^O ) = 7.24, p  < .05,$ = -.44, whereas the 
performance of both FB and Control training groups did not differ from the FS 
training group on that question, ^ ( l )  = 3.89,/? = .10 and 5^(1) = .63,/? = .69 
respectively. Finally, there were no significant differences between the performance 
of the training groups on the other post-test tasks, %2(2) = .00, p  = 1 for the ‘self 
question o f the VPT post-test task, x?(2) = .45, p  = .94 for the ‘other’ question of the 
VPT post-test task, 5^(2) = 1.22,/? = .66 for the AR post-test task and )?(2) = 1.08,/? = 
.69 for the NC post-test task.
Hence, training using a location change version of FS and FB tasks enhanced 
performance on the relevant post-test task which involved contents change. That is, 
the FS training group trained on the location change FS task performed better on the 
contents change FS post-test task than the Control training group; and the FB training 
group trained on the location change FB task performed better on the ‘other’ question 
of the contents change FB post-test task than the Control training group. The FB 
training group also outperformed the Control training group on the FS post-test task, 
confirming half of the second prediction that the effect of false-belief training 
transferred to false-sign understanding. Children’s performance change through 
training to post-test was further investigated in order to reveal whether false-sign
55
training had some contribution to later false-belief understanding within participants 
and to shed light on the underlying mechanism of training representational 
understanding in children.
Performance change through training to post-test.
Performance on each of the training tasks for each training session and relevant 
post-test is shown in Table 2.8. Improvement was shown from training session 1 to 
post-test for the FS and Control training groups, Cochran’s Q (2) = 8.17,/? < .05 and 
Cochran’s Q (2) = 8.6, p  < .05 respectively. However, the increase in performance for 
the FB training group from training session 1 to post-test did not reach significance, 
Cochran’s Q (2) = 5.17,/? = .08. A similar result was also found in Slaughter (1998, 
Study 2). She suggested two possible explanations: (1) children benefited from the 
pre-test so that they had acquired some understanding of false belief already by the 
first training session; (2) her training tasks were somewhat easier than the pre- and 
post-tests. The data obtained in the current experiment supported Slaughter’s first 
explanation. First, a significant difference was found when comparing children’s 
performance on the pre-test and training session 1 for the FB training group, ^(1) =
4.17,/? < .05, </> = .47. For the FS training group, children’s performance on the pre­
test and FB post-test, which was their second FB task, was significantly different for 
the ‘self question, x2(l) = 7.11,/?<.01,</>=.61, and marginally different for the 
‘other’ question, ^ ( l )  = 3.20, p  = .06,0 = .41. However, no significant difference was 
found between children’s performance on the pre-test and FB post-test for the Control 
training group, ^ ( l )  = 2.25, p  = .13 for the ‘self question and ^(1) = 1.33,/? = .25 for 
the ‘other’ question, but this might be due to the delay from the pre-test to post-test 
which could have washed out the potential practice effect. Despite the delay from the 
pre-test to post-test, a significant difference was found for the FS training group, 
suggesting that training on the FS task contributed to children’s understanding of false 
belief, especially for the ‘self question. Second, the FS and Control training groups’ 
performance on the ‘other’ question of the FB post-test task was not significantly 
different from the FB training group’s performance on their first training session, 
which involved an ‘other’ question, 5^(1) = 0.13, p  = 1 and x2(l) = 1.31,/? = .45 
respectively. Taken together, these findings indicated that practice on the pre-test 
without feedback might be sufficient to increase later (short delay: no longer than a
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month) performance on the related task and the FB training task seemed to be of 
similar difficulty to the FB post-test task.
Table 2.8
Number and Percentage of Children With Correct Scores on Each of the Training 
Tasks for Each Training Session
Training
group n
Training session 
1 2 Post-test
FS 19 7 (37%) 15 (79%) 10 (53%; false sign)
FB 19 6 (32%) 12 (63%) 11 (58%; false belief - ‘other’ 
question)
Control 19 8 (42%) 15 (79%) 14 (74%; number conservation)
This consolidating effect of extra practice on the FB pre-test might have 
enhanced the transfer effect from false-belief training to false-sign understanding. If 
children had been given a pre-test which included a FS task as well as a FB task so 
that the FS training group had the same amount of practice on the FS task as the FB 
training group had on the FB task, the effect of training on the FS task might have 
transferred to the FB post-test task in comparison to the Control training group. In 
order to investigate this possibility, the following analyses examined whether children 
in the FS training group benefited from training session 1, which was their first FS 
task, in the same way as those in the FB training group had from the pre-test. A 
significant increase in performance was found from training session 1 to 2 for the FS 
training group, ^(1) = 6.13,/? < .01, <f) = .57. Moreover, the improvement from pre­
test to training session 1 for the FB training group was not significantly different from 
the improvement from training session 1 to 2 for the FS training group, ^(1) = .45,/? 
= .74, suggesting that an extra practice on the FS task might help in consolidating 
false-sign understanding in the same way that the pre-test has benefited the FB 
training group.
To further examine the transferability of the FB and FS tasks, the contingency 
between performance of the FB training group on training session 2 and the FS post­
test was compared with the contingency between performance of the FS training 
group on training session 2 and the FB post-test. The number of children who passed 
FB training session 2 but foiled the FS post-test task (n = 4) was not significantly 
different from the number of children who foiled FB training session 2 but passed the
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FS post-test task (n = 4), ^ ( l )  = . 13, p  = 1; and the number of children who passed FS 
training session 2 but failed the ‘self question of the FB post-test task (n = 7) was 
also not significantly different from the number of children who failed FS training 
session 2 but passed the ‘self question of the FB post-test task (n = 1), ^(1) = 3.13,/? 
= .07. Moreover, both contingencies showed the same numbers of children passing (n 
= 8) and failing (n = 3) both training session 2 and the post-test and the same number 
of children passing (n = 8) either training session 2 or the post-test. These findings 
suggested that training on the FS task probably had the same transfer effect to the 
‘self question of the FB post-test task as training on the FB task had on the FS post­
test task, confirming the other half of the second prediction.
Finally, with a wide age range of 3;3 -  5;4, it was possible that age may have 
played a role in how well the children responded to the training and subsequent 
success on the post-test tasks. To test this possibility, children who failed the first 
training session and passed the relevant post-test task were identified as “improvers” 
and then whether improvement and post-test performance correlated with age was 
examined. There were six improvers in each of the FS and FB training groups and 
seven in the Control training group. Spearman correlation tests revealed that age was 
not associated with improvement and post-test performance, rss (57) < .24, ps > .073, 
suggesting that age did not play a significant role in the success of training and post­
test performance.
Discussion.
The main aim of this experiment was to critically examine the proposal that the 
FB and FS tasks draw on the same underlying conceptual demands in testing 
understanding of representations. If equivalence was found in a training study, this 
would provide more stringent evidence for this claim that understanding of false 
belief reflects a general understanding of representations rather than a domain-specific 
understanding of mind. Related to this the experiment aimed to find concept 
generalisation by using tasks that were not identical between training and post-test. 
Moreover, it was expected that children’s age would not explain how well they 
responded to the training and performed in the post-test.
3 The finding of rs (57) = .24, p  = .07 was gained between age and the ‘self question of the VPT post­
test task. The other findings, showing age was not associated with improvement and post-test 
performance, were rss (57) < .21,ps > .12.
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Main findings.
With respect to the proposal that understanding of false beliefs reflects a general 
understanding of representations, two main findings provided evidence for the 
equivalence of false-belief and false-sign understanding. First, it was found that 
children responded similarly on both FB and FS post-test tasks and the two tasks were 
related, suggesting that the two tasks were equivalent, supporting the results of 
previous studies (Leekam et al., 2008; Sabbagh, Moses, et al, 2006, Experiment 2). 
Second, it was found that training on the FB task enhanced performance of the FS 
post-test task, showing a transfer effect from false-belief training to false-sign 
understanding. Although between-participants analysis did not show a transfer effect 
from false-sign training to false-belief understanding, other within-participants 
analyses suggested that training on the FS task contributed to the understanding of 
one’s own false beliefs and provided evidence for the equivalence/transferability 
between the two types of false representations.
Evidence for concept generalization was also found. In comparison to the 
Control training group, training on the location change FS task enhanced performance 
on the contents change FS post-test task for the FS training group and training on the 
location change FB task enhanced performance on the ‘other’ question o f the contents 
change FB post-test task for the FB training group. This finding showed a 
generalisation of trained concepts to the post-test tasks that are structurally different 
from the training tasks. However, effects of training on non FB and FS post-test tasks 
were not found. Finally, age did not have a significant effect on the training and post­
test performance. The implications of all these findings are outlined below.
Implications o f the findings.
The main finding of transferability between the FB and FS tasks after training 
supports the claim for non-specificity of false-belief understanding. However, an 
alternative explanation might come from the overall better performance on both FB 
and FS post-test tasks shown by the FB training group (see Table 2.7). Instead o f a 
transfer effect from false-belief training to false-sign understanding, one might argue 
that the children of the FB training group might have already possessed the concept of 
false-sign understanding in the first place given that they were not pre-tested on any 
FS task. Although this possibility cannot be ruled out, I suggest that it is unlikely 
based on the contingency demonstrated between the performance of the FB training
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group on the FS and the ‘other’ question of the FB post-test tasks. Only the ‘other’ 
question of the FB task was considered because it was the question on which the 
false-belief training was shown to be effective. There were 13 out of 19 children who 
showed consistent performance between the two post-test tasks. Out of these 13 
children, 9 passed both tasks. In contrast, there were only 3 children in the FB training 
group who failed the FB task but passed the FS task. These 3 children showed no 
benefits from the false-belief training at all (failing the ‘self question of the FB task 
as well) but still performed well on the FS task, suggesting that they were the few 
who might have already possessed the concept of false-sign understanding in advance. 
Such pattern of contingency provided stronger evidence for a transference from false- 
belief training to false-sign understanding than a pre-existing knowledge of false-sign 
understanding.
The subsidiary finding of concept generalisation between different task forms 
supports the results of previous successful training studies (Appleton & Reddy, 1996; 
Slaughter, 1998). Appleton and Reddy found significantly improved performance on 
the contents change FB post-test tasks after training children on the location change 
FB tasks, whilst Slaughter demonstrated an elevated performance on the FB and VPT 
post-test tasks after children were trained on the FB task. However, the current 
experiment only showed an improvement on the ‘other’ question of the contents 
change FB post-test task whereas Appleton and Reddy showed improvements on both 
‘self and ‘other’ questions of the contents change FB post-test tasks after training on 
the location change FB tasks. A possible reason for this difference between the two 
studies would be the difference in procedures used for the ‘self question of the 
contents change FB task. Appleton and Reddy’s procedure for the ‘self question of 
the contents change FB task involved asking the question while the unexpected 
content of the container was still out of the container and on display in the 
experimenter’s hand. The current experiment, instead, involved putting the 
unexpected content of the container back into the container before asking the ‘self 
question o f the contents change FB task. As Appleton and Reddy have mentioned, 
their procedure for the ‘self question of the contents change FB task might have 
slightly reduced the incidence of error on the question by reducing the conflict with 
reality. Therefore, even though training on the location change FB tasks in both that 
and the present experiment only involved asking someone else’s belief about the 
location of something (i.e., an ‘other’ question), only Appleton and Reddy’s study
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found improvements on both ‘self and ‘other* questions of the contents change FB 
post-test tasks.
With respect to the last finding of no training effects on other post-test tasks 
(i.e., the VPT, AR and NC tasks), there may be several explanations. First, the ‘self 
question of the VPT task might be too easy for the children so that a ceiling effect was 
demonstrated across the training groups. Second, a different training task was used for 
the FB training group in the current experiment in comparison to Slaughter’s (1998) 
Study 2 and Slaughter and Gopnik (1996); this might be a possible reason that the 
performance on the VPT and AR post-test tasks was not improved by training. Both 
previous studies trained children with deceptive objects. This type of training is 
relevant to the VPT and AR post-test tasks. However, the current experiment trained 
on location change tasks that are less relevant to the cognitive demands of visual 
perspective-taking and appearance-reality distinction. This may explain why the two 
previous studies showed evidence that the FB training group outperformed the other 
two groups on the VPT and AR post-test task, whereas the current experiment did not. 
Third, another reason why there was no training effect on the VPT and NC post-test 
tasks might be because of the possibility that some of the children in the irrelevant 
training groups (i.e., the Control training group for the VPT post-test task; the FS and 
FB training group for the NC post-test task) already possessed the concepts o f visual 
perspective-taking and number conservation. Previous studies have shown evidence 
that the ability of visual perspective-taking emerges prior to false-belief understanding 
(e.g., Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1986; Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991).
Finally, the lack of pre-test on the NC task and of significant difference between 
the training groups’ performance on the NC post-test task might lead one to argue that 
the training of the NC task was so off-putting that it did not have any benefits and 
further hampered the Control training group’s performance on the other post-test 
tasks, resulting in the impression that the FS and FB training groups were seemingly 
better than the Control training group on those tasks. One might also suggest that the 
NC task might not be a good enough control task because it was completely different 
in structure to the FB and FS tasks (e.g., the NC task might not be subject to any 
practice effect but the FB and FS tasks were). This possible difference between tasks 
might create a difference between the training groups and affect the results. However, 
further analyses indicated that these possibilities were unlikely to be the case. First, 
there was a significant increase in performance from training session 1 to 2 for the
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Control training group, ^ ( l )  = 4 , p <  .05. Improvement was also shown from training 
to post-test as mentioned in the Results section. Second, the improvement from 
training session 1 to 2 for the Control training group was not significantly different 
from that for the FS training group and the improvement from pre-test to training 
session 1 for the FB training group, = .59, p  = .84, indicating that the NC task 
might be subjected to the same practice effect as the FS and FB tasks. Moreover, the 
number of “improvers” in each training group was similar (6 in each of the FS and FB 
training groups and 7 in the Control training group), suggesting that the training 
groups did not differ in terms of how well they benefited from the training tasks 
provided. Thus, children in the Control training group did benefit from the training 
and their poor performance on the other post-test tasks was due to their lack of 
competence.
Mechanism underlying the effects o f training.
Training effects were successfully demonstrated in the current experiment and 
the potential mechanism underlying these effects was further investigated. Results 
revealed that practice with or without feedback seemed to be a key to enhance 
performance, whether it is on false representations or number conservation. More 
specifically, the first encounter with a task significantly increased later performance, 
provided that the delay in between is short. This practice effect shown from the first to 
second encounter of a task however does not imply an acquisition of conceptual 
understanding. Instead, a conceptual change in understanding representations was 
demonstrated by the concept generalisation from training on the location change tasks 
to post-test on the contents change tasks and the transfer effect between false belief 
and false sign shown in the current experiment. It is widely suggested that repeated 
exposure to the tasks together with feedback given according to participants’ 
responses are crucial to effect this conceptual change. Useful kinds of feedback 
include counter-evidence through simple verbal feedback used in the current 
experiment, Slaughter (1998, Study 2), and Slaughter and Gopnik (1996), implicit 
feedback (Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006), discourse (e.g., Appleton & Reddy, 1996; 
Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003), and explanations (e.g., Melot & Angeard, 2003).
Another possible key factor for successful training was the intensity of the 
training scheme. All successful false-belief training studies (e.g., Appleton & Reddy, 
1996; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003; Slaughter, 1998) employed a distributed scheme,
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having several sessions over a long period of time. Amsterlaw and Wellman’s (2006) 
microgenetic study even demonstrated that a focal group which received a spread-out 
schedule of experiences on FB tasks showed improvement whereas a comparison 
group which had a more condensed schedule of experiences did not.
Other factors, such as age (e.g., see Wellman et al., 2001, for a meta-analysis) 
and language (e.g., Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003; see Milligan et al., 2007, for a 
meta-analysis), are important for children to make progress in false-belief 
understanding. However, the current experiment did not show that age played a 
significant role in the success of the training, suggesting that the 3-year-olds were no 
less reactive or sensitive to the training than the 5-year-olds. The training scheme used 
was as effective to young children as to older children if they were previously found 
to have not yet possessed the conceptual understanding of false belief. Unfortunately, 
the current experiment was not able to suggest whether language development has a 
contribution in the success of the training and the development of representational 
understanding. Further investigation is required to evaluate the influence of language 
development on the acquisition of representational understanding. For example, if 
children’s level of language skills determines their understanding of representation, 
then reducing the language demands of the false representation tasks should enhance 
their performance. This issue is dealt with later in the thesis.
To conclude, a conceptual understanding of representations, rather than simply 
learned superficial strategies of passing the tasks, was developed gradually in the 
children in the current experiment through a distributed training scheme which 
involved repeated exposure to the tasks with appropriate feedback. Given that the 
current experiment is the first to include false-sign training, I have only been able to 
discuss the underlying mechanism in terms of previous false-belief training studies. 
However, due to the transferability that has been shown between false belief and false 
sign, I reason that the same mechanism which underlies false-belief training would 
also hold for false-sign training. I suggest that children’s understanding of 
representations develops through a process of conceptual consolidation and 
restructuring which requires the experience of new evidence to be provided.
The interpretation for the training effect found in the current experiment was of 
a shared concept of representational understanding underlying both FB and FS tasks. 
However, an alternative explanation could also be proposed. As both FB and FS tasks 
confound the requirement of understanding representations with language and
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executive demands, the transferability found between the FB and FS tasks might be 
attributed to an increased ability of language and executive function rather than 
representational understanding after training. In the following chapter, the nature of 
the equivalence between the FB and FS tasks is further investigated by carefully 
controlling the demands of language and executive function of the tasks.
64
Chapter 3 Equivalence of Performance on False Mental and False Non-Mental 
Representation Tasks: Representational Understanding or Language and
Executive Function?
As discussed earlier, both FB and FS tasks confound the requirement of 
understanding representations with language and executive demands. It is therefore 
possible that the association and transfer effect found between the two tasks in 
previous studies, including Experiment 1 and 2 in Chapter 2, were due to language 
and executive function rather than representational understanding. In order to address 
this possibility, Chapter 3 describes tasks that disentangle language and executive 
function from representational understanding, and two experiments that employed 
these tasks. One of these tasks is Apperly et al.’s (2004) non-verbal reality-unknown 
FB task which was adapted from Call and Tomasello (1999). Apperly et al.’s FB task 
was employed because it improved on Call and Tomasello’s task by standardising the 
procedure with videos and carefully controlling confounding factors with intervened 
test, control and filler trials. I briefly outline Apperly et al.’s FB task below.
In Apperly et al.’s (2004) FB task, the confounding cognitive factors of 
language and executive function were minimised, eliminated or carefully controlled. 
First, the task was mainly non-verbal which used the minimum level of language. 
Second, the task was free from the requirement of cognitive inhibition of one’s own 
knowledge about reality. Third, the task involved control trials in which participants 
were tested on incidental executive demands (i.e., working memory and response 
inhibition). Each trial of the task was displayed through a short video and participants 
were required to work out which of two identical boxes in the video contained a 
hidden object (ie., a plastic block). Participants were instructed that a woman in the 
videos was there to help them find the object by placing a marker on top of a box to 
indicate the object’s location. Participants’ comprehension of the instructions given 
was checked with a number of warm-up trials on which corrective feedback was 
provided when necessary. All of the trials initially showed a man hiding an object in 
one of two boxes. This hiding action did not reveal to the participant which box 
actually contained the object. He then tipped the boxes toward the woman so she 
could have a look into both boxes. The participant him/herself could not see into the 
boxes at this stage. Therefore, both the man and woman in the videos knew which box 
the object was in, but the participant did not. For the test trial, the woman then left and
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the man swapped the boxes around, creating a false belief in the woman. When she 
returned, she placed the marker on the box that she thought contained the object and 
then put the marker back on the table in between the boxes. At this point, the video 
was paused and participants were asked to indicate the box that contained the object. 
Thus, participants had to take the woman’s false belief into account in order to work 
out where the object really was. Two control trials and two filler trials, which did not 
require false-belief reasoning, were also included to ensure that participants could 
meet the incidental executive demands and basic requirements of the task such as 
attending to and remembering what has happened, and inhibiting the prepotent 
tendency of pointing to the box indicated by the woman when she was wrong.
Based on this FB task, Apperly et al. (2007) also developed a similar task: the 
non-verbal reality-unknown false photograph (FP) task. It followed closely to the FB 
task above except that the woman took a Polaroid photograph of the interior of the 
boxes after an object had been placed inside one of them The participants could not 
see which box contained the object. The woman placed the photograph face-down in 
front of the boxes, and left without returning. For the test trial, the man swapped the 
boxes. He then helped participants to find the object by revealing the photograph 
which showed the object inside one of the boxes. He placed the photograph face­
down again and the video was paused for participants to indicate the box that 
contained the object. Two control and two filler trials were also included. This FP 
task was claimed to be closely matched to the FB task in the aspects of conceptual and 
incidental executive demands.
According to Apperly et al. (2007), both of their FB and FP tasks required 
understanding of representations. They argued that both made the same conceptual 
demand in the sense that both tasks required participants to consider the woman’s 
belief or the photograph in relation to the current situation in order to figure out the 
current location of the object. Hence, Apperly et al. suggested that their tasks 
answered Pemer’s (1995) argument against using the standard FP task (e.g., Zaitchik, 
1990) as a non-mental comparison to the standard FB task (i.e., the photograph used 
in the standard FP task is a true representation of the situation at the time the 
photograph was taken; whereas a false belief is a misrepresentation of the current 
situation). However, it is still important to note that the content of a photograph is 
“about” an outdated situation although Apperly et al.’s FP task related it to the current 
situation. In other words, the photograph in their FP task acted as a clue providing
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outdated information which helped participants to infer the current situation. On the 
contrary, in their FB task, the woman’s false belief was “about” the current situation 
and her indication with the marker acted as a clue providing current but false 
information which helped participants to infer the current true situation. Thus, their 
FP task might still not be conceptually equivalent to their FB task.
Considering the possibility that Apperly et a l ’s (2004) FB task and their (2007) 
FP task might not be conceptually equivalent, I designed a novel task based on their 
tasks. This was a non-verbal reality-unknown FS task with a series of test, control and 
filler trials which were also displayed in short videos. In this task, a signpost was 
constructed with an electric plug attached. As a signpost, especially an electrically 
operated signpost, similar to traffic lights, is supposed to represent a current situation, 
it can become false when electricity supply is disrupted and the situation changes. For 
example, an electrical signpost represents an object’s location (referent) as A by 
automatically turning its direction to point to A (sense). However, when electricity 
supply is disrupted, it cannot change its direction even though the object has been 
moved to B so it keeps representing the object’s location as A. The object’s location 
which is the referent of the signpost is now B but the sense of the signpost is still A so 
the signpost becomes false in that its reference is distinct from its sense. In this way, 
the false signpost matches with the woman’s indication in Apperly et al.’s FB task, 
both of which act as clues providing current but false information which help 
participants to infer the current true situations. However, the signpost is non-mentally 
(electrically) operated whereas the woman’s indication in Apperly et al.’s FB task is 
mentally generated.
The newly devised FS task involved a short training video clip which presented 
the signpost as being electrically operated by means of electrical connection when 
plugged into a socket by a woman. It then turned left or right in between two identical 
boxes to show where an object was. A mechanical noise could be heard whenever the 
signpost was turning. Therefore, participants learned the association between the 
mechanical noise and the “turning” of the signpost during the training. It is important 
to note that the mechanical noise did not indicate direction, only the pointing of the 
signpost indicated direction. Moreover, the signpost turned not only when the object 
was moved from one box to the other box, but also when the two boxes were swapped 
around with the object inside one of them. Figure 3.1 presents the event sequence in 
the training video clip.
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placed in)
(woman)
(noise)(connected)(socket)
(object 
taken out)
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moved to)
(boxes swapped)
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Training. (1) Signpost with an electric plug was not yet connected to electricity supply. 
(2) Signpost was connected to electricity supply by woman. (3) Object was put in one 
box and signpost turned, indicating object’s location. Mechanical noise was always 
heard while signpost was turning. (4) Object was then moved to the other box and 
signpost turned accordingly (noise was heard). (5) Boxes were swapped with object 
inside one o f them and signpost turned accordingly (noise was heard).
Figure 3.1. Event sequence in the training o f the novel false sign task.
Following the training o f the novel FS task, warm-up trials were given (see 
Figure 3.2). In the warm-up trials, the signpost was blocked from view by a screen but 
its electric plug was visible. The woman put the plug into a socket and placed the two 
boxes on the sides o f the screen which covered the signpost only. It was important to 
note that participants knew that one o f the two boxes contained the object but did not 
know which one. The mechanical noise was heard (suggesting the signpost was 
turning behind the screen) as soon as the two boxes were placed. When the noise 
stopped, the woman removed the screen to show the signpost as a true sign indicating 
the location o f the object. Participants were then asked to identify the object’s 
location. Following Apperly et al.’s (2004, 2007) FB and FP tasks, corrective 
feedback was provided in these warm-up trials when necessary.
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Warm-up trial. (1) Signpost was blocked from view by screen but its electric plug was 
visible. (2) Signpost was connected to electricity supply. (3) Two boxes (one contained 
object) were placed on the sides of the screen and mechanical noise was heard. (4) Screen 
was removed and signpost was shown. (5) Screen was replaced and participant was asked 
to identify object’s location.
Figure 3.2. Event sequence of the warm-up trial o f the novel false sign task.
The test trial o f the FS task was as follows (see Figure 3.3). (1) The signpost 
was blocked from view by a screen in the same way as the warm-up trials. The 
woman put the plug o f the signpost into a socket. She then placed the two boxes (one 
contained the object but participants did not know which one) on the sides o f the 
screen. The mechanical noise was heard (meaning the signpost was turning). (2) The 
signpost was then deprived of its electricity supply by the woman removing the plug, 
and it became a false sign when she swapped the boxes around. (3) She then helped 
participants to find the object by taking away the screen to show the signpost. (4) 
Eventually, she put the screen back in front o f the signpost. The video was paused and 
participants were asked to identify the object’s location. Participants thus had to take 
the false sign into account in order to work out where the object really was. Table 3.1 
shows the key stages of the test trials o f these non-verbal reality-unknown FB, FP and 
FS tasks. Table 3.2 presents the analogy between the components involved in the FB 
and FS tasks.
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False sign test trial. (1) Signpost was connected to electricity supply and mechanical noise 
was heard. (2) Signpost was disconnected from its electricity supply and became false 
when woman swapped boxes. (3) Signpost was shown to participant. (4) Signpost was 
blocked by screen again and participant was asked to identify object’s location.
Figure 3.3. Event sequence o f the test trial o f the novel false sign task.
Table 3.1
Key Stages of the Test Trials o f False Belief, False Photograph and False Sign Tasks
False belief (Apperly et False photograph (Apperly False sign (novel) 
al., 2004) et al., 2007)
A man and a woman 
appeared.
The man placed two boxes 
(one contained an object) 
on a table by the two sides 
of a marker and showed 
the interior of the boxes to 
the woman.
The woman left the room 
(so she was not able to 
update her belief about the 
location o f the object).
The man swapped the 
boxes.
The woman’s belief was 
manifested when she 
placed the marker on one 
of the boxes.
A man placed two boxes 
(one contained an object) 
on a table. A woman took 
a photograph o f the boxes’ 
interior and placed it face­
down on the table.
The man swapped the 
boxes.
The photograph was 
shown when the man 
turned it over.
A woman appeared with 
an electrical signpost 
covered by a screen but its 
plug was visible. She put 
the plug into a socket.
The woman placed two 
boxes (one contained an 
object) on a table by the 
two sides o f the screen. A 
mechanical noise was 
heard.
The woman took the plug 
out (so the signpost was 
not able to update its 
indication o f the object’s 
location).
The woman swapped the 
boxes.
The signpost was revealed 
when the woman took the 
screen off.
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Table 3.2
Analogy Between the Components Involved in the False Belief and False Sign Tasks
False belief (Apperly et aL, 2004) False sign (novel)
Man Woman
(hiding object and showing to woman) (hiding object and enabling signpost)
Woman’s presence Signpost being plugged in
Marker placed between boxes 
(no indication of object’s location)
Screen
Woman viewing inside the boxes Signpost’s turning
(suggested by a mechanical noise)
Woman’s absence Signpost being unplugged
False belief being manifested by False sign being revealed by removing
placing marker screen
With this newly devised FS task, the following two experiments investigated 
whether the equivalence between the standard FB and FS tasks are based on the same 
underlying representational understanding or other cognitive processes of language 
and an aspect of executive function, namely cognitive inhibition. The standard FB and 
FS tasks used in previous studies and Experiment 1 and 2 presented in Chapter 2 were 
verbal tasks in which the real location or real identity o f an object was known by the 
participant. The novel FS task and Apperly et al.’s (2004, 2007) FB and FP tasks used 
in the following two experiments were non-verbal reality-unknown tasks in which the 
real location of an object was not known by the participant. Hence, language was not 
involved and cognitive inhibition was not required in these non-verbal reality- 
unknown tasks. If the association between the standard FB and FS tasks was 
replicated in this non-verbal reality-unknown context, it would suggest that language 
and cognitive inhibition did not play an important role in the association between the 
FB and FS tasks.
Experiment 3 provided the very first test of the novel FS task, investigating how 
it worked relative to Apperly et al.’s FB and FP tasks in typically developing children. 
As Apperly et al.’s tasks have not been used with typically developing children in any 
published study, Experiment 3 also extended the applicability o f their tasks. Children 
with an age range of 3 to 7 instead of 5 years were recruited because the youngest
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mean age that Apperly et al.’s FB task has been established with is 13 years 3 months 
with a mean verbal mental age of 6 years 10 months in a sample of atypically 
developing children (including children with fragile X syndrome and intellectual 
disability; Grant et al., 2007). If children’s performance on these non-verbal reality- 
unknown tasks was similar to that of the standard tasks, the strong association 
previously found between the standard FB and FS tasks but not between the standard 
FB and FP tasks would be replicated in this non-verbal reality-unknown context. This 
replication would provide further support for the claim that the FB and FS tasks share 
a developmental factor which is not shared by the FP task. Moreover, this 
developmental factor would not be cognitive skills of language and cognitive 
inhibition but representational understanding, which allows a differentiation between 
reference and sense, as the non-verbal reality-unknown context did not involve the 
demands of language and cognitive inhibition.
Experiment 4 added a verbal reality-known version (corresponding to the 
standard version) of the FB and FS tasks to compare with the non-verbal reality- 
unknown version of the two tasks in a different group of typically developing children 
with the same age range of 3 to 7 years. The aim of this experiment was twofold.
First, this experiment intended to further replicate the associations found between the 
FB and FS tasks in both standard and non-verbal reality-unknown versions within a 
single experiment. If a replication was illustrated again, it would evidently suggest 
that language and cognitive inhibition do not play a role in the association between 
the FB and FS tasks. Second, the experiment aimed to validate the novel FS task with 
the standard version of the task. If a validation was shown, it would suggest that the 
new FS task was virtually the standard FS task but could further be used to test 
populations who have language and cognitive inhibition problems such as atypically 
developing children.
Both Experiment 3 and 4 also measured children’s language ability using the 
long form of the British Picture Vocabulary Scale - Second Edition (BPVS-II; Dunn, 
Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997). This scale is a measure of receptive vocabulary 
which does not require any reading, speaking or writing. From this scale, children’s 
verbal mental age was calculated. As both Experiment 3 and 4 aimed at finding 
associations between the FB and FS tasks and attempting to exclude language as a 
possible explanation for the associations found, controlling children’s verbal mental 
age when examining the associations could further test the claim that language does
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not play a significant role in the equivalence between the two tasks. Ethics approval 
which applied to both Experiment 3 and 4 was granted by the Ethics Advisory Sub- 
Committee in the Department of Psychology in Durham University and the School of 
Psychology Ethics Committee in Cardiff University.
Experiment 3
The novel non-verbal reality-unknown FS task was compared to Apperly et al.’s 
(2004, 2007) non-verbal reality-unknown FB and FP task in 3- to 7-year-old children. 
Although associations have been examined between the standard FB, FP, and FS tasks 
in previous studies to date, comparisons between non-verbal reality-unknown versions 
of these tasks have not been made. If the strong association between the standard FB 
and FS tasks but not between the standard FB and FP tasks was replicated in the non­
verbal reality-unknown context of the current experiment, this would suggest that 
language and cognitive inhibition cannot explain the association between the tasks.
Following the pattern of performance on the standard FB, FP and FS tasks, it 
was expected that performance on the non-verbal FS and FB tasks should correlate 
strongly whereas performance on the non-verbal FP and FB tasks should be less 
correlated. This strong correlation between the non-verbal FS and FB tasks should 
also hold, whether or not performance on the non-verbal FP task or children’s verbal 
mental age was controlled. Moreover, older children were expected to perform better 
than younger children on the non-verbal FB, FP and FS tasks, especially with this 
wider range of age. These predictions were made regarding to children’s performance 
on the test trials of these non-verbal tasks.
These non-verbal tasks also involve control trials, which did not require false- 
belief pictorial and false-sign reasoning, to ensure that children could meet the 
incidental executive demands of the tasks. Instead of screening children with these 
control trials as done in Call and Tomasello (1999), the assurance of meeting 
incidental executive demands of the tasks was achieved by showing that children’s 
performance on these control trials was significantly better than that on the test trials. 
Performance on these control trials across tasks also provided an additional test of 
whether these tasks were equivalent in terms of their incidental executive demands. 
Finally, performance on the filler trials was also analysed.
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Method.
Participants,
Twenty children aged 41 -  58 months (M = 49.90 months, SD = 5.95) and 
twenty children aged 60 -  83 months (M =71.65 months, SD = 7.75) were recruited 
from two schools in North East England and South East Wales. Half o f the younger 
children and half o f the older children were from each school and no significant 
difference in children’s performance was found between the schools (ps > .05) 
although they were from different regions of the United Kingdom. None of the 
participants from North East England participated in Experiment 1 and 2 reported in 
Chapter 2. The sample had a mean verbal mental age (VMA) o f68.93 months (range 
= 39 -100  months; SD = 16.30), which was calculated using the BPVS-II. All 
children were White British except five who were from minority ethnic backgrounds. 
The populations of the schools were generally of low socio-economic status. Parental 
informed consent was obtained before testing.
Design,
This was a mixed design, testing younger versus older participants with the non­
verbal reality-unknown FB, FP and FS tasks. Participants were tested with three 
sessions at one- or two-week intervals. In each session, they were tested with three 
non-verbal reality-unknown tasks: false belief false photograph and false sign. Each 
task in the test phase consisted of five trials: false representation, working memory 
control, response inhibition control, true representation filler and clue confirmation 
filler. The presentation order o f the three tasks was counterbalanced across 
participants and sessions whilst the order of the five trials within each task was 
randomised in each of the three sessions. The purpose of giving three sessions was to 
gain more reliable data for each participant as each trial involves a single pass/fail 
response.
Materials and procedure.
Participants were tested individually in a room of their own school by an 
experimenter. The tasks were video based and were presented on a laptop computer 
using PowerPoint software. As the FB and FP tasks were originally designed for 
adults being administered in two different studies (Apperly et al., 2004, 2007), several
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adaptations have been made to accommodate these tasks and the novel FS task in a 
single experiment for children. First, children were given short training video clips, 
each of which illustrated how a Polaroid camera or a signpost worked, at the 
beginning of the FP and FS tasks respectively. This training procedure for the FP task 
was adapted from that in the standard FP task devised by Zaitchik (1990). As children 
by the age of 3 years already understand the relationship between seeing and 
knowing, no training would be required for the FB task. Second, calls for attention 
(e.g., calling participants by their names) and encouraging words (e.g., “Well done!”) 
to boost motivation were required for children in each of the FB, FP and FS tasks. 
Third, a break was given between each of the three tasks.
The training video of the FP task showed a man who pressed the button of a 
Polaroid camera in front of some flowers and a picture came out o f the camera; the 
picture then developed to show an accurate image of the flowers. The training video 
of the FS task showed a woman who manipulated an electrical signpost (see Figure 
3.1). She put the plug that was attached to the signpost in a socket and then hid an 
object (Le., a plastic block) in one of two identical boxes which were placed on the 
two sides of the signpost. The signpost automatically turned to show the location of 
the object. Each time the signpost turned, it made a mechanical noise. When the 
object was displaced visibly (i.e., the object was taken out from one box and put into 
the other box in full view of participants), the signpost turned to show the object’s 
new location and the mechanical noise was heard while it was turning. Finally, the 
object was displaced invisibly (i.e., the object was in one of the boxes and the boxes 
were swapped). The signpost turned again to accurately show the object’s current 
location and the mechanical noise was heard when the signpost turned.
Before each task started, the principles of each task were explained verbally 
with stills, e.g., “We will play a hiding-and-finding game and your job is to find a 
block. Here, the woman connects the sign by putting its electric plug into the socket. 
Then she hides the block here and the sign turns to help you to find the block.” 
Warm-up trials were then given (see Figure 3.2). Participants were asked to identify 
the location of the object which was hidden in one of the two boxes. In each task, a 
woman provided a clue to help the participants to locate the object. For the FB task, a 
woman placed a marker on top of the box she thought contained the object. For the FP 
task, a woman took a Polaroid photograph showing the interior of the two boxes. For 
the FS task, a woman revealed a signpost which automatically turned to show the
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location of the object. Corrective feedback, e.g., “No, the block is in there.”, was 
provided as necessary. Two consecutive correct responses in the warm-up phase were 
required from participants before they entered the test phase of the relevant task. None 
of the participants required more than four warm-up trials to achieve two consecutive 
correct responses.
The test phase involved one false representation test trial, two control trials 
{working memory and response inhibition), and two filler trials {true representation 
and clue confirmation) in each of the FB, FP and FS tasks. The five trials o f the FB 
and FP tasks were exactly the same as those in Apperly et al. (2004, 2007; see Table 
3.3 and 3.4 respectively). For the FS task, its test, control and filler trials are listed in 
Table 3.5.
Table 3.3
Key Stages of the Test, Control and Filler Trials of the False Belief Task (Apperly et 
al., 2004)
False 
representation 
test trial
Working 
memory 
control trial
Response True 
inhibition representation 
control trial filler trial
Chie 
confirmation 
filler trial
A man and a woman presented.
The man placed two boxes (one contained an object) on a table by the two sides of a 
marker and showed the interior of the boxes to the woman.
The woman 
left the room.
The woman 
placed the 
marker on one 
box and put it 
back on table.
The woman left the room. The woman 
placed the 
marker on one 
box and put it 
back on table
The man 
swapped the 
boxes.
The woman 
left the room.
The man took The man held 
the object out the boxes up 
of one box and and down 
put it into vertically, 
another box.
The woman 
left the room.
The woman 
returned, 
placed the 
marker on one 
box and put it 
back on table.
The man 
swapped the 
boxes.
The woman returned, placed the 
marker on one box and put it 
back on table.
The man took 
the object out 
of the box 
indicated by 
the woman and 
put it into 
another box.
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Table 3.4
Key Stages of the Test, Control and Filler Trials o f the False Photograph Task 
(Apperly et al., 2007)
False Working Response True Clue
representation memory inhibition representation confirmation
test trial control trial control trial filler trial filler trial
A man placed two boxes (one contained an object) <on a table. A woman took a
photograph of the boxes’ interior and placed it face-down on the table. Then she left.
The man The man The man took The man held The man
swapped the revealed the the object out the boxes up revealed the
boxes. photograph of one box and and down photograph
and then put it into vertically. and then
covered it. another box. covered it.
He revealed He swapped He revealed the photograph and He took the
the photograph the boxes. then covered it. object out of
and then the box
covered it. indicated by
the photograph
and put it into
another box.
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Table 3.5
Key Stages of the Test, Control and Filler Trials of the Novel False Sign Task
False 
representation 
test trial
Working 
memory 
control trial
Response 
inhibition 
control trial
True 
representation 
filler trial
Chie 
confirmation 
filler trial
A woman presented with an electrical signpost covered by a screen but its plug was 
visible. She put the plug into a socket.
She placed two boxes on a table and the signpost turned with a mechanical noise 
behind a screen. The signpost indicating the location of an object was established.
She took the 
plug out.
She swapped 
the boxes.
The signpost 
was revealed 
and then 
covered.
The signpost 
was revealed 
and then 
covered.
She took the 
plug out.
She swapped 
the boxes.
She took the plug out.
She took the 
object out of 
one box and 
put it into 
another box.
She held the 
boxes up and 
down 
vertically.
The signpost was revealed and 
then covered.
The signpost 
was revealed 
and then 
covered.
She took the 
plug out.
She took the 
object out of 
the box 
indicated by 
the signpost 
and put the 
object into 
another box.
Only the false representation test trials required false-belief, pictorial or false- 
sign reasoning. The control trials involved the same demands of (1) holding the 
events that happened in mind while working out the object’s location, and (2) 
inhibiting the tendency of pointing to the box indicated, as the test trials. In the true 
representation filler trials, the object’s location was not changed so the woman’s 
belief, photograph or signpost remained accurate in representing the object’s location. 
This filler trial type was to check whether participants had adopted an incorrect 
strategy of always pointing to the opposite box from the one indicated by the woman, 
photograph or signpost. The clue confirmation filler trials revealed the woman’s 
belief, photograph or signpost and then showed the object being taken out of the 
indicated box, demonstrating that the woman, photograph or signpost was not meant 
to be deceptive. Both types of these filler trials did not require false-belief, pictorial
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and false-sign reasoning, and demanded less executive skills than the test and control 
trials. Thus, a relatively good performance on these filler trials would reflect that 
participants had paid attention and not adopted incorrect strategies o f guessing or 
always pointing to the opposite box from the one indicated. Feedback which showed 
the interior of the two boxes was always presented at the end of each trial after 
participants had responded.
Two more testing sessions followed, at one- or two-week intervals with different 
presentation orders of tasks and trials. In the second and third sessions, no training 
and warm-up trials was entailed. Each of the FB, FP, and FS tasks started with an 
explanation of its principle, followed by the test phase of the relevant task.
Results.
Children received a score of 1 for each of the trials if they correctly identified 
the object’s location. Scores across the three sessions were summed and the mean 
scores for each trial type of the three tasks are shown in Table 3.6. The distribution of 
the data was negatively skewed for most of the dependent variables and data 
transformations, including square root, log and inverse transformations, did not 
improve normality. However, the outcomes of the following parametric analyses were 
corroborated by running non-parametric equivalent tests. Results from these non- 
parametric analyses were also reported for each set of the parametric analyses.
Performance on the false representation test trials of the three tasks was first 
analysed to investigate the equivalence of the tasks. These analyses included two 
parts. Part one took age difference into account by (1) comparing older and younger 
participants’ performance against chance; (2) performing a mixed between- and 
within-participants ANOVA with age as between-participants factor and task as 
within-participants factor; and (3) determining whether older versus younger 
participants improved across the three sessions given that feedback was provided after 
each trial. This improvement across sessions was examined using non-parametric 
Friedman tests as the range of scores participants obtained in each session was 0 -  1. 
Part two involved the whole sample to (1) examine the degree of associations between 
the FB, FP and FS tasks with correlation tests; and (2) investigate the contingencies 
between participants’ performance on any two of the three tasks in the first session 
with non-parametric McNemar tests.
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To explore whether the three tasks were also equivalent in their incidental 
executive demands, performance on the control trials of the tasks was analysed by 
comparing against chance and carrying out a mixed ANOVA with age as between- 
participants factor and task as within-participants factor for each type of the control 
trials. Then, performance on the false representation test trials versus the control trials 
was investigated for each of the FB, FP and FS tasks, using a one-way repeated- 
measures ANOVA. The purpose of this analysis was to ensure that children’s 
performance on the false representation test trials could not be accounted for by their 
ability in meeting the incidental executive demands of the tasks. Finally, performance 
on the filler trials o f the tasks was examined. As the filler trials were relatively easy, a 
ceiling effect on these trials was expected if children have paid attention and have not 
adopted incorrect strategies.
Table 3.6
Mean Scores on Each Trial Type of the False Belief False Photograph and False Sign 
Tasks in Experiment 3 (Standard Deviations are Shown in Brackets)
Trial Age N
Task (range of scores = 0 - 3 )
False belief False photo False sign
False representation All 40 1.45 (1.06) 1.5 (1.2) 1.5(1.18)
Younger 20 0.85 (0.81) 0.7 (0.8) 0.9(1.12)
Older 20 2.05 (0.94) 2.3 (0.98) 2.1 (0.91)
Response inhibition All 40 2.7 (0.65) 2.6 (0.81) 2.73 (0.60)
Younger 20 2.45 (0.83) 2.4 (0.99) 2.5 (0.76)
Older 20 2.95 (0.22) 2.8 (0.52) 2.95 (0.22)
Working memory All 40 2(1.04) 2.45 (.78) 2.1 (1.03)
Younger 20 1.6 (0.94) 2.25 (0.85) 1.7 (0.98)
Older 20 2.4 (0.99) 2.65 (0.67) 2.5 (0.95)
True representation All 40 2.73 (0.51) 2.73 (0.56) 2.8 (0.46)
Younger 20 2.65 (0.59) 2.8 (0.41) 2.75 (0.55)
Older 20 2.8 (0.41) 2.65 (0.67) 2.85 (0.37)
Clue confirmation All 40 3(0) 3(0) 3(0)
Younger 20 3(0) 3(0) 3(0)
Older 20 3(0) 3(0) 3(0)
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False representation test trials.
The first part of the analyses looked at older versus younger participants’ 
performance across the FB, FP and FS tasks. Older participants performed above 
chance on the test trials of the three tasks, ts( 19) > 2.60, ps < .05 with effect sizes of 
rs > .51. However, younger participants performed below chance on the three test 
trials, te(19) < -2.40, ps < .05, rs > .48. A 2 (age) X 3 (task) ANOVA revealed a main 
effect for age, F(l, 38) = 28.69,/? < .001 with an effect size of r = .66, but no effect 
for task and no interaction, Fs(2, 76) < 1.40,/?s > .25. Equivalent non-parametric 
analyses demonstrated identical results. Older participants performed consistently 
above chance, Wilcoxon Zs < -2.27, ps < .05 with effect sizes of rs < -.36. However, 
younger participants performed below chance level, Wilcoxon Zs < -2.13,/?s < .05, rs 
< -.34. Mann-Whitney U tests showed that older participants performed better than 
younger participants on all three tasks (Us < 85, ps < .01 with effect sizes of rs < - 
.51). There was no significant difference between tasks, Friedman test: 5 (^2, N=  40) = 
.28,/? = .89.
To examine whether participants improved their performance across the three 
sessions, non-parametric Friedman tests were used. Older participants did not improve 
their performance on the FB and FS tasks across the three sessions, ^s(2, N  = 20) < 
3.82, ps > .24, but improved on the FP task, ^(2, N  = 20) = 12.29, p  < .01. Further 
analyses showed that older participants’ performance on the FP task was improved 
from Session 1 to 2 and from Session 1 to 3, Wilcoxon Zs < -2.45, ps < .05, rs < -.39, 
but no improvement was shown from Session 2 to 3, Wilcoxon Z= -1,/? = 1. Younger 
participants did not improve their performance on all three tasks, x2s(2, N  = 20) <
3.43,ps > .23.
The second part of the analyses involved the whole sample to examine the 
correlations and contingencies between any two of the FB, FP and FS tasks. Bivariate 
correlations were calculated with total scores across the three sessions (range: 0 -  3), 
whereas contingencies were computed with scores from the first session only (range: 
0 -1 ) . Both Pearson’s and non-parametric Spearman’s correlation tests showed that 
performance on the three tasks was significantly correlated. Pearson’s correlations 
indicated that the FB task was significantly related to both FP and FS tasks, r(40) = 
.67,/? < .001, and r(40) = .76,/? < .001 respectively, and the FP task was correlated 
with the FS task, r(40) = .71,/? < .001. Results from Spearman’s correlation tests can 
be found in Table 3.7. The magnitude of the bivariate correlations between the three
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tasks remained strong when children’s VMA was controlled: pr(31) = .60, p  < .001 
between the FB and FP tasks, pr{31) = .71, p  < .001 between the FB and FS tasks, and 
pr{37) = .66, p  < .001 between the FP and FS tasks. When performance on the third 
task was controlled, only the correlation between the FB and FS tasks remained 
highly significant; the FP and FS tasks became less correlated; and the correlation 
between the FB and FP tasks fell to marginal significance level (p = .09; see Table 
3.7).
Table 3.7
Bivariate Raw Non-parametric Spearman’s Correlations and [Third-Task-Controlled 
Correlations] (With N) Between the False Belief, False Photograph and False Sign 
Tasks
False Belief False Photograph False Sign
False Belief
- .68** .77**
(40) (40)
False Photograph [.28m](37)
- .71**
(40)
False Sign [.55**](37)
[.42*]
(37)
-
Note. **p < .001, *p < .01, mp  = .09
The contingencies between performance on any two of the FB, FP and FS tasks 
in the first session are shown in Table 3.8. There was a majority of participants who 
performed consistently between any two of the tasks (i.e., they either answered 
correctly or incorrectly to both tasks: 27 in the FB-FP pair, 27 in the FB-FS pair, and 
28 in the FP-FS pair). The other participants who passed only one task in any two of 
the tasks were subjected to McNemer tests. These tests indicated that the number of 
participants who passed one task but failed the other task (e.g., 7 passed the FB task 
but failed the FP task) was not significantly different from the number of participants 
who failed the former but passed the latter (e.g., 6 failed the FB task but passed the FP 
task), X2s(l, N=  40) < .08, ps > .77. These findings suggest that the three tasks were 
of similar difficulty for participants who first encountered them.
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Table 3.8
Number of Participants With Correct Scores on any Pairs of the False Belief (FB), 
False Photograph (FP) and False Sign (FS) Tasks in the First Session
Total in each pair of tasks
Correct score FB and FP FB and FS FP and FS
Contingency between 
Both tasks (+ +) 20 19 20
1 st task only (+ -) 7 6 5
2nd task only (- +) 6 7 7
Neither task (- -) 7 8 8
Control trials.
Older children performed consistently above chance on the control trials o f all 
three tasks, fc(19) > 4.05, ps < .01, rs > .68 (non-parametric tests showed the same 
results: Wilcoxon Zs < -3.15,/?s < .001, rs < -.50). Younger children also performed 
above chance on the control trials of all three tasks, ts(\9) > 3.94, ps < .01, rs > .67, 
except the working memory control trials o f the FB and FS tasks on which they 
performed at chance level, fs(19) < .91, ps > .37. The same was found with non- 
parametric tests: younger children performed above chance on the control trials of the 
three tasks (Wilcoxon Zs < -2.98, ps < .01, rs < -.47), except the working memory 
control trials of the FB and FS tasks (Wilcoxon Zs > -1.01,/ts > .35).
For the response inhibition control trials of the three tasks, Mauchly’s (1940) 
test indicated a departure from sphericity and it was corrected using the Greenhouse- 
Geisser epsilon (Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959; corrected degrees of freedom are 
reported to one decimal place). There was a main effect of age, F(l, 38) = 6.37,/? < 
.05, r = .38, but no effect for task and no interaction, Fs(1.4, 76) < .98, ps > .36. Non- 
parametric Mann-Whitney U tests showed that older children performed better than 
younger children on the FB and FS tasks (Us < 138.50,ps < .05, rs < -.38) but not on 
the FP task (U= 158,/? = .15). No significant difference between tasks was showed, 
using non-parametric Friedman test: yf(2, N=  40) = 2.17,/? = .44.
For the working memory control trials of the three tasks, there were significant 
main effects of age and task, F(1, 38) = 8.36, p  < .01, r  = .42 and F(2, 76) = 5.23, p  < 
.01 with an effect size of rjp2 = .12 respectively, but no interaction, F(2, 76) = 1.25,/? 
= .29. To spell out the difference between the three tasks, pairwise comparisons using 
Bonferroni adjustment were performed. Performance on the working memory control
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trials of the FB and FS tasks was showed to be worse than that of the FP task, p < .01 
and p  = .07 respectively, but no significant difference was found between that of the 
FB and FS tasks, p — 1. Non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests revealed that older 
children performed better than younger children on the FB and FS tasks (C/s < 110,/?s 
< .01, rs < -.41) but not on the FP task ([U = 147.50, p = . 13). Friedman test also 
indicated a significant difference between tasks, %(2, N=  40) = 10.33,/? < .01. 
Performance on the working memory control trials of the FB and FS tasks was worse 
than that of the FP task, Wilcoxon Z = -2.81, p  < .01, r  = -.31 and Wilcoxon Z = -2.18, 
p  < .05, r  = -.24 respectively, whereas performance of the FB and FS tasks did not 
differ, Wilcoxon Z = -0.66, p  = .60.
False representation test trials versus control trials.
There were significant differences between performance on the test trials, 
response inhibition control trials, and working memory control trials, F(2, 78) =
27.87, p  < .001, riP2 = .42 for the FB task, F(2,78) = 19.08, p  < .001, qp2= .33 for the 
FP task, and F(2,78) = 23.74, p  < .001, rjp2 = .38 for the FS task. For the FB task, 
performance on the test trials was significantly worse than that on the response 
inhibition control trials (p < .001) and working memory control trials (p < .05); 
whereas performance on the response inhibition control trials was significantly better 
than that on the working memory control trials (p < .001). The same pattern of 
performance was shown for the FS task: performance on the test trials was worse than 
that on the response inhibition control trials (p < .001) and working memory control 
trials (p < .05); whereas performance on the response inhibition control trials was 
better than that on the working memory control trials (p < .01). For the FP task, 
performance on the test trials was also worse than that on the response inhibition 
control trials and working memory control trials (ps < .001); whereas performance on 
the two types of control trials did not differ (p = 1). Similar results were found with 
equivalent non-parametric analyses: performance on both of the control trials was 
significantly better than that on the test trials for all three tasks (Wilcoxon Zs < -2.82, 
ps < .01, rs < -.32).
Filler trials.
Ceiling effects were shown for both clue confirmation and true representation 
filler trials of all three tasks (see Table 3.6). Moreover, there were only 11/120,
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11/120, and 8/120 errors on the true representation filler trials of the FB, FP, and FS 
tasks respectively. Out of the 178 correct responses to the test trials of all three tasks, 
there were only 15 which were paired with an incorrect response to the true 
representation filler trial in the same task. These patterns of results suggested that 
participants were not likely using a strategy of always pointing to the opposite box 
from the one indicated by the clues.
Discussion.
The main goal of Experiment 3 was to assess whether the novel FS task is a 
good comparison task to Apperly et al.’s (2004, 2007) non-verbal FB and FP task in a 
group of 3- to 7-year-old children, providing the very first test of the novel FS task. 
Although both of Apperly et al.’s tasks have not been used in such a young age range 
in any published study, their tasks and the novel FS task were shown to be able to 
demonstrate a developmental change of false-belief felse-sign and pictorial 
understandings in consistent with previous studies (e.g., Leekam et al., 2008;
Sabbagh, Moses, et al., 2006). Moreover, performance on the false representation test 
trials of the FB, FP and FS tasks was not significantly different from but was 
correlated with each other, even when VMA was controlled. However, only the test 
trials of the FS and FB tasks remained highly correlated when the third task was 
controlled. These findings were supported by Leekam et al. (2008) who found similar 
results using standard verbal FB, FP and FS tasks.
Neither younger nor older participants significantly improved their performance 
on the false representation test trials of the FB and FS tasks across the three sessions. 
However, older but not younger participants improved their performance on that of 
the FP task. Although the three tasks were shown to be of similar difficulty for all 
participants who first encountered them (in particular, older participants started off 
with the same level of performance: 11 passed each of the FB and FP tasks, and 10 
passed the FS task), older participants improved on the FP task but not the FB and FS 
tasks. This finding suggests that the FP task was somehow easier and more subject to 
a practice effect than the FB and FS tasks for older participants, providing further 
support for the FP task’s lack of strong associations with the FB and FS tasks.
Regarding the performance on the control trials, the FS task rather than the FP 
task was more comparable to the FB task in the aspect of incidental working memory 
demand. Comparisons between the two types of the control trials of the three tasks
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also reflected that the working memory demand was higher than the response 
inhibition demand in both of the FB and FS tasks but not in the FP task. This finding 
provides a possible explanation for why the FP task was easier. However, it does not 
sufficiently explain why only older participants improved on the FP task as younger 
participants were also performing above chance on the working memory control trials 
o f the FP task. This inquiry might relate back to the conceptual problem that exists in 
the standard FP task. As the photographs used in the standard FP task and Apperly et 
al.’s (2007) FP task were true representations which represented the scenes at the time 
the photographs were taken (referent) as the way they were (sense), the photographs 
corresponded with their own referents and senses. Thus, participants might pass both 
of the tasks using their understanding of correspondence rather than representation. 
Although there is evidence showing that children can understand correspondence as 
early as 3 years of age, as mentioned in Chapter 1, younger participants probably 
failed Apperly et al.’s FP task because they tended to regard representations as 
corresponding to reality, regardless of whether it was known to them. However, older 
participants might realise that the task could be passed by using their understanding of 
correspondence from the first trial. With their sophisticated understanding of 
correspondence, older participants improved their performance significantly on later 
trials of the FP task but not the FB and FS tasks. Nevertheless, further investigations 
were required to evaluate this speculation. Taken together, all these findings 
suggested that the FB task was more equivalent to the new FS task rather than the FP 
task in both aspects of conceptual and incidental executive demands when applied in a 
population of typically developing children who are more sensitive to subtle 
differences in the demands of cognitive tasks than adults.
Finally, performance on both control and filler trials o f the three tasks ensured 
that children’s performance on the test trials could not be explained by an inability of 
meeting incidental executive demands and an adoption of incorrect strategies. 
Nevertheless, the non-verbal reality-unknown version of the FS task used in this 
experiment was new, therefore it was essential to replicate its findings and validate it 
with a task that corresponds to the standard FS task. Hence, Experiment 4 tested 
children with the non-verbal reality-unknown version and the verbal reality-known 
(standard) version of the FB and FS tasks.
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Experiment 4
The first aim of Experiment 4 was to replicate the previous finding that the 
equivalence between the FB and FS tasks holds in both verbal reality-known 
(standard) and non-verbal reality-unknown versions within a single experiment with a 
different sample of typically developing children. If this was the case, it would 
provide further evidence that children’s performance on the FB and FS tasks was 
supported by representational understanding and the association between the two 
tasks could not be explained by language and cognitive inhibition. Second, the 
experiment aimed to validate the new non-verbal reality-unknown FS task with the 
verbal reality-known FS task which was essentially a standard FS task.
In order to accomplish these two aims, Experiment 4 followed Call and 
Tomasello’s (1999) design of administering a verbal reality-known (standard) version 
of the FB task in the context of the non-verbal reality-unknown version of the task 
series. The same procedure was also employed in the non-verbal reality-unknown FS 
task series. Hence, the FB and FS tasks could be compared in both versions within a 
single experiment. Based on the findings of previous studies and Experiment 3, no 
significant difference but instead significant correlations were expected between the 
FB and FS tasks in both verbal and non-verbal versions, regardless of whether VMA 
was controlled.
Given that an association has been found in Call and Tomasello (1999) between 
the non-verbal and verbal versions of the FB task, a similar finding was expected in 
the current experiment. However, whether an association would be shown between 
the two versions of the FS task was a focus of the current experiment. No significant 
difference but significant correlations between the non-verbal and verbal versions of 
the FB and FS tasks would validate the new non-verbal FS task.
Method.
Participants,
Thirteen children below age 5 years 2 months (aged 39 -  62 months; M  = 52.69 
months, SD = 7.54) and thirteen older children above age 5 years 2 months (aged 63 -  
88 months; M  = 78.38 months, SD = 8.93) were recruited from two schools in South 
East Wales. All were different children from those in Experiment 3. The sample had a 
mean VMA of 72.46 months (range = 37-100  months; SD = 17.62) which was
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calculated using the BPVS-II. All children were White British except four who were 
from minority ethnic backgrounds. The populations of the schools were generally of 
low socio-economic status. Parental informed consent was obtained before testing.
Design.
This was a mixed design, testing younger versus older participants with both 
non-verbal reality-unknown and verbal reality-known versions of the FB and FS 
tasks. Participants were tested with three sessions at one-week intervals. In each 
session, they were tested with two versions of the FB and FS tasks: one verbal and 
one non-verbal. Following the exact procedure of previous studies, the verbal version 
of the tasks consisted of two questions (a test question and a memory question); 
whereas the non-verbal version of the tasks consisted of five trials (false 
representation, working memory control, response inhibition control, true 
representation filler and clue confirmation filler). The presentation order of the FB 
and FS tasks was counterbalanced across participants. Moreover, half of the 
participants were tested with the verbal version of the tasks first whereas the other 
half o f the participants had the non-verbal version first. For the verbal version o f the 
tasks, the test questions were always asked before the memory questions. However, 
for the non-verbal version of the tasks, the order of the five trials within each task was 
randomised in each of the three sessions.
Materials and procedure.
Participants were tested individually in a room in their own school by an 
experimenter. The same non-verbal FB and FS task series of Experiment 3 were used. 
A break was given between the two task series. The only difference between 
Experiment 3 and 4 was a verbal version of the tasks was added in the context of the 
non-verbal task series. The verbal tasks were either presented consecutively after the 
warm-up trials of the non-verbal tasks or after the series of the test, control and filler 
trials of the non-verbal tasks. In this way, the presentation order of the verbal tasks 
and the non-verbal series of trials was counterbalanced across participants.
Similar to Call and Tomasello (1999), the verbal FB task was identical to the 
response inhibition control trial of the non-verbal FB task except that participants 
were asked about the woman’s false belief regarding the location of the object when 
she returned to the room. That is, the test question, “Where does the woman think the
block is?” After participants responded, they were asked the memory question, 
“Where is the block really?”
For the verbal FS task, participants saw the woman presented with the signpost 
covered by a screen but its plug was visible. The woman put the plug in the socket 
and placed the two boxes (one contained the object) on the table. The mechanical 
noise produced by the turning signpost was heard. The woman then revealed the 
signpost, took the plug out, and displaced the object visibly. Participants were then 
asked the test question, “Where does the arrow show the block is?”, and the memory 
question, “Where is the block really?”
Following the non-verbal version of the tasks, feedback was provided in the 
verbal version of the tasks after participants responded but in a verbal way, e.g., “No, 
the arrow shows the block is in this box.” Some participants looked confused if the 
feedback was unexpected but none of them disagreed with it. Calls for attention and 
encouraging words to boost motivation were used as in Experiment 3.
Results.
For both non-verbal and verbal versions of the FB and FS tasks, children 
received a score of 1 for each of the trials if they responded correctly. As previous 
studies using the standard verbal FB task considered participants as passers only if 
they passed both of the test and memory questions, the same criterion was employed 
to calculate a final score for each of the verbal FB and FS tasks. Scores across the 
three sessions were summed and the mean scores for each version of the tasks were 
shown in Table 3.9. The distribution of the data was negatively skewed and data 
transformations, including square root, log and inverse transformations, did not 
improve normality. However, as before, the outcomes of the following parametric 
analyses were corroborated by running non-parametric analyses. Results from these 
non-parametric analyses are also reported for each set of the parametric analyses.
Performance on the verbal FB and FS tasks and the false representation test 
trials of the non-verbal FB and FS tasks was analysed first. Performance of older and 
younger children was compared against chance and a three-way mixed design 
ANOVA with age as between-participants factor, and version and task as within- 
participants factors was administered. Correlation tests were then carried out to 
examine the degree of associations (1) between the FB and FS tasks in both verbal 
and non-verbal versions, and (2) between the two versions of the tasks.
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Following the analyses of Experiment 3, performance on the false representation 
test trials of the non-verbal tasks was also subjected to non-parametric within- 
participants analyses to determine whether participants improved across the three 
sessions. Performance on the control trials of the non-verbal tasks was compared 
against chance and mixed ANOVAs were also carried out. Moreover, performance on 
the false representation test trials versus the control trials of the non-verbal tasks was 
compared, using one-way repeated-measures ANOVAs. Finally, performance on the 
filler trials was examined.
Table 3.9
Mean Scores on Each Version of the False Belief and False Sign Tasks in Experiment 
4 (Standard Deviations are Shown in Brackets)
Version Age N
Task (range of scores = 0 - 3 )  
False belief False sign
Verbal
Test question All 26 1.85 (1.19) 2.08 (1.06)
Younger 13 1.31 (1.25) 1.38 (0.96)
Older 13 2.38 (0.87) 2.77 (0.60)
Final score All 26 1.73 (1.28) 1.89(1.24)
Younger 13 1.15(1.28) 1.08(1.12)
Older 13 2.31 (1.03) 2.69 (0.75)
Non-verbal
False representation All 26 1.58(1.33) 1.69(1.23)
Younger 13 0.77(1.17) 0.85 (1.07)
Older 13 2.38 (0.96) 2.54 (0.66)
Response inhibition All 26 2.77 (0.51) 2.81 (0.40)
Younger 13 2.54 (0.66) 2.62 (0.51)
Older 13 3(0) 3(0)
Working memory All 26 2.19(1.02) 2.35 (0.94)
Younger 13 1.69(1.18) 1.92 (1.04)
Older 13 2.69 (0.48) 2.77 (0.60)
True representation All 26 2.42 (0.64) 2.69 (0.55)
Younger 13 2.46 (0.78) 2.62 (0.51)
Older 13 2.38 (0.51) 2.77 (0.60)
Chie confirmation All 26 2.96 (0.20) 2.96 (0.20)
Younger 13 2.92 (0.28) 2.92 (0.28)
Older 13 3(0) 3(0)
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Verbal tasks and false representation test trials o f non-verbal tasks.
Final scores of the verbal FB and FS tasks were used in the following analyses. 
Older children performed consistently above chance on both verbal and non-verbal 
FB and FS tasks, ts( 12) > 2.82, ps < .05, rs > .63. However, younger children 
performed below chance on the non-verbal FB and FS tasks, fc(12) < -2.2\,ps < .05, 
rs > .54, but at chance on the verbal FB and FS tasks, /s(12) > -1.37,/?s > .20. A 2 
(age) X 2 (version) X 2 (task) ANOVA revealed a main effect for age, F(l, 24) = 
22.81,/? < .001, r = .70, but no effects for version and task, and no interactions, Fs(l, 
24) < 2.13, ps > . 16. This pattern of findings remained the same when the scores of 
the test questions of the verbal tasks were used.
Equivalent non-parametric analyses illustrated similar pattern of results. Older 
children performed consistently above chance on both verbal and non-verbal FB and 
FS tasks, Wilcoxon Zs < -2.29, ps < .05, rs < -.45. Younger children, on the other 
hand, performed marginally below chance on the non-verbal FB and FS tasks, 
Wilcoxon Zs < -1.91,/?s = .07, rs < -.37, but at chance on the verbal FB and FS tasks, 
Wilcoxon Zs > -1.33,/?s > .23. Mann-Whitney U tests showed that older children 
performed better than younger children on both verbal and non-verbal FB and FS 
tasks (Us < 42, ps < .05, rs < -.45). Moreover, no significant difference was found 
between the verbal FB task, the verbal FS task, the non-verbal FB task and the non­
verbal FS task, Friedman test: 3 (^3, N=  26) < 3.98,/? = .27.
Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlations for the whole sample of children 
indicated that performance on the test trials of the non-verbal FB and FS tasks was 
significantly correlated, r(26) = .87,/? < .001 and rs (26) = .86,/? < .001, even after 
controlling for VMA, pr(23) = .79, p < .001. Performance on the verbal FB and FS 
tasks was also correlated, r(26) = .86,/? < .001 and rs (26) = .84,/? < .001, even after 
controlling for VMA, pr{23) = .74,/? < .001. Significant correlations were also found 
between the verbal and non-verbal FB tasks, r(26) = .61,/? < .001 and rs (26) = .61, p  
< .01, and between the verbal and non-verbal FS tasks, r(26) = .58,/? < .01 and rs (26) 
= .57,/? < .01. However, the two versions of the same task did not remain as 
significantly correlated after controlling for VMA, /?r(23) = .34,/? = .10 for the two 
versions o f the FB task, and pr(23) = .27,/? = .20 for the two versions of the FS task.
For both non-verbal FB and FS tasks, both older and younger children’s 
performance was not improved across the three sessions, 3^s(2, N=  13) < 5.20, ps >
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.17. Moreover, no significant improvement was shown by both older and younger 
children on both verbal FB and FS tasks across the three sessions, %2s(2, N=  13) < 6, 
ps > .07.
Control trials o f non-verbal tasks.
Older children performed consistently above chance, /s(12) > 7.64, ps < .001, rs
> .91 (non-parametric tests showed the same results: Wilcoxon Zs < -3.31,ps < .001, 
rs < -.65). Younger children also performed above chance, ft(12) > 5.61, ps < .001, rs
> .85 (Wilcoxon Zs < -3.07, ps < .01, rs < -.60), except the working memory control 
trials on which they performed at chance level, /s(12) < 1.47, ps > .17 (Wilcoxon Zs > 
-1.37, ps > .21).
There were significant main effects of age, F(l, 24) = 8.16,p  < .01, r  = .50 for 
the response inhibition control trials and F(l, 24) = 9.44,p  < .01, r  = .53 for the 
working memory control trials. However, no effect for task and no interaction was 
found for both of the control trials, Fs(l, 24) < .86, ps > .36. Non-parametric tests also 
showed that older children performed better than younger children on both of the 
control trials (Mann-Whitney Us < 52, ps < .05, rs = -.46 -  -.48) and there was no 
significant difference between tasks, Wilcoxon Zs > -.92, ps > .48.
Test versus control trials o f non-verbal tasks.
There were significant differences between performance on the test trials, 
response inhibition control trials, and working memory control trials, F{2, 50) =
14.07, p  < .001, r\p = .36 for the FB task, and F(2, 50) = 12.89, p  < .001, fjp2 = .34 for 
the FS task. For the FB task, performance on the test trials was significantly worse 
than that on the response inhibition control trials (p < .001) and marginally less good 
than that on the working memory control trials (p < .06); whereas performance on the 
response inhibition control trials was significantly better than that on the working 
memory control trials (p < .05). The same pattern of performance was shown for the 
FS task: performance on the test trials was worse than that on the response inhibition 
control trials (p < .001) and working memory control trials (p < .05); whereas 
performance on the response inhibition control trials was better than that on the 
working memory control trials (p < .05). Similar results were found with equivalent 
non-parametric analyses: performance on both of the control trials was significantly 
better than that on the test trials (Wilcoxon Zs < -2.29, ps < .05, rs < -.32), and
92
performance on the response inhibition control trials was also better than that on the 
working memory control trials (Wilcoxon Zs < -2.38, ps < .05, rs < -.33).
Filler trials o f non-verbal tasks.
Ceiling effects were shown on both true representation and clue confirmation 
filler trials (see Table 3.9). Moreover, there were only 15/78 and 8/78 errors on the 
true representation filler trials of the non-verbal FB and FS tasks respectively. Out of 
the 86 correct responses to the test trials of the tasks, there were only 16 which were 
paired with an incorrect response to the true representation filler trial in the same task. 
Hence, participants were not likely using a strategy of always pointing to the opposite 
box from the one indicated by the clues.
Discussion.
The purpose of Experiment 4 was (1) to replicate the finding that the 
equivalence between the FB and FS tasks holds in both verbal reality-known and non­
verbal reality-unknown versions, and (2) to validate the new non-verbal FS task. 
Results showed a replication of the association between the FB and FS tasks. 
Furthermore, the association remained significant regardless of whether the tasks are 
verbal reality-known or non-verbal reality-unknown and whether VMA was held 
constant. This finding suggests that the FB and FS tasks shared the same underlying 
requirement of representational understanding rather than language and cognitive 
inhibition. By comparing the two versions of the FB and FS tasks, the new non-verbal 
FS task was validated based on the findings that performance on the non-verbal FS 
task did not differ from that on the verbal FS task and the two FS tasks were strongly 
correlated (r = .58). Thus, the new non-verbal FS task was appropriate to be further 
employed to assess false-sign understanding in populations who have language and 
cognitive inhibition problems such as atypically developing children.
The two versions of the FB tasks were also shown to be comparable, replicating 
the results of Call and Tomasello’s (1999). However, neither the two versions of the 
FB task nor the two versions o f the FS task remained as significantly correlated after 
controlling for children’s VMA. Unfortunately, none of the previous studies that have 
employed the same verbal and non-verbal FB tasks as those in the current experiment 
have measured participants’ VMA (Call & Tomasello, 1999; Figueras-Costa &
Harris, 2001). Hence, it was unclear whether or not the non-significant associations
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found between the two versions of the FB and FS tasks after controlling for VMA in 
the current experiment were unusual. Nevertheless, Figueras-Costa and Harris 
compared the performance of deaf children of hearing parents on their first non-verbal 
FB test trial versus their unique verbal FB test trial. There were eleven children who 
either passed or failed both trials whereas 10 children passed either one of the trials (9 
passed the non-verbal trial whereas 1 passed the verbal trial). Using a Pearson’s chi- 
square test, the two trials were shown to be not associated, %{\, N  =2\ )=  1.05, p  = 
.61 with a phi-coefficient of .22. This finding provided a support for the non­
significant association found between the two versions of the FB task after controlling 
for VMA in the current experiment. On the contrary, both Call and Tomasello’s study 
and the current experiment found associations between the two versions of the FB 
task before controlling for typically developing children’s VMA. Taken together, 
these findings suggest that language ability has an effect on determining whether or 
not the two versions of the FB task were associated. The same probably held between 
the two versions o f the FS task given that the FS and FB tasks were highly associated.
Finally, participants’ performance on the non-verbal tasks could not be 
explained by their inability to meet the incidental executive demands o f the tasks, 
learning through feedback across sessions or an adoption of incorrect strategies, 
replicating those findings in Experiment 3. Despite that, participants’ motivation of 
doing their best in the tasks might not be sufficiently induced by just having verbal 
compliments from the experimenter in both Experiment 3 and 4. Although the tasks 
were embedded in a hiding-and-finding game context, finding a block was not a very 
interesting goal for children. Having children choose some stickers they preferred, 
asking them to find the stickers and receiving the stickers as rewards for success, Call 
and Tomasello’s (1999) procedure definitely had a better chance of getting children 
motivated. However, I would suggest that the less motivating procedure used in both 
Experiment 3 and 4 would not be a critical problem based on the observation that 
participants in both experiments usually showed excitement when the feedback 
demonstrating the block’s location was displayed.
In conclusion, both Experiment 3 and 4 successfully showed that the novel non­
verbal reality-unknown FS task was valid in tapping false-sign understanding and 
closely related to Apperly et al.’s (2004) FB task. Having established the validity of 
these non-verbal false representation tasks in typically developing children, they can 
be applied in other young populations especially those have problems in language and
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cognitive inhibition. Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) who are widely 
suggested to be specifically impaired in understanding minds as well as having 
general deficits in language and executive function would be a valuable population to 
re-examine the applicability o f the tasks and the non-specificity claim of false-belief 
understanding. This is therefore the aim of the next chapter which reports an 
experiment investigating children with ASD’s performance on the novel FS task as 
well as Apperly et al.’s (2004, 2007) FB and FP tasks.
Moreover, in this chapter, I suggested that Apperly et al.’s (2007) FP task, 
corresponding to the standard FP task, may be passed by employing an understanding 
of correspondence. This possibility would be further evaluated in children with ASD 
with the inclusion of Apperly et al.’s FP task in the experiment reported in Chapter 4. 
If children with ASD passed the standard FP task with the understanding of 
correspondence but failed the standard FB task due to an impaired understanding of 
representation, they would probably pass Apperly et al.’s FP task but fail their FB task 
and the novel FS task. Moreover, children with ASD were matched with typically 
developing children in Experiment 5. This enabled us to test whether the finding of 
Experiment 3, that older typically developing children improved on the FP task but 
not the FB and FS tasks across sessions, could be replicated.
Chapter 4 Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD): A Special Case?
In Chapter 1, it was proposed that the question of whether understanding mental 
representations is underpinned by a general concept of representational understanding 
cannot be completely addressed by looking at typical development only. Although the 
previous empirical chapters of this thesis consistently suggested that children’s 
understanding of representation underpins their performance on both false mental and 
false non-mental representation tasks, whether this finding can be generalised to 
atypical developing populations is unknown. The atypical case of Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD) has been postulated as being caused primarily by a specific deficit in 
“theory of mind” (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; for a review, see Tager-Flusberg, 
2007). If individuals with ASD are selectively impaired in understanding mental 
representations, it would provide evidence for the existence of a domain-specific 
mechanism for understanding mental representations, contradicting the results found 
in typically developing children. Moreover, children with ASD are also known to 
have impairments in language and executive function which may confound with their 
difficulties in understanding mental representations. Therefore, Chapter 4 investigates 
whether ASD is a special case in which a dissociation of ability to understand mental 
versus non-mental representations may be seen, independent of other cognitive 
abilities, namely language and executive function.
Impaired Mental but Intact Non-Mental Representational Understanding?
Previous studies have shown that about 80% of children with ASD do not 
understand false beliefs when compared with typically developing children of a 
similar mental age range (4 to 6 years; e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1989b; Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985; Leslie & Frith, 1988; Pemer, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989; for meta-analyses, 
see Happe, 1995; Yirimiya et al., 1998). In addition to these false-belief studies, later 
studies, using tasks previously mentioned in Chapter 1 that tap the understanding of 
mental representations, such as the “level 2 visual perspective-taking” task (e.g., 
Masangkay et al., 1974) and the “appearance-reality distinction” task (e.g., Flavell et 
al., 1983), also showed that children with ASD performed significantly worse than 
children with typical development or mental retardation (e.g., Down’s syndrome). 
Two examples of these studies are briefly described below.
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Hamilton, Brindley, and Frith (2009) showed children a toy (e.g., a panda) 
which was placed on a square turntable and trained them to use pictures which were 
taken from the front, back, left and right side of the toy to answer questions. During 
the test phase, children were asked two types of questions. One type of question tests 
the understanding that visual perception is a representation which may represent the 
same referent (panda) in different senses (front, back, left or right side) depending on 
which viewpoint the referent is being viewed from (i.e., level 2 visual perspective- 
taking: ‘This is Susan. When I lift the pot, which panda will Susan see?”). Another 
type of question controls for the ability to imagine the rotation of the toy on the 
turntable (i.e., mental rotation: “When I lift the pot, which panda will you see?”). 
Hamilton et al. found that children with ASD have difficulty on the former type of 
question compared to the latter type of question, relative to typically developing 
children. This finding suggests that children with ASD have genuine impairments in 
level 2 visual perspective-taking which cannot be accounted for by problems in 
mental rotation.
Another example comes from the “appearance-reality distinction” task in which 
an object’s appearance is distinct from its real identity. For example, a bottle of milk 
was shown to children, who were asked to name it and its colour. Then, an orange 
filter was placed in front of the bottle of milk and children were asked the appearance 
question, “Now what colour does the milk look?”, and the reality question, “What 
colour is it really?” In order to answer both questions correctly, children need to 
understand that their visual perception represents the bottle of milk (referent/reality) 
as orange in colour (sense/appearance) and clearly distinguish between referent/reality 
and sense/appearance. Baron-Cohen (1989a) found that children with ASD performed 
worse than children with Down’s syndrome and tended to commit more phenomenist 
errors by answering that the bottle of milk looked orange and really was orange.
This impairment in understanding mental representations in children with ASD 
was suggested to be specific due to the findings that children with ASD performed 
poorly on the FB task but well on a non-mental representation task (i.e., the FP task; 
Leekam & Pemer, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). The same pattern of dissociation 
between mental and pictorial understandings was also found in children with ASD, 
using the “false” drawing task (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992). More recent studies 
further investigated children with ASD’s competence on a different type of non­
mental representation task which has also been mentioned in Chapter 1 -  the
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ambiguous figures task (Ropar, Mitchell, & Ackroyd, 2003; Sobel, Capps, & Gopnik, 
2005; Wimmer & Doherty, 2010). Despite children with ASD’s failures on mental 
representation tasks such as the FB task, these studies indicated that children with 
ASD could reverse an ambiguous figure by switching from one of its interpretations 
to the other after being informed about the ambiguity of the figure. Wimmer and 
Doherty (2010) even suggested that this reversal ability o f children with ASD was 
underpinned by an understanding of pictorial representation.
However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the photographs and drawings used in the 
FP and “false” drawing tasks were not false and no distinction between reference and 
sense was required. The same issue also holds for the ambiguous figures task.
Without the requirement of distinguishing reference from sense, it is not clear whether 
a satisfying performance on these tasks implies a genuine understanding of non­
mental representations or a simple understanding of correspondence. Children with 
ASD might understand that a photograph/drawing corresponds to the scene at the time 
the photograph/drawing was taken/made, and an ambiguous figure corresponds to two 
different objects so they succeeded on these tasks. They might even learn that a non­
mental representation (e.g., a word) corresponds to something through simple 
association. A recent study (Preissler, 2008), using the same paradigm as that in 
Preissler and Carey (2004) mentioned in Chapter 1, taught low-functioning children 
with ASD (IQ under 70) a novel word (e.g., ‘whisk’) for a picture of a novel object 
(e.g., a whisk) and asked them to indicate the word from a choice of the picture and a 
real object (e.g., a real whisk). Unlike typically developing children, Preissler found 
that low-functioning children with ASD made associative mappings between words 
and pictures and failed to transfer a word learned for a picture to their corresponding 
real referent. Thus, children with ASD’s good performance on the FP, “false” drawing 
and ambiguous figures tasks could be explained by lower-level cognitive abilities 
rather than a real understanding of non-mental representations.
The only task, until now, that assessed children with ASD’s true understanding 
of non-mental representations was the false signal task (Bowler et al., 2005). The 
signal in the task falsely represented a plane’s location (referent) as a different 
location (sense). In order to correctly predict the destination of an automatic train 
which picked up cargo from planes based on the signal, participants had to 
differentiate the signal’s sense from its referent. Bowler et al. showed that children 
with ASD’s performance on the false signal task was comparable to their performance
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on the FB task. Moreover, strong associations (phi-values > .55) were found between 
the two tasks with two different samples of children with ASD in the two experiments 
of Bowler et al.’s study. Therefore, with a non-mental representation task that requires 
a distinction between reference and sense, children with ASD show the same deficit 
as they have in the FB task. The suggestion that ASD selectively impairs an 
individual’s understanding of mental representations may require revision.
Language and Executive Dysfunctions or Deficit in Representational 
Understanding?
Previous research has illustrated that language abilities vary widely among 
individuals with ASD (e.g., Charman et al, 2003; Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg, 2001; 
Smith, Mirenda, & Zaidman-Zait, 2007). However, it is commonly found that both 
language comprehension and production are delayed in children with ASD (e.g., 
Charman et al, 2003; Charman, 2004; Mitchell et al., 2006). Moreover, two recent 
studies with large samples of children with ASD aged 24 to 59 months showed that 
receptive language ability is more severely delayed or impaired than expressive 
language ability in ASD (Ellis Weismer, Lord, & Esler, 2010; Hudry et al., 2010). 
There is also evidence demonstrating that the development of different aspects of 
language (ie., pragmatic, lexical and grammatical) is strongly related to false-belief 
understanding in individuals with ASD across ages and levels o f ability (e.g., Fisher, 
Happe, & Dunn, 2005; Paynter & Peterson, 2010; for a review, see Tager-Flusberg, 
2000).
Individuals with ASD are also found to be impaired in executive function, 
including inhibitory control and working memory (e.g., Luna et aL, 2007; Robinson et 
al, 2009; for a review, see Hill, 2004). Previous research has indicated that children 
with ASD who had difficulty on the FB task also showed impairments on tasks 
tapping executive function (e.g., Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991; Ozonoff & 
McEvoy, 1994; Pellicano, 2007; Zelazo, Jacques, Burack, & Frye, 2002). Russell 
(1997) even suggested executive function as a contributor to individuals with ASD’s 
performance on the FB task. Russell, Saltmarsh, and Hill (1999) further argued that 
the difference between children with ASD’s performance on the FB and FP/“false” 
drawing tasks was because of the different executive demands o f the tasks. Although 
the FB and FP/“false” drawing tasks all elicit a prepotent response of acting in 
accordance with reality which is in conflict with the representation in question, a
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photograph/drawing might be more salient than a belief so that the requirement of 
resisting interference from reality would be less demanded in the FP/“false” drawing 
tasks than the FB task. To evaluate this proposal, Russell et al designed a modified 
FP task in which a photograph of a screen was taken. An object was then placed in 
front of that screen. By having no object in the photograph, the photograph became 
less salient and thus this modified FP task might become as demanding as the FB task. 
Children with ASD were tested on this modified FP task and the standard FP and FB 
tasks. No better performance on the modified FP task than the FB task was found. 
However, better performance on the standard FP task than the other two tasks was 
indicated. Therefore, Russell et al. concluded that executive function was a critical 
factor, explaining children with ASD’s failure on the FB and modified FP task as well 
as their success on the standard FP task.
Hence, it is possible that individuals with ASD’s impairments in language and 
executive function rather than false-belief understanding determine their performance 
on the FB task. As mentioned in Chapter 1, although children with ASD’s problem in 
understanding false beliefs was usually concluded from a comparison with a control 
group which matched the ASD group on verbal mental age and/or general intellectual 
ability, verbal mental age and general intellectual ability were measured by 
independent tests which did not measure the exact incidental cognitive demands of the 
FB task. It is thus possible that the ASD and control group are different in terms of 
their ability in meeting the incidental cognitive demands of the FB task. Furthermore, 
the impairments in executive function of children with ASD are found to be 
independent of verbal and general intellectual abilities (Robinson et al, 2009). 
Matching on verbal mental age and/or general intellectual ability does not control for 
the possible differences in executive function between the ASD and control groups.
In the following, I briefly review three recent studies that have attempted to 
disentangle children with ASD’s problem with false-belief understanding from their 
impairments in language and executive function. Two of these studies used the non­
verbal FB paradigm of Southgate et al. (2007) to investigate individuals with ASD’s 
spontaneous anticipatory looking of a protagonist’s searching location based on the 
false belief the protagonist was holding. The first study was Senju, Southgate, White, 
and Frith (2009) which tested adults with Asperger syndrome, whereas the other study 
was Senju et al. (2010) which tested children with ASD. Results of these two studies 
showed that individuals (both adults and children) with ASD failed to show correct
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action anticipation that is in line with the protagonist’s false belief. Although the ASD 
group was not matched with the control group on verbal mental age in Senju et al. 
(2010), the group difference on anticipatory looking remained significant when verbal 
mental age was covaried out. These findings suggest that individuals with ASD were 
impaired in false-belief attribution which was independent of verbal ability. However, 
as mentioned in Chapter 1, looking behaviours are ambiguous and alternative 
explanations are possible. For example, individuals with ASD’s lack of correct 
spontaneous anticipatory looking may be generally directed to social stimuli 
(Ruffman, Gamham, & Rideout, 2001) rather than specifically to false-belief 
attribution. Moreover, the control group’s success could be explained by behaviour 
rules (see Chapter 1; Pemer & Ruffman, 2005; Ruffman & Pemer, 2005). Therefore, 
this anticipatory-looking paradigm does not necessarily provide evidence that a false 
belief is attributed or genuinely understood as a false representation which involves a 
difference between reference and sense.
Using a non-verbal FB task which was adapted from Call and Tomasello (1999), 
Colie et al (2007) tapped the genuine understanding o f mental representations in 
children with ASD and children with specific language impairment who were 
matched on their very low levels of language development. In this task, children were 
asked to find an object with the help of a protagonist who put a marker on the location 
where she thought the object was. Children needed to understand that the 
protagonist’s false belief represented the object’s location (referent) as the location 
where she put the marker (sense) and reason the object’s location to be the alternative 
location as they had witnessed the switch of locations. Thus, a distinction between 
reference and sense was required while cognitive inhibition of one’s knowledge about 
reality was not needed. Results showed that children with ASD were significantly 
impaired in false-belief understanding relative to children with specific language 
impairment, suggesting a fundamental deficit in false-belief understanding in children 
with ASD. Only with a task like this can one conclude that children with ASD have 
impairment in understanding false beliefs which cannot be fully explained by their 
language and executive dysfunctions.
However, the FB task and the false signal task used in Bowler et al. (2005) did 
not disentangle the demands of language and executive function from that of 
representational understanding. It is therefore possible that the association found 
between these two tasks in children with ASD was due to language and executive
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function rather than representational understanding. In the following section, I report 
an experiment to investigate whether ASD selectively impairs an individual’s 
understanding of mental representations or generally impairs his/her representational 
understanding or primarily impairs his/her language and executive skills which mask 
their competence of understanding mental and non-mental representations in standard 
verbal tasks. Ethics approval was provided by the Ethics Advisory Sub-Committee in 
the Department of Psychology in Durham University and the School of Psychology 
Ethics Committee in Cardiff University.
Experiment 5
The aim of Experiment 5 was to examine whether a dissociation between 
understanding of mental versus non-mental representation will be seen in the case of 
children with ASD. In order to critically address this issue, it was important to 
demonstrate that this dissociation is a core characteristic of ASD which cannot be 
explained by other cognitive impairments namely language and executive function. 
Hence, mental and non-mental representation tasks that require clear distinction 
between reference and sense while minimising, eliminating, and controlling for 
language and executive demands were essential. The non-verbal reality-unknown FB 
and FS tasks used in Chapter 3 met the criterion and were thus employed in the 
current experiment. Although the non-verbal reality-unknown FP task used in Chapter 
3 did not meet the criterion of distinguishing reference from sense and did not involve 
the same level o f incidental working memory demand, it was also employed in the 
current experiment for the following reasons. First, the inclusion of this FP task 
allowed an evaluation of whether this FP task resembled the standard FP task which 
could be passed by children with ASD given their spared understanding of 
correspondence, as proposed in Chapter 3. Second, if children with ASD could 
perform well on the non-verbal FP task, it would then serve as a control task in the 
experiment. This FP task and the control trials o f each of the FB and FS tasks would 
allow a validation of equal executive abilities between children with ASD and 
comparison children. If the two groups of children with and without ASD did not 
differ in their performance on the FP task and the control trials of the FB and FS tasks 
but significantly differed in their performance on the false representation test trials of 
both FB and FS tasks, it would clearly suggest that children with ASD suffer a 
genuine impairment in understanding representations.
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Typically developing children were recruited as comparison children to match 
with children with ASD for the following reasons. First, if an association between the 
FB and FS tasks was replicated in typically developing children and also found in 
children with ASD, it would suggest that children with ASD were no different from 
typically developing children in that both groups process mental and non-mental 
representations with a unitary system of representational understanding. On the 
contrary, if the association was found in typically developing children but not children 
with ASD because they performed selectively worse on the FB task than on the FP 
and FS tasks, it would provide evidence for a specific deficit in understanding mental 
representations in ASD. Second, if typically developing children improved across 
sessions on the FP task but not the FB and FS tasks, the finding of Experiment 3 
would be replicated. This finding would suggest that children might realise that the FP 
task could be passed by using their understanding of correspondence from the first 
session and significantly improved their performance afterwards.
Method.
Participants.
Eighteen children with a diagnosis o f ASD were recruited from two special 
schools and one resource unit of a primary school in South East Wales. All o f them 
have Statements o f Special Education Needs which confirmed their formal diagnoses 
of autistic disorder or Asperger syndrome, given by qualified clinicians, according to 
internationally accepted criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994; World 
Health Organisation, 1993). To further assess participants’ ASD symptoms, their 
parents were requested to complete the lifetime version of the Social Communication 
Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003), which is a screening measure for 
the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter, Le Couteur, 1994) 
and has high diagnostic validity (Berument, Rutter, Lord, Pickles, & Bailey, 1999). 
With a cut-off point of 15 for ASD, all participants were justified to be included in the 
ASD group of the experiment (range of score: 15 -  38; M  = 26.50; SD = 6.34) based 
on their parents’ reports on the SCQ.
A comparison group of 18 typically developing children were recruited from 
two schools in South East Wales. Five of these children took part in Experiment 3 
reported in Chapter 3 and their data was carried over to the current experiment for
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matching with the ASD group. The ASD and comparison groups were matched in 
terms of verbal mental age (VMA) and non-verbal intelligence quotient (NVIQ), as 
measured with the long form of the British Picture Vocabulary Scale - Second Edition 
(BPVS-II; Dunn et al., 1997) and the Brief Intelligence Quotient composite of the 
Letter International Performance Scale-Revised (Roid & Miller, 1997) respectively. 
Using VMA, there were 12 children who were matched exactly (same VMA score),
10 children who were matched within 5 months o f age, and 14 children who could not 
be matched individually. With NVIQ, there were 10 children who were matched 
exactly (same NVIQ score), 14 children who were matched within 6 points of NVIQ 
(less than 0.50 SD), and 12 children who could not be matched individually. 
Participant characteristics are presented in Table 4.1. The two groups did not differ in 
VMA, t(34) = -.35,/? = .73, and NVIQ, 27.98) = -1.50,p  = .15, but differed in 
chronological age (CA), r(27.40) = 5.59, p  < .001 with an effect size of r  = .73. The 
ASD group was older because 13 children with ASD above the age of the oldest 
typically developing children were included in order to match for VMA and NVIQ. 
All participants were recruited with parental informed consent.
Table 4.1
Characteristics of the Experimental and Comparison Groups
Characteristic ASD (n = 18, 16 males) Comparison (n = 18, 8 males)
M  SD Range M SD Range
CA 104.89 19.95 70-133 74.44 11.66 52-88
VMA 75.56 20.70 51 - 119 77.61 13.84 53-98
NVIQ 97.89 19.93 65 - 133 106.11 12.06 91 - 135
Note. ASD = Autism Spectrum Disorder; CA = Chronological age in months; VMA = 
Verbal mental age in months; NVIQ = Non-verbal intelligence quotient
Design, materials and procedure.
This experiment used exactly the same design, materials and procedure as in 
Experiment 3, except that the between-participants factor was group (children with 
ASD versus typical development) rather than age.
Results.
Children received a score of 1 for each of the trials if they correctly identified 
the object’s location. Scores across the three sessions were summed and the mean
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scores for each trial type of the FB, FP and FS tasks are presented in Table 4.2. The 
distribution of the data was negatively skewed for most of the dependent variables 
and data transformations, including square root, log and inverse transformations, did 
not improve normality. However, the outcomes of the following parametric analyses 
were corroborated by running non-parametric analyses. Homogeneity of variance was 
violated for some of the variables according to Levene’s test (Levene, 1960), but due 
to equal sample sizes this is unlikely to constitute a problem (Cardinal & Aitken, 
2006).
Table 4.2
Mean Scores on Each Trial Type of the False Belief False Photograph and False Sign 
Tasks (Standard Deviations are Shown in Brackets)
Trial Group N
Task (range of scores 
False Belief False Photo
= 0 - 3 )  
False Sign
False representation ASD 18 1.67(1.08) 2.28 (.89) 1.89 (1.13)
Comparison 18 2.61 (.70) 2.67 (.49) 2.72 (.57)
Response inhibition ASD 18 2.89 (.47) 2.83 (.38) 3(0)
Comparison 18 3(0) 2.94 (.24) 3(0)
Working memory ASD 18 2.56 (.78) 2.67 (.77) 2.67 (.59)
Comparison 18 2.28 (1.02) 2.72 (.46) 2.56 (.92)
True representation ASD 18 2.67 (.77) 2.94 (.24) 2.72 (.46)
Comparison 18 2.61 (.61) 2.94 (.24) 2.89 (.47)
Clue confirmation ASD 18 3(0) 3(0) 3(0)
Comparison 18 3(0) 3(0) 3(0)
Note. ASD = Autism Spectrum Disorder
Data from the false representation test trials and the control trials were analysed 
separately. Performance on each of these trials was compared against chance and 
tested using a mixed between- and within-participants ANOVA with group (ASD or 
comparison) as between-participants factor and task as within-participants factor. 
Performance on the false representation test trials of each group was also subjected to 
(1) planned contrasts to test whether the ASD group performed significantly worse 
than the comparison group on the FB and FS tasks but not on the FP task; (2) 
correlation tests to examine the degree of associations between the FB, FP and FS
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tasks; and (3) within-participants analyses to determine whether participants improved 
across the three sessions given that feedback was provided after each trial. As the 
range of scores participants obtained in each session was 0 to 1, non-parametric 
Friedman tests were used to examine whether there were improvements across 
sessions. Finally, performance on the filler trials was examined to exclude the 
possibility that participants’ performance was determined by an adoption of incorrect 
strategies such as always pointing to the opposite box from the one indicated by the 
clues provided in the tasks. Results from non-parametric equivalent tests were also 
reported for each set of the parametric analyses.
False representation test trials.
Children with ASD’s performance on the FB and FS tasks was not significantly 
different from chance, *(17) = .65,/? = .52 and *(17) = 1.46,/? = .16 respectively. 
However, their performance on the FP task was significantly above chance, *(17) = 
3.69, p  < .01 with an effect size of r = .67. On the contrary, performance on all three 
tasks was significantly above chance for the comparison group, *s(17) > 6.76, ps < 
.001, rs > .85.
A 2 (group) X 3 (task) ANOVA revealed significant main effects of group and 
task, F(l, 34) = 9.30,p  < .01 with an effect size of r = .46 and F(2, 68) = 3.12,/? = .05 
with an effect size of rjp2 = .08 respectively, but no significant interaction between 
group and task, F{2, 68) = 2.43, p  = . 10. This pattern of findings remained the same, 
except the main effect o f task was not significant, when chronological age, VMA, or 
NVIQ was included as a covariate. Planned contrasts revealed that the groups were 
different on the FB and FS tasks, *(34) = -3.11, p  < .01, r = .47 and *(34) = -2.79, p  < 
.01, r  = .43 respectively, but not on the FP task, *(34) = -1.62,/? = .11. To spell out the 
difference between the three tasks, pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment 
were performed. Performance on the FP task was marginally better than that on the 
FB task, p  = .06; whereas performance on the FS task did not differ from those on the 
FB and FP tasks, p  = .57 and p  = .70 respectively.
Equivalent non-parametric analyses indicated identical results. Children with 
ASD performed at chance level on the FB and FS tasks, Wilcoxon Z = -.65, p  = .58 
and Wilcoxon Z = -1.41, /? = .19 respectively. However, they performed above chance 
on the FP task, Wilcoxon Z = -2.83, p  < .01 with an effect size of r = -.47. On the 
contrary, the comparison group performed consistently above chance, Wilcoxon Zs <
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-3.63, ps < .001, rs < -.61. Mann-Whitney U tests showed that the comparison group 
performed better than the ASD group on the FB and FS tasks (Us < 9\,ps<  .05 with 
effect sizes of rs < -.42) but their performance on the FP task did not differ (U = 126, 
p  = .23). There was no significant difference between tasks, Friedman test: x?(2, N  = 
36) = 4.36,/? = .12.
The bivariate correlations between the FB, FP and FS tasks found with the ASD 
group are presented in Table 4.3 whereas those found with the comparison group are 
shown in Table 4.4. For the ASD group, both Pearson’s and non-parametric 
Spearman’s correlation tests showed that performance on the three tasks was 
significantly correlated. However, only the correlation between the FB and FS tasks 
remained significant when performance on the third task was controlled. When VMA 
was controlled, the association between the FB and FS tasks remained significant, 
pr( 15) = .61,/? < .05, but the correlations between the FB and FP and that between the 
FP and FS tasks fell to marginally significant,pr( 15) = .46,/? = .06 andpr(\5) = .43,/? 
= .08 respectively.
Table 4.3
Bivariate Raw Pearson’s/Non-parametric Spearman’s Correlations and [Third-Task- 
Controlled Correlations] (With N) Between the False Belief, False Photograph and 
False Sign Tasks for the ASD Group
False Belief False Photograph False Sign
False Belief - .53*/.54* .69**/.66**(18) (18)
False Photograph [.29](15)
- .50*1 A l*  
(18)
False Sign [.58*](15)
[.22]
(15)
-
Note. **p < .01, */? < .05
Table 4.4 indicated that performance of the comparison group on the three tasks 
was also significantly correlated, except the correlation between the FB and FP tasks 
fell to non-significance when the non-parametric Spearman’s test was used. When the 
third task was controlled for, only the correlation between the FB and FS tasks stayed 
significant. The same pattern was also obtained when VMA was controlled for: pr( 15) 
= .51,/? < .05 between the FB and FS tasks, pr( 15) = .21,/? = .42 between the FB and 
FP tasks, andpr(\5) -  .37,/? = .15 between the FP and FS tasks.
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Table 4.4
Bivariate Raw Pearson’s/Non-parametric Spearman’s Correlations and [Third-Task- 
Controlled Correlations] (With N) Between the False Belief, False Photograph and 
False Sign Tasks for the Comparison Group
False Belief False Photograph False Sign
False Belief 
False Photograph 
False Sign
[.24]
(15)
[•48*]
(15)
.46*/. 40 
(18)
[.30]
(15)
,60**/.57*
(18)
.49*/.49*
(18)
Note. **p < .01, *p = or <.05
Children with ASD improved their performance across the three sessions, x(2,  
N=  18)= 10.89,/? <.01 for the FB task, £ (2 ,N =  18) = 7.75,/) < .05 for the FP task, 
and 5^(2, N=  18) = 10.75,/) < .01 for the FS task. Further analyses showed that 
improvement from Session 1 to 2 and from Session 1 to 3 was significant on the FB 
and FS tasks, Wilcoxon Zs < -2.45, ps < .05, rs < -.41, but marginal on the FP task, 
Wilcoxon Zs < -2.\2,ps = .07 and .06, rs < -.35. No improvement was shown from 
Session 2 to 3 for all three tasks, Wilcoxon Zs > -.58, ps = 1. On the contrary, 
typically developing children did not improve their performance on the FB and FS 
tasks across the three sessions, x2(2, N=  18) = 2.80, p  = .40 and )?(2, N=  18) = 6.50, 
p  = .07 respectively, but improved on the FP task, ^(2 , N=  18) = 12, p  < .01. Further 
analyses showed that typically developing children’s performance on the FP task was 
improved from Session 1 to 2 and from Session 1 to 3, Wilcoxon Zs = -2.45, ps = .05, 
rs < -.41, but no improvement was shown from Session 2 to 3, Wilcoxon Z = 0, p  = 1.
Control trials.
Both groups performed above chance on the two types of control trials of the 
FB, FP and FS tasks, fs(17) > 5.71, ps < .001, rs < -.81 for the ASD group, and fs(17) 
> 3.24, ps < .01, rs < -.62 for the comparison group. The same was found with non- 
parametric tests: Wilcoxon Zs < -3.49, ps < .001, rs < -.58 for the ASD group, and 
Wilcoxon Zs < -2.67, ps < .01, rs < -.45 for the comparison group.
A mixed ANOVA with group as between-participants factor and task as within- 
participants factor was carried out for each type of the control trials. Mauchly’s
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(1940) tests were inspected for both types of the control trials and only the response 
inhibition control trials showed a departure from sphericity which was corrected using 
the Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon (Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959). For both types of the 
control trials, there were no significant main effects of group and task, Fs < 2.31, ps > 
.14, and no significant interactions between group and task, Fs < .64, ps > .53. Non- 
parametric tests revealed the same results: no significant difference between groups,
Us < 140.50, ps > .47, and tasks, Friedman test: ^s(2 ,N =  36) > 4.77, ps > .10, for 
both types of the control trials.
Filler trials.
Ceiling effects on the two types of the filler trials were shown for all three tasks 
(see Table 4.2). Moreover, there were only 13/108, 2/108, and 7/108 errors (6/54,
1/54, and 5/54 were from the ASD group) on the true representation filler trials of the 
FB, FP, and FS tasks respectively. Out of the 250 correct responses to the test trials of 
all three tasks (106 were from the ASD group), there were only 16 (7 were from the 
ASD group) which were paired with an incorrect response to the true representation 
filler trial in the same task. These patterns of results suggested that participants were 
not likely using a strategy of always pointing to the opposite box from the one 
indicated by the clues and the two groups were not using different strategies.
Discussion.
Experiment 5 was the first experiment which successfully applied the novel non­
verbal FS task devised for this thesis as well as Apperly et a l ’s (2004, 2007) FB and 
FP tasks in a group of children with ASD. It investigated whether ASD is a special 
case in which there is a dissociation of an individual’s ability to understand mental 
versus non-mental representations, independent of other impairments in language and 
executive function. If this was the case, it would provide evidence for the existence of 
a domain-specific mechanism for understanding mental representations which was 
impaired in ASD. Results showed that children with ASD performed worse on the 
false representation test trials of both FB and FS tasks but not on that of the FP task 
relative to typically developing children. No significant difference between the false 
representation test trials of these three tasks was found. Moreover, the association 
between the false representation trials of the FB and FS tasks remained significant for 
the ASD group no matter whether VMA or the FP task was controlled or not. These
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findings suggest that children with ASD were not selectively impaired in 
understanding mental representations but generally impaired in understanding mental 
and non-mental representations. Moreover, the same as typically developing children, 
both mental and non-mental representations were processed with a unitary system of 
representational understanding, which was however impaired, in ASD. Despite that, 
children with ASD were capable of improving their performance over sessions, 
showing significant improvement on the FB and FS task but marginally significant 
improvement on the FP task. This might be due to an already good performance on 
the FP task (10 out of 18 children with ASD passed) but relatively poor performance 
on the FB and FS tasks (7 out of 18 passed in each) in the first session. Their better 
performance on the FP task was consistently found in previous studies (e.g., Leekam 
& Pemer, 1991), probably due to the lack o f requirement of distinguishing reference 
from sense and could be passed by employing a simple understanding of 
correspondence. However, children with ASD’s improvement on the FB task was in 
contrast with Grant et al.’s (2007) finding that children with fragile X syndrome or 
intellectual disability did not improve their performance on the FB task. This 
difference in finding might be due to the different intervals between trials employed 
by the current experiment versus Grant et al.’s. The current experiment had a week in 
between the trials whereas Grant et al. presented the trials consecutively. This might 
suggest that atypically developing children may require time to show an improvement 
in performance. There is a recent 3-year longitudinal study by Pellicano (2010a) 
which indicated that children with ASD made substantial progress over time in false- 
belief understanding.
Although children with ASD performed well on the standard FP task and the 
non-verbal FP task, previous evidence has shown that they failed Russell et al.’s 
(1999) modified FP task in which the photograph used was also a true representation 
that corresponded with its referent and sense. If children with ASD succeeded on the 
former two FP tasks with their spared understanding of correspondence, why would 
they fail the latter? I would suggest that children with ASD failed Russell et al.’s 
modified FP task because of its higher executive demands and its unnatural nature of 
taking photograph of a screen, as Russell et al. has suggested. Children with ASD’s 
performance on the modified FP task was no better than that on the FB task in Russell 
et al.’s study, suggesting that the two tasks were o f similar executive demands. 
However, no association was found between these two tasks in their study, suggesting
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that the two tasks were probably not tapping the same conceptual understanding. The 
modified FP task probably tested an understanding of correspondence, whereas the 
FB task tested an understanding of representation.
For the comparison group, the bivariate correlations found between the false 
representation test trials of the three tasks, including those controlled for VMA or the 
third task, were less significant than those found in Experiment 3 reported in Chapter 
3. However, this could be explained by the smaller sample size of children with a 
narrower age range that was recruited in the current experiment compared to 
Experiment 3. Regarding the improvement shown across sessions, the finding of 
improvement on the false representation test trials of the FP task but not on those of 
the FB and FS tasks in the older children o f Experiment 3 was replicated in the 
current experiment. As in Experiment 3, children started off with the same level of 
performance on the false representation test trials across the three tasks in the first 
session (14 passed the FB task, 12 passed the FP task, and 14 passed the FS task). 
Both children with ASD and older children with typical development showed a 
different degree of improvement on the FP task compared to the FB and FS tasks, 
providing further evidence for the FP task’s lack of strong associations with the FB 
and FS tasks.
Finally, children with ASD performed above chance on the control trials of the 
FB, FP and FS tasks and their performance was not different from that of the 
comparison group, suggesting that they were capable of meeting the incidental 
cognitive demands of the tasks. Furthermore, the patterns o f the results found in the 
filler trials o f the tasks suggested that children did not use an incorrect strategy of 
always pointing to the opposite box and the two groups were not using different 
strategies. Taken together, children’s performance on the false representation test 
trials reflects their genuine understanding of representations rather than other 
cognitive skills and incorrect strategy use.
With the FP task and the control trials o f the tasks, the two groups were verified 
as comparable in their ability to meet the incidental requirements of the tasks although 
they were not able to be matched on their chronological age. However, further studies 
were required to apply these tasks in different atypically developing populations, such 
as children with intellectual disability, to compare with children with ASD as well as 
children with typical development. This would extend the current research in testing
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the non-specificity claim o f false-belief understanding and provide an evaluation of 
the findings reported in this thesis.
To conclude, ASD is not a special case in which there is a dissociation of an 
individual’s ability to understand mental versus non-mental representations. Rather, 
children with ASD also process mental and non-mental representations with a unitary 
system of representational understanding. However, this system of representational 
understanding in ASD is impaired. Moreover, this impairment in ASD is independent 
of its language and executive dysfunctions. The possible underlying causes of this 
impairment are discussed in the following chapter.
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Chapter § General Discussion
In this chapter, I first summarise the results from the previous three empirical 
chapters and discuss them in terms of the theoretical issues outlined in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 1 provided a basis upon which I built up this thesis’s theme: Children’s 
understanding of false representations. The most frequently investigated false 
representation is false belief. However, whether children’s understanding of false 
beliefs is underpinned by a general system for understanding representations or a 
domain-specific mechanism for processing mental-related information is continuously 
debated. This debate is the focus of this thesis and it has two implications. One 
contributes to the theoretical account of cognitive development and the other extends 
to our understanding of the human brain. Results from the empirical chapters of this 
thesis are thus discussed regarding to these two implications. Based on this 
discussion, suggestions for future research are made in the last part of this chapter.
Summary of the Main Findings
In order to address the debate in question, the previous empirical chapters 
introduced new FS tasks as non-mental comparisons of different FB tasks to 
investigate whether children’s understanding of false beliefs is equivalent to their 
understanding of false signs through different experimental approaches. If 
equivalence was to be found that could not be explained by other alternatives except 
for a genuine understanding of representations, it would evidently support the general 
account of understanding false beliefs which suggests that both mental and non­
mental representations are processed with a unitary system o f understanding 
representations. Different experimental approaches include (1) manipulating 
children’s understanding of false beliefs versus false signs; (2) controlling 
confounding factors of language and executive function; and (3) comparing typical 
with atypical development in understanding false beliefs versus false signs.
Chapter 2 examined the equivalence by manipulating false-belief versus false- 
sign understanding through training and testing for transferability after training. Both 
Experiment 1 and 2 used the FB and FS tasks that were verbal and reality-known. 
These FB and FS tasks were found to be associated in both experiments. However, 
this association could be explained by a developmental coincidence between two 
distinct concepts, one for understanding mental representations and the other for
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understanding non-mental representations. Experiment 2 raised evidence against this 
possibility by showing a transfer effect from false-belief training to false-sign 
understanding and the contribution of false-sign training to the understanding of one’s 
own false beliefs.
Chapter 3 dealt with the equivalence by excluding the possible contribution of 
other cognitive skills that are normally required in both standard FB and FS tasks. 
Experiment 3 and 4 indicated that the association between tasks testing false beliefs 
and false signs remained significant when the demands of language and cognitive 
inhibition were minimised or eliminated. Furthermore, the association between the 
two tasks was also found to be present whether or not participants’ verbal mental age 
(VMA) was held constant, providing further evidence that language ability was not 
determining the relationship between the two tasks. Therefore, the association 
between the tasks probably reflects the same underlying representational 
understanding rather than language and cognitive inhibition processing.
Chapter 4 further explored the equivalence by testing its existence in a well- 
known type of atypical development -  Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), which 
impairs an individual’s mental-related processing, language and executive function, 
relative to that found in typical development. Experiment 5 showed that children with 
ASD were impaired in both non-verbal reality-unknown FB and FS tasks but the 
association between the two tasks remained significant no matter whether VMA or the 
non-verbal reality-unknown FP task was controlled. This suggests that children with 
ASD were not selectively impaired in understanding mental representations but 
generally impaired in understanding representations relative to that of typical 
developing children while general language ability, cognitive and executive functions, 
and ability in meeting task requirements were controlled with different measures.
To conclude, an association between the FB and FS tasks was consistently found 
in the series of experiments reported in Chapter 2 to 4. This association was also 
found in previous studies with different versions of FB and FS tasks and different 
samples of children (Bowler et al., 2005; Leekam et al., 2008; Parkin, 1994; Sabbagh, 
Moses, et al., 2006, Experiment 2). Hence, it has important implications for the 
theoretical account and neurological basis o f cognitive development.
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Developmental Accounts of Understanding False Belief: Domain-Specific or not?
In Chapter 1 ,1 outlined two developmental accounts for the understanding of 
false beliefs. One is the domain-specific account which indicates that false-belief 
understanding relies on an innate specific mechanism This mechanism matures 
according to its own timetable and is dedicated to mental-related information only 
(e.g., Leslie, 1987, 1994). As children possess this mechanism early in life, their 
failure on the FB task is due to their lack of other general cognitive skills required in 
the task, such as language and executive function. In contrast, the other account is the 
general system approach which suggests that children’s understanding of false beliefs 
depends on a general theory of representation (e.g., Pemer, 1991; Wellman, 1990). 
This general theory develops with age through experience and it supports children’s 
understanding of both mental and non-mental representations.
The consistent association between the FB and FS tasks found in previous 
studies and the series of experiments in this thesis obviously supports the general 
system approach. However, the experiments in this thesis added new evidence to the 
literature: (1) the general system for understanding representations develops gradually 
through experience; and (2) it sufficiently explains the equivalence between the FB 
and FS tasks, independent of other shared cognitive skills namely language and 
cognitive inhibition.
The argument in this thesis is that experience is key to development rather than 
natural maturation. Furthermore, other cognitive skills cannot explain the associated 
performance on the FB and FS tasks. Therefore, the position taken is that of a general 
system account. I discuss these two issues below in separate sections. I then extend 
the discussion on the general account of understanding mental representations to the 
conception of “theory of mind” and ASD.
Experience: Key of the development of metarepresentation.
In Chapter 2, Experiment 2 demonstrated a conceptual change in understanding 
representations through training and transferability between the FB and FS tasks. 
Evidently, the experience of repeated exposure of tasks and feedback that children 
gained over time from pre-test to training sessions is crucial to effect the conceptual 
change in understanding representations. Previous training studies on false-belief 
understanding also converged on the same conclusion that experience of repeated 
exposure of tasks and feedback that is incorporated and integrated over several
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sessions is important for the development of false-belief understanding (e.g., 
Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006; Appleton & Reddy, 1996; Lohmann & Tomasello, 
2003; Slaughter, 1998, Study 2).
The experience of repeated exposure of tasks and feedback also involved a 
social child-adult interaction component which may facilitate children’s conceptual 
change in understanding representations. Previous studies have demonstrated that 
children’s experience of social interaction has an influence on their development of 
false-belief understanding. For example, the well-known “sibling effect” suggests that 
children who have experience in interacting with older siblings illustrate an earlier 
understanding of false beliefs (e.g., Lewis, Freeman, Kyriakidou, Maridaki-Kassotaki, 
&Berridge, 1996; Ruffman, Pemer, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 1998). Longitudinal 
studies also indicated that family talk about mental states was related to later false- 
belief understanding (e.g., Brown, Donelan-McCall, & Dunn, 1996; Ruffman, Slade, 
& Crowe, 2002). Although the social interaction between a child and the experimenter 
in Experiment 2 was much less extensive than that between the child and his/her 
family members in everyday life, it was a possible factor of experience which children 
have gained through training and might have helped in enhancing their understanding 
of representation.
Although the experiments reported in Chapter 3 and 4 also involved several 
sessions with tasks, feedback and social interaction between children and the 
experimenter, no significant improvement was shown in typically developing 
children, especially on the FB and FS tasks. One might argue that this finding 
contradicted that o f Experiment 2. However, there is a fundamental difference 
between Experiment 2 and the experiments in Chapter 3 and 4 that may explain the 
difference in the effect of experience shown. That is, the experiments in Chapter 3 and 
4 did not screen children to ensure their lack o f false-belief understanding before 
inclusion. Without this manipulation, some typically developing children in these 
experiments may already have some kind of representational understanding so a 
significant improvement across sessions was less likely to occur. On the contrary, 
children with ASD in Experiment 5 reported in Chapter 4 significantly improved their 
performance across sessions, especially on the FB and FS tasks. Despite that, their 
mean performance across sessions was significantly worse than that of typically 
developing children, suggesting a fundamental impairment in understanding 
representations in ASD. All these findings, taken together, might suggest that
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experience is important for children who initially lack a conceptual understanding of 
representation, such as the typically developing children included in training in 
Experiment 2 and children with ASD, to gradually develop this understanding or 
improve task performance (as the findings in Experiment 5 did not suggest a 
conceptual change of representational understanding in ASD).
Other cognitive skills: Language and executive function.
The experiments in Chapter 3 and 4 indicated that the equivalence between tasks 
testing false beliefs and false signs was not due to shared demands of language and 
cognitive inhibition. Especially, the association between the two tasks remained, 
whether or not VMA was controlled, and regardless of whether the sample had a 
diagnosis of ASD. There is other evidence that language and cognitive inhibition 
might not be the crucial sources of difficulty for children in a false representation task 
based on the following logic. If language and cognitive inhibition placed a critical 
demand on children when they were tested with the standard FB/FS task, better 
performance on the non-verbal reality-unknown version of the task which did not 
require the comprehension of linguistic narratives and cognitive inhibition of 
knowledge about reality should have resulted. However, this was not the case. 
Experiment 4 in Chapter 3 showed no significant difference but correlation between 
the verbal reality-known and non-verbal reality-unknown versions of both FB and FS 
tasks. Call and Tomasello (1999) also found that children passed the non-verbal 
reality-unknown FB task at the same age as they passed the verbal reality-known FB 
task. Another study (Grant et al., 2007) which tested children with fragile X syndrome 
and children with intellectual disability yielded no significant difference between 
three types of FB tasks: (1) the non-verbal reality-unknown FB task, (2) a standard 
verbal reality-known FB tasks, and (3) Samson et al.’s (2005) non-verbal reality- 
known FB task.
Colle et al. (2007) further demonstrated a dissociation between children with 
specific language impairment’s language competence (very low level) and their 
performance on the non-verbal reality-unknown FB task (76% correct), suggesting 
that language and false-belief understanding are relatively independent. Other studies 
found that eliminating the demand of cognitive inhibition in the FB task did not 
facilitate 3-year-olds’ performance (Russell, 1996). In addition to language and 
cognitive inhibition, response inhibition and working memory might also not be an
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alternative explanation for children’s performance on false representation tasks. 
Results of Experiment 3 and 4 showed that where participants failed the false 
representation test trials of the tasks it was neither because of their difficulty in 
inhibiting their tendency to act according to the clues nor because of their difficulty in 
remembering and processing the sequence of the events while working out the 
location of the object. In a microgenetic study, children tested with a battery of 
response inhibition and false belief tasks every four weeks for six phases o f testing 
showed good performance on response inhibition before having a good understanding 
of false beliefs (Flynn, O’Malley, & Wood, 2004). Moreover, Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, 
Moses, and Lee (2006) showed that Chinese preschoolers had advanced executive 
skills but this advantage did not lead to advanced performance on the FB task. All 
these findings suggest that children’s performance on false representation tasks could 
not be reduced to their ability in language and executive function, but rather it is 
determined by a general conceptual understanding in representation.
The control trials of the non-verbal reality-unknown false representation tasks 
described in Chapter 3 and 4 teased apart the incidental executive demands of the 
tasks. This design of the tasks had three advantages. First, it allowed a check of 
whether children could meet the incidental executive demands. Second, it served as a 
measure of executive abilities to ensure an equality o f confounding variables between 
children with ASD with the comparison group. Third, it provided a means to evaluate 
the equivalence between the tasks in terms of their incidental executive demands. 
Performance on these control trials showed that the FB and FS tasks imposed similar 
levels of response inhibition and working memory demands on children. In this sense, 
response inhibition and working memory might explain part of the equivalence 
between the FB and FS tasks although language and cognitive inhibition have been 
found to be not involved. This is reasonable because the false representation test trials 
of these tasks involved the demands of response inhibition and working memory but 
not language and cognitive inhibition.
Compared to the non-verbal reality-unknown FB and FS tasks, the non-verbal 
reality-unknown FP task involved less working memory demand. This might be 
related to the different functions of photographs versus beliefs and signs. Photographs 
show situations at the time they are taken, whereas beliefs and signs represent 
whatever they are supposed to (usually up-to-date with respect to reality). Due to the 
changeability of beliefs and signs (especially mechanical signs like the one used in the
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non-verbal reality-unknown FS task and traffic lights), more working memory 
capacity might be required when reasoning about their false version than “false” 
photographs, which are fixed once they have been developed. Sabbagh, Moses, et al. 
(2006) also suggested that executive functioning may be required to think about 
representations that are intended to be up-to-date representations of reality, i.e., false 
beliefs and false signs but not “false” photographs.
To conclude, children may need language and executive function to reason 
about false representations but their success in reasoning about false representations is 
not determined by language and executive functions. The findings presented in this 
thesis consistently suggest that representational understanding is probably the key 
variable in dealing with false representations for children.
Theory of mind: An umbrella concept.
Understanding of false belief has been considered as a crucial aspect of “theory 
of mind” which has been broadened to comprise processing of all types of inner, 
mental and emotional states. Hence, the argument that understanding of false belief is 
a general ability of representational understanding would be contradictory to the 
notion that “theory of mind” is a domain-specific mechanism which is limited to 
mental-related information processing (e.g., Leslie, 1987, 1994; Leslie et al., 2004). 
However, this thesis underlines that understanding of false belief involves not only 
mental but also representational characteristics so it should be regarded as a separate 
aspect of “theory of mind” as previously suggested by Leekam et al. (2008), Pemer 
(1991), and Wellman (1990). This separate aspect o f “theory of mind” can be 
specified as “representational theory of mind” which is distinguished from “non- 
representational theory of mind” by the requirement to interpret a mental state as a 
representation. “Non-representational theory of mind” may thus include the following 
examples: gaze monitoring, joint attention, detection of intentional contingencies, and 
emotion processing, etc. Contrasting to “representational theory of mind”, “non- 
representational theory of mind” might be domain-specific as they are all restricted to 
social stimuli and seem to be dependent on specific neural circuitry (e.g., Blakemore, 
et al., 2003; Campbell, Heywood, Cowey, Regard, & Landis, 1990; Stone, 2005).
Further, other researchers suggest that “theory of mind” goes beyond the 
understanding of false belief to what has been called an “interpretive theory of mind” 
(e.g., Carpendale & Chandler, 1996; Chandler & Lalonde, 1996; Lalonde & Chandler,
119
2002). In addition to the appreciation that different people will hold different beliefs if 
they have access to different information (e.g., a false belief situation in which A has 
access to the previous location of an object while B has access to its current location), 
“interpretive theory of mind” involves the recognition that different people can make 
different interpretations of exactly the same information. For example, children by the 
age of seven to eight years come to understand that different people can interpret an 
ambiguous figure differently (e.g., A would say that is a duck while B would
say that it is a rabbit; Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). In other words, children by this 
stage do not only view the mind as passively accommodating to the world, but also 
view it as actively interpreting the world and constructively assimilating experience to 
its own knowledge structures. This more complex appreciation of the mind was also 
found to be related to executive function (Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Blattman, 2010).
The very broad set of “theory of mind” abilities, as Stone and Gerrans (2006a, 
2006b) and Gerrans and Stone (2008) has recently proposed, may thus depend on the 
interaction of domain-general mechanisms, such as metarepresentation, language and 
executive function, with domain-specific low-level cognitive mechanisms, such as 
gaze monitoring and joint attention. This argument against the domain-specific 
account of “theory of mind” seems to be in line with the findings and their 
implications discussed in this chapter.
ASD: What is its core cognitive impairment?
The differentiation between “representational theory of mind” and “non- 
representational theory of mind” not only has theoretical implication to the conception 
of “theory of mind” but also illuminates our understanding of atypical development. 
Although individuals with ASD are widely found to show poor performance on the 
FB task (for meta-analyses, see Happe, 1995; Yirimiya et al., 1998), this mental 
difficulty in ASD seems not to apply to every task concerning mental states. There is 
evidence that mental states which do not require a “representational theory of mind” 
are not as difficult as false beliefs for individuals with ASD. For example, their level 
1 visual perspective-taking is intact (Baron-Cohen, 1989c; Hobson, 1984; Leslie & 
Frith, 1988), and their understanding of simple emotions is not worse than that of 
other mentally retarded populations (see Begeer, Koot, Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, & 
Stegge, 2008, for a review). Castelli (2005) also indicated that individuals with ASD 
are able to recognize basic emotions (i.e., happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and
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surprise). Furthermore, there are several studies demonstrating that children with ASD 
are capable of understanding goals and intentions (see Hamilton, 2009, for a recent 
review), although they were also found to give explanations that were inappropriate to 
animated geometric shapes which moved interactively with implied intentions (Abell, 
Happe, & Frith, 2000; Castelli, Frith, Happe, & Frith, 2002). As a result, individuals 
with ASD may not be as impaired in “non-representational theory of mind” as they 
are in “representational theory of mind”.
As mentioned earlier, language is also impaired in ASD (e.g., Charman et al., 
2003; Lord & Paul, 1997), especially receptive language ability which is severely 
delayed (Ellis Weismer et al., 2010; Hudry et al., 2010). Could language delay be a 
central impairment which causes ASD’s deficit in “representational theory of mind”? 
Some evidence from research with deaf children who are raised by hearing parents 
and mastered sign language belatedly at school (late signers) in comparison to 
children with ASD provide support for this possibility. Deaf preshoolers with hearing 
parents show delays and deficiencies on the FB task which are comparable to those 
found in children with ASD (e.g., Peterson & Siegal, 1995; Peterson, 2004). By 
contrast, deaf children who are raised by deaf parents and have acquired sign 
language early in life do not show such delays. These findings suggest that a delay in 
language development affects the development of understanding false beliefs in both 
deaf children of hearing parents and children with ASD. However, counterevidence 
comes from further research by Peterson, Wellman and Liu (2005), using a “theory of 
mind” scale devised by Wellman and Liu (2004). Peterson et al. illustrated that late- 
signing deaf children, children with ASD, and typically developing children all 
followed the same sequence of early “theory of mind” development, which includes 
the understanding of (1) diverse desires (e.g., two persons have different desires for 
the same object), (2) diverse beliefs (e.g., two persons have different beliefs about the 
same situation), and (3) perceptual access to knowledge. Late-signing deaf children 
and typically developing children continued to progress from understanding (4) false 
beliefs to (5) hidden emotions, whereas children with ASD deviated in these later 
steps of development. Children with ASD showed a reversed pattern of having greater 
difficulty in understanding false beliefs than hidden emotions. This finding suggests 
that late-signing deaf children simply delay in “theory of mind” development due to 
their delay in language development. However, children with ASD demonstrate a
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different pattern of development, showing a central difficulty in understanding false 
beliefs which could not be simply explained only by language delay.
Individuals with ASD are also found to have executive dysfunction which has 
even been suggested to be the explanation for the manifestation of autistic symptoms 
by some researchers (e.g., McEvoy, Rogers, & Pennington, 1993; Russell, 1997). 
Could executive dysfunction underline the ASD deficit in “representational theory of 
mind”? Pellicano (2007) examined the pattern of false-belief and executive function 
impairments in children with ASD. Children who are impaired in false-belief 
understanding but not in executive function were found. However, there was no child 
who showed impaired executive function but possessed intact false-belief 
understanding. Pellicano (2010b) further investigated the longitudinal relationship 
between false-belief understanding and executive function in ASD. Consistent with 
her earlier study, the asymmetric relationship between false-belief understanding and 
executive function (i.e., early-emerging executive skills were associated with the 
progress of false-belief understanding but not the reverse) remained over a 
longitudinal period o f 3 years. Taken together, these findings suggest that intact 
executive function is necessary, but not sufficient, for the development of false-belief 
understanding in ASD.
Using a non-verbal reality-unknown FB task adapted from Call and Tomasello 
(1999), Colie et al. (2007) also indicated that children with ASD were significantly 
impaired in false-belief understanding relative to children with specific language 
impairment despite the fact that the demands of language and cognitive inhibition in 
the task were minimised and eliminated. Experiment 5 of this thesis presented in 
Chapter 4, extended this finding to false-sign understanding, suggesting a 
fundamental deficit in representational understanding in children with ASD which 
cannot be explained by their language and executive dysfunctions. However, how this 
metarepresentational deficit arises has not yet been established.
The Human Brain: Functional and Developmental Issues
Research on children’s understanding of mental and non-mental representations 
is also informative to the investigation of the human brain, including its function and 
its development. For example, following the findings from behavioural studies that 
children’s performance on mental representation task is equivalent to that on non­
mental representation task, a question has been raised about whether the brain shows
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similar equivalence in processing mental and non-mental representations (e.g., Pemer 
et al., 2006). Given that language and executive function are often confounded in 
standard mental and non-mental representation tasks, I formulated the question 
mentioned in Chapter 1: Is there a specific neural mechanism which selectively 
responds to mental rather than non-mental representations that is independent of 
language and executive demands? Further questions regarding development should 
also be investigated, e.g., does the brain change its way of processing mental and non­
mental representations across the lifespan? Having outlined these questions, this 
section attempts to extend this thesis which is based on behavioural experiments by 
incorporating recent evidence from previous neuroscience studies.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) has been found 
to be crucial for understanding both mental and non-mental representations in adults 
(Aichhom et al., 2009; Pemer et al., 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Powell, 
2006; Saxe & Wexler, 2005). More specifically, in studies with adults only, the right 
TPJ is more important for the understanding of false beliefs whereas the left TPJ is 
associated with both false beliefs and false signs (Aichhom et al., 2009; Pemer et al.,
2006). This finding might be interpreted as showing a neural equivalence in 
processing mental and non-mental representations as well as a specific neural 
mechanism which selectively responds to mental representations. However, I would 
interpret this finding as in line with the transfer effect between the FB and FS tasks 
reported in Experiment 2 of this thesis.
Before expanding on this further, another intriguing finding by Dahlin, Neely, 
Larsson, Backman, and Nyberg (2008) has to be mentioned. Dahlin et al. indicated 
that training on one cognitive task, which recruits the same brain region as another 
cognitive task, will enhance activations in that region and benefit its recruitment in the 
latter task, aligning with a behavioural transfer effect after training. Given that the FB 
and FS tasks are associated with the same brain region namely the left TPJ, it is 
possible that training on the FB task increases activations in the left TPJ which benefit 
its recruitment in the FS task, resulting in the transfer effect from false-belief training 
to false-sign understanding demonstrated in Experiment 2 o f this thesis. However, the 
FB task is not only associated with the left TPJ but also the right TPJ. Training on the 
FS task would probably increase activations in the left TPJ only which may not 
provide enough help for processing false-belief information, especially in processing 
information about other people’s false belief. Reasoning about others’ cognitive
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mental states and distinguishing oneself from others has consistently been shown to 
result in activating the right TPJ (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006; 
Saxe & Wexler, 2005; see Decety & Lamm, 2007, for a meta-analysis). This 
speculation backed up by related evidence offers a reason why Experiment 2 of this 
thesis found that false-sign training contributed to the understanding of one’s own 
false beliefs (i.e., the ‘self question of the FB task) but not other’s false beliefs. 
Another reason may come from the findings of Burianova, McIntosh, and Grady’s 
(2010) study, which suggested that the left TPJ is also involved in declarative memory 
retrieval. As the ‘self question of the FB task does not only require the understanding 
of one’s representational change but also places demands on the retrieval of one’s 
previous representation, the increased activation o f the left TPJ resulting from false- 
sign training may benefit its recruitment in answering the ‘self question rather than 
the ‘other’ question o f the FB task.
Although the above is mainly a speculation based on the findings o f recent brain 
imaging studies with adults only, there is one issue which is more certain. That is, 
both right and left TPJ are activated not only when processing false beliefs and false 
signs, but also during other cognitive processes. The left TPJ is also engaged in 
declarative memory retrieval, whereas the right TPJ is also involved in attentional 
reorientation (e.g., Mitchell, 2008; Serences et al., 2005). Thus, there might not be a 
specific neural mechanism which selectively responds to mental or non-mental 
representations that is independent of other cognitive processes. Although one could 
isolate the cognitive demands involved in the FB and FS tasks in a way described in 
Chapter 3, one might not be able to find a brain mechanism that is specifically 
activated for understanding false representations but not other cognitive processes.
Other brain regions that are activated in “theory o f mind” tasks, most of which 
involve false-belief scenario, are not specifically social either. For example, the 
posterior superior temporal sulcus (for meta-analyses, see Frith & Frith, 1999, 2003; 
for a recent review, see Carrington & Bailey, 2009). On one hand, the posterior 
superior temporal sulcus has been suggested to be concerned with biological motion 
(e.g., Pelphrey, Morris, Michelich, Allison, & McCarthy, 2005; Saxe et al., 2009). On 
the other hand, it is also illustrated to participate in predicting complex movement 
trajectories of any kind, e.g., two balls that moved in correlated trajectories which 
were determined by a mathematical algorithm (Schultz, Friston, O’Doherty, Wolpert,
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& Frith, 2005; Schultz, Imamizu, Kawato, & Frith, 2004; see also Kawawaki, Shibata, 
Goda, Doya, & Kawato, 2006).
Thus far, each brain region that has been mentioned is shown to be involved in a 
wide range of cognitive processes. Brain regions are also suggested to influence and 
be influenced by each other as well as its external environment across development 
(Friston & Price, 2001; Mareschal et al., 2007). The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) 
is an example. When engaging in tasks requiring mentalising, the mPFC is activated 
more extensively in children than adults, who however show greater activity in 
posterior temporal cortical areas (e.g., Blakemore, den Ouden, Choudhury, & Frith, 
2007; Kobayashi et al., 2007; Wang, Lee, Sigman, & Dapretto, 2006). Another study 
using event-related potentials (ERPs) also indicated that a left frontal negative slow 
wave which presumably reflects the prefrontal cortex’s activity was observed in 
adults and children who succeeded in belief reasoning, but these children’s activity 
had a more diffuse frontal scalp distribution than adults (Liu, Sabbagh, Gehring, & 
Wellman, 2009). Liu, Meltzof£ and Wellman (2009) further illustrated that a mid- 
frontal late slow wave and a right-posterior late slow wave were associated with belief 
judgments in adults. According to the interactive specialisation view (see Johnson, 
2005), the mPFC may start off by being extensively activated in a wide range of 
different contexts. However, the mPFC may change its response properties as it 
interacts with other brain regions in this wide range of different contexts during 
development. Johnson, Grossmann, and Cohen Kadosh (2009) further suggested that 
the mPFC may play a role in orchestrating the combinations o f other posterior brain 
regions activated for dealing with a given mentalising task. Once the mPFC has 
learned the appropriate pattern of activity in the posterior regions for succeeding in 
that task, the activity in the mPFC becomes less extensive while greater activity can 
be found in the posterior regions.
A developmental change in response properties of a posterior brain region was 
also demonstrated in one recent brain imaging study. Saxe et al. (2009) scanned 
children aged 6 to 11 years and found that the mPFC, TPJ, and posterior cingulate 
were recruited while they listened to sections o f a story describing a protagonist’s 
thoughts. However, only the right TPJ showed a developmental change in that it was 
recruited equally for both mental and physical facts about people in younger children, 
but only for mental facts in older children. Although the response profile in the mPFC 
did not change over this period of age, previously mentioned studies suggest the
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diffuse to focal shift in the activity o f the mPFC occurs later in development which 
extends to adulthood.
It is also important to note that studies using non-mental tasks also demonstrated 
similar developmental patterns of (1) shifting from diffuse to focal activity in the 
prefrontal cortex (e.g., Durston et al., 2006), and (2) changing response properties of 
posterior cortical regions (e.g., Brown et al., 2005). As a result, any functional 
selectivity o f a certain brain region observed in adults may not be innate but gradually 
become sophisticated in a narrower range of cognitive processes through experience 
during development (e.g., the right TPJ; Saxe et al., 2009). Moreover, it is more likely 
that several brain regions interact to support a particular set of cognitive functions.
These suggestions are also consistent with the evidence from the neuroscience 
studies in neurodevelopmental disorders such as ASD. Instead of having a deficit 
localised in a specific brain region, abnormalities are indicated in several cortical and 
subcortical regions in ASD (e.g., Rumsey & Ernst, 2000; McAlonan et al 2005). 
Importantly, an abnormal brain overgrowth trajectory was found as early as the first 
two years of life (e.g., Courchesne et al., 2001; Schumann et al, 2010; Webb et al.,
2007) which precedes the age of 2 years at which symptoms usually become apparent. 
In addition to grey matter (i.e., nerve cell bodies in the brain), white matter (i.e., 
connections between different locations o f nerve cell bodies in the brain) development 
is also anomalous (e.g., Herbert et al., 2004; Ben Bashat et al, 2007; Waiter et al,
2005). Moreover, there is a growing body of evidence demonstrating abnormalities in 
long-range, functional connectivity in ASD (e.g., Castelli et al., 2002; Cherkassky, 
Kana, Keller, & Just, 2006; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, Kana, & Minshew, 2007; Kana, 
Keller, Cherkassky, Minshew & Just, 2006; Kennedy & Courchesne, 2008; Kleinhans 
et al., 2008; Koshino et al., 2005, 2008). A more recent brain imaging study further 
showed that individuals with ASD continue to show developmental differences in 
interhemispheric connectivity into early adulthood (Anderson et al., 2010). Thus, any 
initial brain abnormalities that affect the processing of external stimuli early in life 
may further affect broader patterns o f connectivity between brain regions during 
development. This may offer a neural framework explaining how the 
metarepresentational deficit found in ASD arises.
It has been suggested that an early abnormality in the brain that leads to 
diminished attention to social stimuli, resulting in decreased relevant input and 
experience, has a cascading influence on the development of other cortical areas in
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ASD (e.g., Dawson et al., 2005; Johnson et al., 2005; Schultz, 2005). This suggestion 
was supported by recent studies which examined infant siblings of children diagnosed 
with ASD and found behavioural as well as neurological differences on eye-gaze, 
face, and object processing relative to infants with no family history of ASD (e.g., 
Elsabbagh et al., 2009; McCleery, Akshoomof£ Dobkins, & Carver, 2009; Merin, 
Young, Ozonoff, & Rogers, 2007; Presmanes, Walden, Stone, & Yoder, 2007). Given 
that social stimuli are often relevant to all sorts of social and cognitive learning, 
young infants who later received a diagnosis of ASD might have missed out various 
amount of input that is important for normal development of brain circuitry which 
subserves representational understanding. However, it is important to note that brain 
connectivity may change in relation to its interaction with external contexts across 
development. Therefore, any early training or intervention that may improve the 
affected processing of external stimuli may allow a reallocation of connectivity 
between brain regions.
In sum, there might not be a specific neural mechanism which selectively 
responds to mental or non-mental representations that is independent of other 
cognitive processes. Brain regions act together for a set o f cognitive functions and 
may change functionally in connections with each other and in relation to external 
contexts during development. Children may initially rely on several brain regions to a 
greater extent than adults for a given cognitive task. However, the activation and 
function of these brain regions could become progressively specific probably through 
the interactions between these regions and external contexts in a developmental 
process. If any brain region, connectivity or aspect of external contexts alters during 
development, so may the others and their associated functions change subsequently.
Suggestions for Future Research
In this final section, I make suggestions for further research based on the broad 
discussion on the implications of the empirical work reported. This thesis addresses 
the importance and the scope of representational understanding, which include other 
essential cognitive processes such as mentalising, language and executive function, in 
the context of typical and atypical development. Further investigation is required to 
clarify the acquisition and development of representational understanding. Although 
Chapter 2 presented a training study which suggests that experience is the key of the 
acquisition and development of metarepresentation, the kind o f experience gained was
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not specified (e.g., repeated exposure of representations, conflicting information, 
verbal instructions, or social interaction). Microgenetic studies are thus essential to 
investigate the change over the course of transition in representational understanding, 
especially on how the change occurs and what mechanisms or specific kinds of 
experience underpin the change. Although there are microgenetic studies that have 
been done on false-belief understanding (Flynn et al., 2004; Amsterlaw, & Wellman,
2006), neither of them has attempted to identify the specific kinds of experience that 
children have received in the study underpin the change of understanding. Moreover, 
according to the constructive viewpoint suggested by Carpendale and Lewis (2004), 
experience of social interaction has a significant influence on children’s development 
of understanding minds. The link between social interaction experience and the 
development of metarepresentation is therefore an important issue to be investigated. 
It would have implications not only in cognitive development but also in functional 
brain development given that the brain changes in relation to its interaction with its 
external environment.
The interactive specialisation view o f functional brain development also 
suggested that each brain region may change its response properties as it interacts 
with each other (see Johnson, 2005). Hence, the brain network that underpins 
representational understanding may become more sophisticated in processing 
representations or may even exhibit a less extensive activation for a specific type of 
representations as a child develops into an adult. However, this is just a speculation 
based on a specific view of functional brain development. Extensive research would 
have to be devoted to it before it could be established. Especially, whether it is the 
interactions between brain regions that affect the developmental changes in functional 
brain activity requires investigation.
Regarding atypical development of representational understanding, this thesis 
provides an example in examining children with ASD with a cross-sectional 
methodological approach which lacked a contribution in addressing the 
developmental change occurs in this particular type of atypical development. In 
particular, the question of how the metarepresentational deficit in ASD arises on 
behavioural, cognitive and neurological levels is essential to the conception and 
intervention of the disorder. I have suggested a neural framework which parallels to 
other models proposed by other researchers (e.g., Dawson et al., 2005) to explain the 
emergence of the social impairments and metarepresentational deficit shown in ASD.
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Again, it is a suggestion which requires further investigation. As a result, 
neuroscience and brain imaging opens a wide window into the functional brain 
development that is involved in understanding representations in both typical and 
atypical development.
In addition to individuals with ASD, exploring representational understanding in 
other populations with atypical development would offer an advanced understanding 
of that particular type of atypical development and extend the current research on 
representational understanding. Given that atypical development, as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, may factor apart the cognitive components which usually entangle with 
representational understanding, the influence of mentalising, language and executive 
function development on the acquisition and development of representational 
understanding can therefore examined more clearly. For example, having established 
a new non-verbal paradigm in Chapter 3 and 4, further investigation can be carried 
out with atypically developing children, such as deaf children with hearing parents to 
specifically explore the effect of having a delay in language development on the 
acquisition and development of representational understanding. As deaf children of 
hearing parents have been found to show better performance on the non-verbal FB 
task than the standard one (Figueras-Costa & Harris, 2001), it is expected that the 
same would be found on the non-verbal FS task and it would be significantly 
correlated with the non-verbal FB task. If this is the case, it would provide support for 
the findings and their implications presented in Chapter 3 and 4.
Conclusion
This thesis addresses the long-standing dispute between domain-specificity and 
domain-generality in understanding mental representations by critically investigating 
whether mental and non-mental representations are both underlined by the same 
competence of representational understanding. Novel tasks for assessing children’s 
understanding of non-mental representations were developed in comparison to mental 
representation tasks. In a series of experiments, children’s understanding of mental 
representations was consistently demonstrated to be equivalent to their understanding 
of non-mental representations. The equivalence exists in a stringent methodology, 
testing transferability after training, as well as a correlational methodology, with and 
without the involvement of language and cognitive inhibition. Moreover, it was also 
found in a group of children with ASD. These findings provide supports to the
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generality claim that understanding of mental representation is an ability of 
representational understanding which includes, but is not limited to, mental aspect.
I suggest that children’s understanding o f representations develops through 
experience during a process of conceptual consolidation and restructuring. On the 
contrary, children with ASD are impaired in representational understanding probably 
due to their early abnormality in the brain that affects social orienting. Both children 
with typical development and ASD may need language and executive function to 
reason about false representations but their success in reasoning about false 
representations is not determined by language and executive functions. In other 
words, language and executive function are necessary but not sufficient for 
understanding false representations in both typically developing children and children 
with ASD. Although the findings reported in this thesis favour the generality claim of 
understanding mental representation, there is a possibility that children after the age 
of 4 to 5 years may rely on a general understanding of representation in dealing with 
mental representations but then this general understanding may become progressively 
specific through further experience and brain development. Future research focusing 
on the development of understanding representations and functional brain changes are 
needed. Detailed investigations of the nature and scope of functional brain 
development will help develop cognitive and neural models of representational 
understanding and its relation to other social and cognitive processes.
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